

ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF Gilbert Murray

THE RT. HON. H. A. L. FISHER

SEÑOR S. A. de MADARIAGA

LT.-COL. CHARLES ARCHER

SIR HUBERT MURRAY

S. MARGERY FRY

PROFESSOR ALFRED ZIMMERN

JOHN MASEFIELD

EDWYN R. BEVAN

DAME SYBIL THORNDIKE

PROFESSOR F. M. CORNFORD

LORD CECIL

HARLEY GRANVILLE-BARKER

J. L. HAMMOND

PROFESSOR D. S. MARGOLIOUTH

BARBARA HAMMOND

MRS. W. H. SALTER

PROFESSOR J. A. K. THOMSON

PROFESSOR A. J. TOYNBEE

LONDON

George Allen & Unwin Ltd

MUSEUM STREET

FIRST PUBLISHED IN 1936

All rights reserved

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY
UNWIN BROTHERS LTD., WOKING

DEDICATION

Πολλ' ἀπαμαλδύνουσι παρερχόμενοι λυκάβαντες,
 κεῖ πρόσβυς τὰ πάρος καλά τις ἀμπολῆει,
ὅσσα τ' ἴδεν, νέος ὦν, ὅσα τ' εἰργάσαθ', ὅσσα τ' ἐώλπει,
 οὐκέθ' ὁ πρὶν λάμπειν φαίνεται ἡέλιος.
Ἀρχαίης θεράπων Μούσης, σὺ δὲ κάλλεσιν αἰεὶ
 συζῆς μυριετοῦς οὐκ ἀλέγουσι χρόνου,
ὥς προτερηγενέων ἱχνεύεις ῥήματ' αἰοιδῶν,
 ἐξηγῇ δὲ νέοις ἦν κυέει σοφίην.
Οὐ μὴν ἀστείπτω σύ γ' ἀτιμαγελῶν ἐνὶ κήπῳ,
 τῶν πάλαι ἀμφιέπεις Κεκροπιδέων θυμέλῃν,
ὥστε κακῶν ἀμελεῖν πολυήγαισιν παρεόντων
 σήμερον, οἷς πολέμου τάρβος ἐπικρέμαται,
ἀλλ' ἐς ὁμοφροσύνην σπεύδεις νόμῳ ἀστυφελίκτῳ
 δυσπειθέων συνάγειν ἔθνεα πάντα βροτῶν.
Εἰ δὲ φίλον τι ποθεῖς ἀπεόν, λάχος ὥς ἀνθρώπων,
 ἀλλ' ἔτι σοι στοργῇ τῶνδ', ἴδε, σῶς ἐτάρων,
οἳ νῦν ἔπτ' ἐτέων δεκάδας πεπερακότη χαρτῶν
 σοί, φίλ', ὀπάξουσιν γραμματικῶν στέφανον.

E. R. B.

PREFACE

THE ESSAYS which compose this volume have been contributed by friends of Gilbert Murray who considered that the occasion of his retiring from the Chair of Greek at Oxford was an opportunity for them to express, each in his own way, something of the regard and admiration in which they hold him.

Our book is produced simultaneously with *Greek Poetry: Essays to be Presented to Professor Gilbert Murray*, published by the Clarendon Press, a volume dedicated specially to Murray the Greek scholar by Greek scholars of the University of Oxford, while ours, its complement, covers nearly the whole field of his many-sided interests.

The editors desire to thank the contributors for the confidence reposed in them and Mr. Stanley Unwin for publishing a work produced for love and not for money.

J. A. K. T.

A. J. T.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
DEDICATION E. R. B.	7
PREFACE J. A. K. T., A. J. T.	9
PIGNUS AMICITIAE	13
The Rt. Hon. H. A. L. Fisher, <i>Warden of New College, Oxford</i>	
G. M.—W. A. 1895—1924	31
Lt.-Col. Charles Archer, C.S.I., C.I.E.	
GILBERT MURRAY AND SOMERVILLE	49
Margery Fry, M.A., LL.D., <i>formerly Principal of Somerville College, Oxford</i>	
PROFESSOR MURRAY AND THE AMATEUR PLAYER	63
John Masefield, O.M., LL.D., <i>Poet Laureate</i>	
GILBERT MURRAY AND SOME ACTORS	69
Dame Sybil Thorndike, LL.D.	
THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS UNION AND GILBERT MURRAY	79
Lord Cecil	
GLADSTONE AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS MIND	95
J. L. Hammond, D.LITT.	
THE BATTLE FOR OPEN SPACES	119
Barbara Hammond	
MAN AND LEVIATHAN	141
H.E. <i>The Spanish Ambassador in Paris,</i> Señor S. A. de Madariaga	
THE MACHINERY OF INDIRECT RULE IN PAPUA	157
Sir Hubert Murray, K.C.M.G., <i>Lieutenant-Governor of Papua</i>	
POST-WAR ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION: THE STORY OF A PROJECT	173
Professor Alfred Zimmern	

ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF GILBERT MURRAY

	PAGE
RHETORIC IN THE ANCIENT WORLD	189
Edwyn R. Bevan, D.LITT., LL.D.	
THE INVENTION OF SPACE	215
Professor F. M. Cornford	
ON TRANSLATING GREEK TRAGEDY	237
Harley Granville-Barker, LL.D.	
SOME PROBLEMS IN THE "ACTA JUDAE THOMAE"	249
Professor D. S. Margoliouth	
THE EVIDENCE FOR TELEPATHY	261
Mrs. W. H. Salter	
THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF CLASSICAL SCHOLARSHIP	279
Professor J. A. K. Thomson	
THE GREEK DOOR TO THE STUDY OF HISTORY	293
Professor A. J. Toynbee	

PIGNUS AMICITIAE

by The Right Hon. H. A. L. FISHER,
Warden of New College, Oxford

THEY TELL me, my dear Murray, that you will be seventy next winter, and though the thing is *prima facie* incredible and not to be believed on the mere word even of so great a historian as Arnold Toynbee, I am nevertheless compelled to give credence to the assertion, remembering that we were undergraduates of the same vintage and elected to Classical Fellowships at New College on the same examination and having only too good reason to know (for we are all exposed to birthdays) that I am myself recently accepted into the solemn company of septuagenarians. So what Arnold Toynbee has told me twice must be true. With your gifts of inspiration as fresh and powerful as ever, you are actually treading on the threshold of old age. As I ruminate on the years which have gone by since we first met as undergraduates and read Thucydides to one another under the stone pines at Ruta Camogli, you do not seem to me to have changed. Life which has brought you so many sorrows and disappointments has not quenched your ardour or narrowed the circle of your interests, or weakened your power of making fresh friendships or of throwing yourself into any new movement for the promotion of the public welfare. As an undergraduate at St. John's you were poet and scholar, liberal politician and social reformer, and ready to follow the light of reason wherever it might lead. So in your larger sphere you remain, reason sits unshaken on her throne, you have never admitted a challenge to her empire.

And none of your contemporaries is likely to forget the sensation which you created by winning the Hertford and Ireland Scholarships in your first term. As a freshman you were easily the foremost classical scholar in the University. But your friends, much as they admired and envied your classical accomplishments, did not think of you as they thought of other learned undergraduates. Your learning was carried so lightly as to be almost inconspicuous. Rather you were an entrancing companion, wonderfully gifted for receiving and communicating the enjoyment which may be won through good letters and game for every kind of light-hearted enterprise of the spirit. They will remember your finished speeches at the Union and the Palmerston. I still recall one Palmerston dinner when we had a specially strong team of famous orators (including Lord Granville) down from London and you made the hit of the evening. Those were days when political feeling ran very high in the country. There was Joe Chamberlain's radical, and, as we should all now admit, wholly admirable programme, and Gladstone's Home Rule Bill, and the Liberal split, and the failure of the campaign to relieve Gordon. We were both strong for Home Rule, but the main body of undergraduate opinion was the other way, and it must be confessed also that Gladstone was far from happy in his conduct of the Egyptian business. The Liberalism which you led with so much spirit and conviction among the undergraduates was very little to the mind of our seniors. Arthur Sidgwick and L. R. Phelps were Home Rulers, and a few others. Jowett was against us, and you will remember how redoubtable was Albert Dicey's championship of the Union. In the Easter vacation before Greats I joined you at a

little mountain inn near Rapallo, and there we spent a very happy three weeks, reading, bathing, climbing trees, and walking. After supper we read aloud to one another Mrs. Gaskell's *Wives and Daughters*, which I still think one of the best novels in the world. How much, too, we gained through our walks and talks with Leonard Hobhouse, a prince of good companions, and then in the full spate of his philosophical enthusiasm! He had just absorbed Wundt, and must have been one of the first young Oxford tutors (for he was then already a Fellow of Merton) to introduce the works of that eminent psychologist to our notice.

It was rumoured, with what justice I know not, that Margoliouth had made a vow that he would set papers in the Fellowship Examination at New College which would be calculated to extend Murray of St. John's. The other competitors were a little sore when they were given to understand the nature of the ordeal before them, for the papers were certainly hard. I still remember the admiration with which I read the rough copy which you showed me after the business was over of your rendering into Latin prose of a passage from Walter Pater's essay on Luca della Robbia. It was the piece which begins with the sentence: "These Tuscan sculptors of the fifteenth century worked for the most part in low relief, giving even to their monumental effigies something of its depression of surface, getting into them by this means a pathetic suggestion of the wasting and etherealization of death." Pater was then living in Brasenose College, and was perhaps next after Jowett the most widely influential of Oxford residents, though of course easily surpassed in his popular appeal by the author of *Alice in Wonderland*,

then a familiar figure in the streets of Oxford in his tall silk hat and flowing frock coat.

The New College Common Room when we both joined it as Prize Fellows was full of animation and good talk. Of those who are no longer with us, W. L. Courtney and Joseph Sylvester were the most outstanding, and delightfully ready to pursue any subject which might be brought into the discussion. How pleasant that first year of the Fellowship was! But, alas! Glasgow claimed you at the end of it: Jebb's Chair of Greek was awaiting you. During the ten years of your Glasgow Professorship you set yourself to master the whole corpus of Greek literature, besides giving lectures to your class which have left a durable impression upon all who heard them. The amount of distinguished work which you managed to accomplish during those years has never ceased to astonish me, and I do not wonder that it imposed upon you so great a strain that at the end of it you were compelled to give up the Chair under doctor's orders and to go into the country for a complete rest. I think that I have heard you say that the short history of Greek literature which you wrote as a very young professor no longer satisfies you. Be that as it may, at the time it delighted a wide circle of readers and gave them the wish to learn more.

The rendering of Euripides into English poetry was the occupation of your enforced leisure at Barford. How well I remember my visits to you there, and your readings from the play which happened at the moment to be on the anvil! To what a vast number of people in England, in America, and all over the world these plays, whether they were read or acted (and how beautifully they were acted by Penelope

Wheeler and others), opened out for the first time the whole territory of Greek literature! When the history of Greek studies in this country comes to be written, I surmise that the historian will lay stress on the Hellenic renaissance of the last two decades of the nineteenth century, and though he will mention many names, such as those of S. H. Butcher, A. W. Verrall, and Benjamin Jowett, as having contributed to the reviving of literary interest in Greek, he will assign to you by reason of your renderings from Greek drama the widest measure of influence.

We are always being reminded that we live in a scientific age, but the conquests of knowledge in the field of Greek antiquity which have been made since we were undergraduates together have been just as notable and surprising as the discoveries of our physicists and chemists. When in 1888 I induced you to relieve me of my copy of Müller's *Fragments of Minor Greek Historians*, I was under the impression that Greek history was more or less wound up, and that little more remained to be done than to collect a few more inscriptions and to weave a few more patterns out of the famous old historical textures of Herodotus and Thucydides, Homer and the dramatists and orators. How ill-founded were these anticipations was revealed a few years later when our friend Kenyon discovered Aristotle's lost treatise on the Athenian constitution, and so inaugurated the new age of the papyri. Since then the whole landscape of Greek history has been transformed, and our knowledge of every aspect of Hellenic life has become fuller and wider. We know more about Greek art and archaeology, Greek religion and Greek politics. The brilliant fragment of history which is lit up by the genius of

the literary artists has been placed in its true historical setting, with Sumerians and Hittites, Egyptians and Minoans, contributing the later pages to the prologue, while the epilogue is introduced by Paul of Tarsus. In all this active movement of speculation and discovery, so wide-ranging and multifarious, you have been in the forefront, prompt to seize the point of living significance in every detail and to make it familiar to your disciples. Whether you are dealing with Homeric origins or with the stages by which Greek religion melts into Christianity, you give to your readers not only the impression of a complete mastery of every relevant source of information, but of gifts of insight and ingenuity which make your writings on scholarship as exciting as the pages of a romance.

These observations are of course grossly impertinent in the *Festschrift*, to which so many distinguished Hellenic scholars will contribute. Let me pass, then, to an incident belonging to the autumn of our lives, when after the catastrophe of European Liberalism in the Great War and the miscarriage of so many of our hopes for the future, we who still cherished the flame of the Liberal faith found a common and congenial field of work in the service of the League of Nations.

I have in my possession a faded Swiss postcard, and on the back of it a photograph of nine elderly gentlemen seated round a horseshoe table, and the legend "Première réunion du Conseil de la Société des Nations à Genève, 14 Nov. 1920," followed by the names M. la Cunha (Brazil), M. de Léon (Espagne), M. Tittoni (Italie), M. Bourgeois (France), M. Hymans (Belgique), Sir Eric Drum-

mond, Sec.-Gén., M. Fisher (Grande Bretagne), M. le Vicomte Ishii (Japan), M. Caclamanos (Grèce). This, then, was the first Council of the League, composed as to half of it of Ambassadors, three of whom (Brazil, Spain, and Japan) were accredited to the French Republic and resident in Paris. Mr. Balfour, who should have represented Great Britain, did not make his appearance in Geneva till November 21st, so that the task of leading the British delegation during the first week of the Assembly fell to me. My colleague was my honoured friend George Barnes, who, though he was no longer a member of the British Cabinet, was rightly included in the delegation as a representative of Labour opinion and as one of the creators of the International Labour Office. There could have been no better choice. Barnes had and has a passionate belief in the ideals of the League. His strong and homely eloquence made a deep impression on the Assembly.

The time set for the opening of that first Council was 3 p.m. on Sunday, October 14th. The place was the Council Room in the Palais des Nations, which was afterwards destined to be the scene of so many interesting international discussions. Though the political weather was as far as possible from being favourable to our enterprise, for the United States had refused to join the League, and the atmosphere in Germany, which had been hopeful in April, had by November taken a decided turn for the worse, while Hungary and Ireland, Russia and the Near East, were quivering with hatreds, and the League was regarded with much suspicion by Spanish clericals as an atheist machine, we nevertheless felt that we were helping to launch a movement which, however im-

perfectly supported at the moment, had within it the seeds of great promise for the future. By degrees Europe would recover from the convulsions of war. The bitter animosities which divided the peoples would die down. Geneva would help to rally and confirm the influences hitherto scattered and disjointed, which in every community of the world are thrown into the scale of moderation and good sense. Not that the British delegates were under any illusions as to the moral and material difficulties confronting the League. Such illusions, had they ever been disposed to cherish them, would hardly have survived a dark and Rembrandtesque panorama of the New Europe and its appetites, which the Prime Minister had painted for their encouragement at a memorable meeting in Downing Street on Guy Fawkes Day. We went, then, to Geneva with chastened expectations, having little hope of speedy or spectacular victories, but persuaded that even in its imperfect and mutilated state the League might, under wise guidance, lay the foundations of a safer and better international order. The spirit of the Secretariat which had been brought together by Eric Drummond was splendid. At Geneva, for the first time in human memory, there was gathered together an organized body of men and women who might be described as Servants of Europe. The idealism and impartiality of the Secretary-General seemed to run through all the members of his staff.

A brilliant apparition enlivened the proceedings of our first Council meeting. By some accident, the nature of which I do not recall, the first item on our agenda was no matter of far-reaching principle, but a contest between M. Paderewski, then Prime

Minister of Poland, and Herr Salm, the tall, stiff German Burgomaster of Dantzig.

M. Paderewski is almost as wonderful in oratory as in music. Melody flows from his lips in an unending stream. On this occasion he was at the very top of his form. There had been a strike (most inconvenient to Poland) in the harbour of Dantzig. Not Disraeli denouncing Peel, not Gladstone denouncing Disraeli, could have exceeded the emotional expenditure of the great Polish pianist denouncing those German strikers. I can see him still, his golden hair falling in picturesque luxuriance round his sensitive face, his long body quivering with passion, his exquisite voice now rising now falling as he expatiated on the latest wrong done to his martyred nation. Some time afterwards, meeting Clemenceau at the British Embassy in Paris, I spoke of the great impression which the famous musician had made upon me as an orator, and asked whether I was right in thinking that his French was impeccable. The Tiger confirmed my impressions, adding that he only twice remembered to have wept tears: once when he heard of the Armistice, and again as he listened to Paderewski expounding the wrongs of Poland to the Peace Congress.

The later part of our Session, which was prolonged to the dinner hour, was less melodramatic and more serviceable. We discussed the composition of the Mandates Commission, the procedure to be followed at the Assembly, and the name to be proposed for the Presidential Chair. For this we settled on M. Hymans, who was doubly acceptable, not only by reason of the general respect inspired by his eloquence and integrity, but also as the representative of Belgium, which of all the nations in that first League Assembly

evoked by reason of the wrongs which she had been compelled to endure the warmest and most general sympathy. After dinner I summoned a meeting of the British Empire delegation to my rooms that my colleagues might learn what had happened at the Council meeting in the afternoon, and that they might be apprised of the grounds which made it desirable that they should support M. Hymans on the morrow. Though the delegates of the Dominions were much too independent to take their cue from Britain, they appreciated the opportunity which these informal meetings from time to time gave them of learning what was in the mind of the British delegation.

We had, of course, no secrets from the Dominions and no wish to dictate to them, but only to communicate our naturally greater knowledge of European affairs, and to secure, so far as might be, a certain community of spirit upon the largest issues.

A pleasant spirit of conciliation and reasonableness animated that first Council. Our leader, until the arrival of Mr. Balfour, was the venerable Léon Bourgeois, then President of the Senate, than whom France could have sent no better representative, for Bourgeois was not only the soul of honour but a fervent supporter of the idea of the League. The successful conduct of League business during the first three years of its existence was not a little due to Bourgeois's real devotion to the cause of peace and to the respect which he inspired. The best virtues of provincial France seemed to be embodied in this dignified grey-bearded veteran, who was never in better humour than when he regaled his colleagues with champagne grown from his own vineyards in

his official residence at the Luxembourg. Tittoni, the Italian, was manifestly ill at ease, for Italy was an unsatisfied Power; but of the future defection of Japan and Brazil we had on the occasion of that first meeting no indication. Viscount Ishii, most charming of men, was a firm and loyal adherent of League principles, and, despite difficulties with the French language, a helpful colleague. Before the end of the Assembly, however, there were faint indications that we might have trouble with Brazil, for this umbrageous and ambitious Power regarded herself as being insufficiently armed, having regard to the area and population of the country.

November is a gloomy month in Geneva, but the sun shone brilliantly for the first day of the Assembly. Everything looked cheerful. The great fountains were playing in the lake; the high snows shone beautifully in the distance. The streets were beflagged and crowded with residents and visitors anxious to identify the delegates as they walked to the Salle de la Reformation. You, my dear Murray, know that scene as well as I do: the huge ugly hall, with its drab grey and yellow walls, its two tiers of galleries (then packed to overflowing with journalists and spectators), the row of melancholy palms which decorated the dais, the little tables on the floor for the delegates, and the row of secretaries and experts who lined the walls. As was fitting we were, on that first day, welcomed by a representative of Switzerland. Then it was that the Assembly for the first time listened to the voice of Motta, who at once established himself as one of the best and most effective orators in Geneva. After the dull barbarities of the War it was refreshing to hearken to this eloquent Swiss-Italian from the Ticino, who

quoted Dante and alluded to Aeschylus. The day was dedicated to formalities, our one substantial achievement being the unanimous election of a President.

It was clear from the first that Italy was out of humour with her position. The Peace Treaties had given to her less than she considered to be her due, regard being had to her sacrifices during the War and to the crushing victory of Vittorio Veneto, which had brought the Austrian Empire to the ground. The price of coal was another grievance. Why, it was asked, should Italy go cold when other countries, more favoured by nature, could warm themselves cheaply by coal fires? Tittoni, a tall, straight, impressive figure with a resolute and spartan air, raised the question of an equitable distribution of the raw materials of the world. In conversation the second Italian delegate continually referred to it. There was no question, indeed, at that time so poignantly interesting to the Italians, or in their opinion so fit a subject for the remedial action of the League. Not a little of the disaffection to the League which prevails in Italy may be traced to its failure to give satisfaction to these far-reaching demands. What, however, asked the members of the British delegation, was a raw material? The selling price of coal was to the extent of over 80 per cent due to the cost of mining and distribution. With more justice might it be urged that the sun which ripened the Italian vineyards, or the water which provided power for their factories, belonged to the category of raw materials. It was easy, indeed, and a task eminently lending itself to the subtle dialectic in which Mr. Balfour excelled, to demonstrate the theoretical objections to the Italian thesis. But that the Italians, like many other peoples, had

and have a grievance against Providence I do not doubt. From inquiries, however, which I thought it my duty to make upon my return to England, it became clear that the price of coal in the Italian market was then determined not by the English but by the American supply.

As our debates proceeded, our French colleagues were relieved of one apprehension which had been very widely entertained in their country with respect to the rôle likely to be played by the British Dominions at Geneva. It was then commonly thought, and the allegation is repeated in the French Press to this day, that the presence of the Dominions in the Assembly secures a preponderance for the British interest. This, of course, is not the case, partly because unanimity is required for the decisions of the Assembly, and partly because the Dominions like to go their own way. Our Dominion orators were very eloquent during that November month. They talked often, they talked at length, and they talked about all kinds of subjects. But what delighted and surprised the Latins was the unexpected discovery that the Dominions did not hesitate to differ from Great Britain. In finance they were great economizers. I remember how, on December 7th, M. Hanotaux, the well-known historian who was the third French delegate, came to me to complain of the difficulties which the delegates from the Dominions were raising in the Conference on the budget. "L'Angleterre," he said, "est un poulet qui a enfanté des canards qui font beaucoup de bruit et jettent de l'eau aux yeux."

The Dominions had a point of view which was not very much to the taste of the League secretariat. Canada was afraid of Article x, and just as appre-

hensive of being drawn into European entanglements by the Covenant as the United States. It was common form among our délégués from overseas to denounce the Peace Treaties, and to shrink, much to the concern of the French, from any interpretation of the Covenant which should seem to commit them to the automatic support of the *status quo*.

The one really passionate debate in the Assembly was occasioned by a motion introduced at the instance of an illustrious absentee. General Smuts had been one of the architects of the Covenant. He had served in the British War Cabinet, had led an army in East Africa, and had publicly registered his disappointment at the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. It was as his representative that Lord Robert Cecil sat in the South African delegation to the Assembly. And it was at his prompting that Mr. Blankenberg, another South African delegate, proposed on the afternoon of Wednesday, December 16th, that Germany should be admitted to the League. The motion, which released a great pent-up volume of emotion, was pressed with burning eloquence by Motta. Switzerland, indeed, with its large German population, could not fail to be favourable to any plan likely to promote the reconciliation of the Latin and Teutonic peoples. But Swiss idealism found no echo in France. No sooner had Motta resumed his seat than Viviani dashed to the platform, and in an improvised speech of glittering and finished periods expounded the French philosophy of the situation. He told us how much he desired to see the League made universal, how greatly he would welcome the adhesion of the United States, how Russia and Germany would be welcomed also when the League could feel assured

that they would fulfil their treaties, but how Germany in particular must first show that she was willing to respect the obligations which she had incurred at Versailles. The magic of the great French orator swept the Assembly off its feet, but there were some who thought that the longer the admission of Germany was delayed the more difficult would it be for the Germans to regard the League as other than an alien thing and a machine for French and Slavonic policies.

Looking back upon that first Assembly of the League, I can see that it accomplished much good and necessary work of a preliminary kind. The instrument created by the Covenant was made to function. The procedure of the Assembly was fixed. The Mandates Commission was set up. A beginning was made of international government in certain regions and with respect to certain subjects. Against the dark background of European barbarism the civilized interchange of views at Geneva constituted a bright point of light. Yet the gravest questions remained unsolved. The League turned away from the vast problem raised by the Italian delegates of the redistribution of the raw materials of the world. It refused even to accept with unanimity Dr. Lange's resolution for the limitation of armaments for two years. It did nothing to close the breach between France and Germany. A sharp division disclosed itself between the French and the Canadians as to the obligation of member States to observe Article x of the Covenant, the Transatlantic peoples being determined never again, if they could help it, to be drawn into European struggles, and France being on her side fiercely desirous of obtaining from the League a common

agreement to use all the sanctions of the Covenant for the maintenance of the *status quo*. When we broke up on Saturday, December 19th, with the snow lying thick upon the ground, I felt that while the League offered to its member States an incomparable instrument for the improvement of international relations, it would not, of itself, produce the moral disarmament of the world.

In the absence of Germany and Russia, the leadership of the Assembly had naturally fallen to the heads of the British and French delegations. It was, therefore, a great stroke of good fortune that Mr. Balfour and M. Bourgeois entertained for one another the warmest sentiments of friendship and respect. The French and British delegations worked together in harmony, each comprehending that on certain points differences existed, but each realizing that what was important for the success of the League was that both Powers should march together in a spirit of conciliation as long as possible. As an orator in the Assembly A. J. B. made a great impression. His fine appearance, his musical voice, his reputation as a statesman and a philosopher, his social charm, won for him general favour. The well-balanced and moderating counsels which he gave to the Assembly, often after preliminary discussions with the French emissary, were much appreciated. More particularly did the Assembly enjoy those occasions on which the first British delegate found himself at variance with the eloquent and indefatigable, but also happily irrepressible, delegate from South Africa. "Ah, votre Lord Robert Cecil," exclaimed Viviani to me, "qu'il est sentimentale et compliqué! J'ai perdu un kilo de cervelle en discussions avec lui!"

The lofty vein of Anglo-Saxon idealism which Lord Robert was able, the more freely since he had no Cabinet responsibility, to represent in these Geneva discussions was quite incomprehensible to our Latin friends. And so, I greatly fear, it still remains.

On the last day of the first session the Assembly received ocular proof that the first step towards the healing of the broken unity in Europe had been taken. Count Mensdorf, the Austrian Ambassador in London at the outbreak of the War, and for many years a most popular figure in London society, appeared at the head of the Austrian delegation. With charming courtesy he came up to our British table and thanked me for having proposed the admission of his country, and then passing straight to the Australians, one of whose delegates had spoken in opposition, made himself known to them and conquered their esteem. The Austrians, in the dark hour of their misfortune, could have sent no better or more acceptable delegate to Geneva than this distinguished and experienced diplomatist of the old school. Later on, in 1922, when the British delegates at the League were much occupied with the financial restoration of the Austrian republic, they received much help from Count Mensdorf.

Fifteen years have passed since that memorable first meeting in Geneva. In that period the League has rendered many services and achieved some striking victories. It is difficult to believe that the world will ever consent to discard an instrument for the transaction of international business which has so often proved its value. But there are dark clouds on the horizon. Among the Germans and Italians a philosophy of education is now preached which is wholly at vari-

ance with the ideals of peace-loving men and women. The League's Committee of Intellectual Co-operation to which you, my dear Murray, have given so much devoted labour, has not yet succeeded against the powers of darkness. Yet may we not take comfort from the lessons of history? The new barbarism is not more formidable than the forces which in the first ages of the Christian era confronted the teaching of the Church.

G. M.—W. A. 1895-1924

by Lieut.-Col. CHARLES ARCHER

I

"IS HE like Burke, who winds into a subject like a serpent?" burst out Goldsmith, interrupting one of Boswell's dithyrambs on Johnson's marvellous powers. "But," replied Boswell triumphantly, "Johnson is the Hercules who strangled serpents in his cradle." The retort has been quoted as one of Bozzy's most glaring ineptitudes; yet here, as so often, while seeming to bungle, he manages to hit the nail on the head. At the cost of a daring mixture of metaphors he brings out the distinction between two types of intellect—the one strong in patient, discriminating apprehension and analysis, the other in trenchant, intuitive penetration—one skilled in disentangling knots, the other more apt to cut them across.

Two men of these opposite, or complementary, types came together in 1895, when Gilbert Murray and William Archer sought each other out, brought together in the first instance by their common interest in drama. "Murray is my host here," wrote Archer from Sheringham in July of that year; "Professor of Greek at Glasgow—a young Balliol man [for Balliol read St. John's], first-rate scholar, I believe, and an exceedingly nice fellow. I came across him through Charrington, who sent me a play he had written, *Carlyon Sahib*, a curiously grim and powerful, though unskilful, piece of work, which interested me very much. Then Murray came to see me, and we discussed the play, and he showed me

another one, not nearly so good, and I sat upon it, and we struck up quite a friendship."

It might well have seemed unlikely that the friendship so begun—between two men so diverse in training and faculty, one a fine product of academic culture, steeped in the classical tradition, the other largely self-educated, and with no great respect for the English academic discipline—would last for half a lifetime and grow closer with the years. Yet so it was to be. Their points of likeness and sympathy, indeed, were so fundamental that their differences could not weaken the alliance, but rather served to make it fruitful. Both were men of character in the Emersonian sense—"a person who is rich; so that I cannot think of him as alone, or poor, or exiled, or unhappy, or as a client; but as perpetual patron, benefactor, and beatified man." Both were men of goodwill, believing in the possibility of progress and devoted to its cause. And they had in common the love of beauty, wherever found; a keen and kindred sense of humour; and (as the characteristic phrase "I sat upon it, and we struck up quite a friendship" shows) the strength of mind to base their relation on complete candour.

Very early in that relation the older man laid his finger on the gift that was to shape one of Murray's chief contributions to the culture of his time—his genius for what may be called the creative interpretation of classical literature and life. "At last I have read your paper,"* Archer writes in November 1895, "with the deepest interest. It heightens my eagerness (that is really the word) to see your *Greek Literature*; for it seems to me you have a peculiar gift, if I may

* Address to the Edinburgh Philomathic Society.

say so, for bringing the workings of the antique imagination into vital relation with our modern imagination. It may seem to you a curious comment on my former mental state, but I feel as though the few hours' talk I had with you at Sheringham on these subjects had brought me nearer Greece than all my previous reading in Greek (with which I had never more than an idle schoolboy's nodding acquaintance), English, or German. It was almost like a visit to the Greek city in your romance*—a touch of living intercourse with a man to whom antique civilization was not only intellectually comprehensible but sensationally real. (Sensationally is not the word I want, but I haven't time to hunt up the right one.)"

Throughout the correspondence of these early years, amid references to the daily interests of the two men—to the fortunes of *Carlyon Sahib* (which, after many adventures among managers and would-be managers, at length in 1899 reached the stage, only to prove too "grim" for the public of that day); to Archer's Ibsen translations and the Ibsen productions, in which Murray takes a lively interest; and to current literature—this theme of Murray's calling and election as interpreter of the classical spirit keeps recurring. Before long Archer, with the instinct for helpful criticism that was inborn in him, has cast himself for the rôle of the intelligent though uninformed commentator, qualified to render assistance by his very ignorance—which, as was his habit, he stresses and exaggerates. "Please tell your husband," he writes to Lady Mary Murray in October 1896, "that I hope he will let me read the proofs of the *Greek Literature* when they come in—mainly for my own

* *Gobi or Shamo: A Story of Three Songs*, 1890.

pleasure, but partly, too, because none of his other friends, probably, is so thoroughly qualified to regard the thing from the standpoint of the ignoramus, who must, of course, be taken into account." And again, to Murray, when the proofs have begun to reach him: "I propose to read and mark these proofs just as if they were my own. I know you will forgive the impertinence of the proceeding, and glean what advantage you can from it."

The book, *Literature of Ancient Greece*, appeared at the beginning of 1897. Evidently, as was natural, Archer's criticisms and remarks on the proofs had been mainly verbal, for the only criticism of substance that appears in the correspondence comes, not from him but from Graham Wallas. Murray had written: "My enemies stood together and raged, saying that the 'i' of Leptines was short. What was worse, they produced very good evidence; so that some of my oldest friends were thinking of cutting me. But by long prayer and diligent searching I have confounded them. There is a featherweight of probability in favour of its being long. But what a danger to have been through!" "I congratulate you," Archer replies, "on your victory in the Battle of Leptines. Wallas tells me that L. was a man, but there his information ceases; and as Wallas himself has your book just now, I am not in a position to look him up. Wallas is enthusiastic about your Thucydides chapter; and likes the book as a whole very much, though he says you are unsympathetic to Sophocles and Aristotle. I suggest that A. is more or less outside your scheme; Wallas replies that if you'd cared much about him you'd have got him in somehow."

In the enterprise that soon followed Archer was

able to offer more than verbal criticism. In answer to a suggestion of his that it might be possible to re-utilize some of the Greek tragic themes—"I mean, as it were, to take the wigs and high-heeled shoes off the people in *Andromaque*, make them Greek in costume and *allgemeinmenschlich* in speech, and construct the play according to the more vivid and *mouvementés* methods of the modern drama"—Murray writes: "About rewriting Greek plays—it is an idea that has often been in my mind. I think there are two possible ways. One, to take the saga as your basis, and treat it in a Sophoclean spirit, with more liveliness and use of the freer conventions and greater resources of the modern stage. It would have to be in verse, I think. The other way would be to go a step beyond Euripides; to take the real facts and characters that are implied in a story like that of the Andromache or the Agamemnon—every bit of which might, in a sense, really have happened—and treat it realistically. It should produce something like *The Vikings at Helgeland*, and should, I think, be in prose. I have often wished to try this."

Soon the two were plunged into discussion, in correspondence, and, when they managed to meet, on walks and bicycling tours, of the relative merits of these two methods—Archer pressing the claims of verse and the more ideal treatment, Murray inclining more and more to prose and realism. These in the end carried the day, and the drama shaped itself somewhat on the lines of a (rather more realistic) Ibsen saga-play. Nineteen sheets of notes and numerous letters conveyed to the author Archer's criticism of the first draft—criticism mainly directed towards clarifying the emotional processes and softening

touches of primitive realism which modern audiences would be likely to find grotesque. "The more ignorant an audience is," he wrote, "(short of absolute illiteracy) the more rooted will be its preconception of a heroic age about as like your picture of it as the Arthurian age of the Idylls is like any possible historic period in which Arthur can be placed. That's where I think my value to you comes in. I am more or less in the mental condition of the average audience, and see more clearly than you what it is likely to stumble at."

After extensive revision by the patient author, the play eventually emerged as the interesting and beautiful experiment, *Andromache*, with a prefatory letter to the critic, giving its genesis, and suitably acknowledging "many gifts of friendly encouragement and critical objurgation." But the exacting critic evidently still hankered after the ideal treatment. After pointing out, in his notice of the production by the Stage Society (March 1901), that *Andromache* herself—"a noble, beautiful, and very moving figure"—is clearly a product of pure imagination in a more or less realistically primitive setting, he goes on to say, as to the theatrical effect: "Wherever he [the author] appeals direct to the imagination, he moves us; where he appeals to the imagination through the historic sense, he interests the more intelligent among his audience, bewilders the less intelligent, but leaves all alike unmoved."

Meanwhile the correspondence flows on, with ripples of laughter enlivening the record of hard work. "I am now," writes Murray, "doing an *apparatus criticus*—compiled from various sources and sifted—to Euripides. Rather fun; except correcting the spelling, which is work for Chinamen." "What is an *apparatus criticus*?" asks Archer in his reply. "To

the natural man it suggests either a butter-ladle or a bludgeon." "An *apparatus criticus*," the explanation comes, "is a list of the MS. variations, with occasional remarks thereon. Only men of the highest moral character, religion, and social grace can produce one satisfactorily."

Many of Archer's letters are concerned with the struggles and the fortunes, mainly disappointing, of the New Century Theatre, the organization started and carried on in these years by himself, Miss Robins, and others, for producing plays of merit unlikely to reach the commercial stage; and Murray is constantly ready to assist with sympathetic advice and with a much larger measure of practical support than his friend is prepared to accept. Answering a letter in which he suggests a bolder policy for the enterprise, and offers to make a substantial investment towards providing the funds for such a policy, Archer writes: "I am genuinely touched by your letter, which chimes in, to a certain extent, with a good deal that I have been thinking and feeling. Not that I could ever dream of letting you invest £——, or a tenth part of that, in anything I was concerned with; for I have the gift of unpopularity in a marked degree—I mean of liking, and doing, the unpopular thing. But it has been borne in upon me of late that the principle of the N.C.T. is unsound; and that is the reason why I look forward with complete equanimity to winding it up as soon as its absolute promises are fulfilled."

The New Century Theatre, however, was not to expire till it had to its credit one achievement which, together with its memorable production of Ibsen's *Little Eyolf*, gives it a claim to a place in theatrical history. About the turn of the century Archer had

heard Murray read, in the course of a lecture on Euripides, some extracts from a verse translation of the *Hippolytus*; and "there and then," he wrote later, "I felt that he had found a satisfying solution of the problem of reproducing in English the very life and movement of a Greek tragedy. My acquaintance with translations was unfortunately extensive, and in none of them had I found any approach to the vitality of Mr. Murray's work. The best of them had the deadness of a plaster cast; this was living, breathing poetry." And, when the whole play was in his hands: "I am entirely confirmed in my impression that this is the best—most readable, comprehensible, and delightful—rendering of a Greek play I ever came across. I also think that it could be made highly effective on the stage, though it would 'ask' some money. Oh, why haven't we a decent theatre? . . . As to the N.C.T. I can say nothing for the present . . . but I am not without hope that we might be able to tackle it."

More than three years passed before the hope was fulfilled; but the delay was fortunate, for, when at last the directors of the New Century Theatre were in a position to tackle the play, they were able to enlist Harley Granville-Barker as producer; and the performance was so strikingly successful that when, the same autumn, the historic Vedrenne-Barker management opened at the Court Theatre, the *Hippolytus* was the first play given. The *Trojan Women*, the *Electra*, and the *Medea* followed, and the impulse had been given for the whole stately series of translations which has enabled thousands of lovers of poetry and drama to rejoice in masterpieces for which they could otherwise never have had any feeling warmer than a distant respect.

It was for these lovers of literature, unable to enjoy Greek drama in the original, that Archer spoke in his notices of the plays. Then and later many critics, both scholars and would-be scholars, have objected to Murray's departure from what they conceive to be the strict classical form—to the "romantic" tinge given to the translations by the use of rhymed verse carrying with it associations of Morris and Swinburne. For Archer, apart from the grace and beauty of the choric passages (not for nothing was the translator a kinsman of W. S. Gilbert, that master of rhythm and rhyme)—the great virtue of the renderings, that which made them living literature instead of mere academic exercises, lay precisely in the vehicle chosen for the dialogue—Chaucer's riding-rhyme, rescued, as Morris had already shown that it could be, from the hardening process it had suffered in the "heroic couplet" of Dryden and the eighteenth-century poets, and from the degrading associations of pantomime and burlesque. "At first sight an undramatic measure," the critic writes, "it is in reality admirably suited to Mr. Murray's purposes. Greek tragedy demands to be clothed in a formal, decorative beauty scarcely attainable in English without the aid of rhyme. A very great poet might no doubt attain it in blank verse; but that noble measure is so intimately associated with Elizabethan drama as to bring with it, when applied to Attic tragedy, a wholly incongruous atmosphere. What one requires in the theatre is, so to speak, a certain pressure of pleasurable sensation to the square inch—or rather to the minute. In Greek tragedy we can seldom expect to receive this pleasure from the rapid and bustling action, the swift interchange of cut-and-thrust dialogue, to which we are

accustomed on the modern stage. Except for brief passages of 'stichomythy,' character is portrayed and emotion uttered in long speeches, the dramatic effect of which required in Greek, and requires in English, the reinforcement of highly wrought and continuous verbal beauty. It is in giving us this verbal, this musical, beauty, combined with clearness, terseness, and dramatic point, that Mr. Murray has so admirably revived the work of the poet he loves. . . . In the harmony and equipoise of its parts, the play [*Hippolytus*] is constructed like a noble piece of architecture; but we are misled by a false analogy if we think that it should rely for its attraction on this architectonic quality alone. Euripides gave it a high surface decoration as well, and it is by dint of reproducing this beauty of detail in his subtly modulated and free-moving verse that Mr. Murray has given it a new hold upon the sympathies of the modern reader and hearer.

"To show how different is Mr. Murray's verse from that 'heroic couplet' which Dryden at one time tried to make the vehicle of English drama . . . and which has since been put to the ignoble uses of burlesque and pantomime, let me contrast a passage from Dryden with the first six lines spoken by Hippolytus. Indamora in *Aureng-zebe* thus addresses Morat:

Dare to be great, without a guilty crown;
View it, and lay the bright temptation down;
'Tis base to seize on all, because you may;
That's empire, that, which I can give away:
There's joy when to wild will you laws prescribe,
When you bid Fortune carry back her bribe:
A joy, which none but brightest minds can taste,
A fame, which will to endless ages last.

This is very fine; I choose it as an admirable specimen of Dryden's vigorous, flowing manner; and place beside it Hippolytus' address to Artemis, not arguing that it is better, but that it is utterly diverse:

To thee this wreath'd garland from a green
And virgin meadow bear I, O my Queen!
Where never shepherd leads his grazing ewes,
Nor scythe has touched. Only the river dew
Gleam, and the spring bee sings, and in the glade
Hath Solitude her mystic garden made.

Though both these passages are written in what are technically described as rhymed pentameters, they could scarcely be more unlike each other in cadence and effect. Dryden's verses flash and ring; Mr. Murray's glow and quiver. Thus the common prejudice against rhyme on the stage, founded solely on the heroic couplet, has no application to the verse of the *Hippolytus*. That must be tried on its own merits. . . ."

"The medium, of course," he says elsewhere, "is not everything. Many a scholar might have conceived the idea of rendering Euripides in Morrisian rhyme, whose attempts would have seemed to demonstrate the unfitness rather than the fitness of that medium. Something must be allowed for Mr. Murray's tact and fertility of resource in handling the measure; much—very much—for his intimate and sympathetic understanding of his original. Nor must we leave out of sight the rich and varied beauty of the lyric measures in which he renders the choruses. But, when all is said and done, the feature which distinguishes Mr. Murray's translations from all their predecessors, and gives them a hitherto unrivalled vitality and

charm, is his choice of the meandering rhymes of Chaucer and Morris. . . ."

The wide acceptance of these translations has shown that in this instance Archer had his finger on the popular pulse. "By a lower but loving likelihood" the case may be compared with that of FitzGerald's version of Omar Khayyám. Lovers of the original *Rubá'iyát* may find that version open to criticism at many points; but who that has ever tried to read any of the more literal renderings can doubt that, in putting much of himself into his version and making it a poem and not a slavish reproduction, FitzGerald deserved well of the old tent-maker and of both Persian and English literature?

II

With Gilbert Murray's translation to Oxford, soon after the turn of the century, and Archer's release about the same time from the strictest bondage of theatrical journalism, the alliance between the two men enters on a new phase. It is as intimate as ever—indeed the two are able to meet and supplement their lively correspondence by personal talk more frequently than before. But the talk and correspondence, which hitherto had dealt mainly with literature and the stage, gradually come to be concerned more and more with wider issues.

In the struggle for the removal or reform of the theatrical Censorship and in the Simplified Spelling campaign—causes which Archer had much at heart, and in which he did much to enlist Murray's co-operation—it may appear, on a superficial view, that their energies were largely wasted. But though the

Censorship stood, seemingly unshaken, it has, since those days of strife in 1906-9, and doubtless largely as a result of them, to some extent taken thought and mended its ways; while the Spelling Reform movement, lost, to all seeming, with many greater causes, in the hurly-burly of the War years, may yet again uprear its drooping head in quieter times, if those should ever come.

But, as the comparative peace of the Victorian age receded, and clouds gathered both at home and on the world-horizon, the attention of both men came to be more and more directed to public affairs and world politics. In this sphere, their agreement being much more complete than on questions of literature and drama, it would be hard to say which of them influenced the other. From very early youth, even while, borrowing Mr. Yellowplush's delightful phrase, he could still describe himself as a "pokerkranty on plitticle subjix," Archer had been to all intents a disciple of Mill, and had nourished a hearty instinctive hatred for what may be called Carlylism—the worship of force—in politics, and for Carlyle himself, in so far as he was the apostle of that creed. In early works, both published and unpublished, he gives vent to this feeling in attacks, ranging from boyish lampoons* to serious, reasoned onslaughts, on

* As, for instance, in these two contributions to a series of "Recipes" compounded by some of his Edinburgh friends and himself:

IV

A Hero by C-rl-le

When a man shows his faith in the justice of God
By riding o'er other folks' justice rough-shod;
And by the exertion
Of calm self-assertion,
Brings every dissentient under the rod;

[Continued on page 44]

that great 'sower of dragons' teeth—though he can hardly have foreseen the luxuriant rankness that the crop was to attain under intensive cultivation in Germany and elsewhere. By the time he encountered Murray he had moved far along the path on which anti-Carlylism may be said to have set his feet, and, with less detailed knowledge of public affairs, held opinions in substance identical with his friend's strong, sane, considerate liberalism.

Here, again, the two men reinforced and supplemented each other. Murray, more in touch with the workings of home politics, could keep his friend informed as to these, while, in the roving missions on which from this time Archer was largely engaged, he may be said to have acted (unconsciously, of course) as a sort of Commissioner to report to Murray on oversea conditions and problems. The books* which gave the results of these journeys, though they might make no wide appeal, were sure of one careful reader, who, however he might criticize points of detail, was

Continued from page 43]

We say, if he tyrannize well and successfully,
 "The more fools the rest, and, for him, why the less fool he."
 So, so, Galba or Nero,
 More favoured by fortune, had made a good Hero.

V

An Essay by Ditto

First catch your true hero (see Recipe IV);
 Lard well with stock phrases of Germanized lore;
 Deal largely in "verities"
 And "silent sincerities"
 On "babblings" and "brabblings" your scorn-vials pour;
 The science dubbed "dismal" denounce with scurrility;
 From "fire-deeps abysmal" hurl bolts at "utility"—
 Thus, thus, prove the inanity
 Of aught but brute force in the things of humanity.

* Such as *America Today*, *Thro' Afro-America*, *Francisco Ferrer*, *India and the Future*.

prepared by kinship in spirit to accept their main theses. The most important of those books, *India and the Future*, Murray had read and criticized in proof long before its belated publication. With obvious reference to it, he writes in 1916, when Archer had sent him a proposed reply to an "Indian Politician" who, apropos of Murray's lecturing tour in the North, had been attacking British rule in India in the Scandinavian papers: "Your answer to the 'indisk politiker' is most admirable. . . . I gladly accept all the opinions; indeed they are either my own opinions or opinions that I have learnt from you in the past."

To Archer's "Plea for a Rational World-Order," *The Great Analysis*, published in 1912, with its proposal for an International College of Systematic Sociology to study in advance the problems of world politics looming in the future, Murray had contributed a Preface, approving the spirit of the plan, though reserving judgment as to its practicability. That the time was not ripe even for the consideration of such a scheme was shown two years later, when it seemed that, with the World War, chaos was come again. In the years that followed, the chief public service that could be rendered by men of letters seemed to be to help on the better cause by stating the case of Britain and her Allies fairly, so far as humanly possible, and at any rate without hatred or virulence. The brochures and pamphlets in which this was attempted—such as Murray's *Thoughts on the War* and *The Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey*, Archer's *The Thirteen Days*, *Colourblind Neutrality*, etc.—written quite independently, were nearly always discussed by the two before publication, and Archer's overseas

experience was useful in the arrangements for Murray's lecturing visits to Scandinavia and America.

With the return of "a glooming peace" the task that presented itself was to make the best of the possibilities for good opened up by the foundation of the League of Nations—for it was not in the nature of either man to quarrel with tools, however imperfect, which were the best that could be had. Before the War ended Archer had become a paid employee of the League of Free Nations Association, founded to spread League principles in England. In the discussions and negotiations which resulted in the amalgamation of that body with the rival association, the League of Nations Society, to form the League of Nations Union, both Murray and he took a prominent part, and he continued for some months in the employment of the Union. But in this class of work, in which a capacity for the management of men of diverse views and temperaments is at least as important as the power of clear thought and trenchant statement, he was at a disadvantage. For, though not, as he himself claimed, "the worst committee-man in the world," he was not highly endowed with the patience and persuasiveness that were, and are, such potent weapons in his friend's armoury. A proposal which he had much at heart, for the establishment of a popular, *readable* weekly paper to spread the gospel of the League among a wide public, came to nothing; and, on the termination of his engagement with the Union, he turned back to his first mistress, the Theatre, which, through the agency of his play, *The Green Goddess*, rewarded him in three years with a greater share of worldly goods than he had earned as a critic in thirty. But the change did not lead to

any slackening of the alliance. Indeed, the two men were now held together by an additional bond in personal losses due to the War and its aftermath, and the habit of constant intercourse continued. Murray was helpful as critic and adviser in the composition of *The Green Goddess* and the less fortunate plays that followed; while Archer retained all his enthusiasm for the cause of peace. Before his death he had the satisfaction of knowing that his friend had accepted the Chairmanship of the Union, and that everything that could be done would be done to make its work fruitful.

In his Preface to *The Great Analysis*, Murray had written:

"The scheme it [the book] suggests will no doubt seem to many people very remote from actuality; but it is at least sane and sweet-tempered. It is based on a belief in reason and reasonableness. Its political aim is to find out what is good for society as a whole, not to snatch by strategy what is good for a group. . . .

"If Aristotle were alive I should have no more doubts. He would take over triumphantly the organization of the Great Analysis—it is just the subject he was working at—and lead us within some measurable time to the Great Synthesis which should follow it. . . ."

Aristotle has not reappeared to work this triumph of organization. And perhaps some of the chief difficulties that beset the League of Nations arise from the fact that it is an attempt to effect the Great Synthesis without a preliminary Great Analysis on which to work. This seems to have been Archer's own view, when he wrote to his friend in one of his last letters: "I verily believe I went [in *The Great*

Analysis] straight to a point which, as yet, all you League of Nations people are merely fumbling after. What you want—I mean one of the things you most urgently want—is an organized World Brain, in the shape of an International University. It is such an innocent-looking thing, even the most rabid nationalist could scarcely oppose it; and before you knew where you were—that is to say in a generation or two—you'd have a World Senate and an ideal Arbitration Court firmly established. . . .”

But he would have been the first to recognize the efforts, however partial and tentative, towards the Great Analysis made within the framework of the League, and to rejoice that at the head of one of the most promising of these, the Committee of Intellectual Co-operation, is his friend of half a lifetime, Gilbert Murray.

GILBERT MURRAY AND SOMERVILLE

by MARGERY FRY, M.A., LL.D.,

formerly Principal of Somerville College, Oxford

IN MOST aspects of his work Gilbert Murray belongs to a generation newer than his own. He is so much identified with younger people's ways of thinking that it is hard to count him amongst the "elder statesmen." But, paradoxically, when one considers his connection with women's education and with Somerville, the College which proudly claims him as a member, it is as one of the last of a band of older men, some of them already mature at his birth, that he most naturally takes his place. Amongst them he will always be counted.

A certain period in the social history of England brought with it the need for a particular kind of disinterested and unpopular action, a particular form of co-operation between men and women demanding and creating confidence, friendship, and loyalty of no common order. This particular need exists no longer; the weapons of education and enfranchisement are in the hands of women. So far as they still have special battles, they can fight with the weapons of ordinary citizenship. And as they can never again have quite such need of help, so there will be no new-comers to one very special place in their regard and affection, no renewal of one very gracious form of human relation.

This relation I shall try to indicate at the risk of going, like the children's grey hare, "roundabout, roundabout," and of retelling an often-told story. To find a single word for it is hopeless. Language is

poverty-stricken when it comes to describe the ways in which people affect each other. In the most delicate of all the arts we are inarticulate. We cannot learn our way amongst people by definitions.

Our lives are voyages of discovery, brief or long, contracted or wide, blindly or observantly performed, through the world of human character. Each of us makes his own maps as he sails, correcting them from time to time by the observations of others. A Shakespeare or a Rembrandt may have charted the whole sphere, but most of us explore a very meagre portion of the whole.

The uneducated mind, in particular, is limited in its conception of this inner world not only by a narrow experience of contemporary human types but by ignorance of humanity in the past. It is apt—if it thinks of the people of other ages at all—to assume them to have been as odd in their emotions as in their clothes, as unwieldy in their wits as in their armour. A grasp of the essential sameness of human character, affected but never completely deformed by differences of culture, is the distinctive mark of the humanist. So far as the culture of Ancient Greece is concerned Gilbert Murray has been an outstanding exponent to his generation of the continuity of man's thought and of his emotional links with the world and with other people, as revealed by literature. He has, as it were, laid before us these charts of an earlier time and made us mark how constant are the coastlines of human character from generation to generation; how for the Greeks, as for us, there were moments when the beauty of nature seemed charged with a profounder meaning, but how, too, for them, as for us, "It is love won in spite of obstacles and enemies, it is Death in the midst

of strife and glory, especially Death averted or conquered, that move us most."

Yet he has shown, too, that the aspects of this inner life change from epoch to epoch, that there exist heroic ages when the chance of knowing whether in actual truth a man is "brave, wise, temperate, and just" is greater than in the crowded obscurity of a "well-policed modern city," that, to push our metaphor one stage further, there are, in the world's history, seasons when the familiar landscape of human character bursts into unaccustomed harvests. And these are generally disturbed times, whether disturbed by stress of outward discord or by the ferment of new ideas.

To describe the fifty years before the Great War as "disturbed" may seem almost ridiculous to those who remember their seemingly secure and ordered course. Yet they were stirred by currents whose full force we can hardly yet estimate. The terrible upheaval of the War changed the social landscape beyond recognition, but the strata it exposed had been deposited by the slow working of forces only dimly apprehended in their origins even by prescient observers. The fierceness of to-day's fight between nationalism and internationalism, the vigorous political consciousness of the workers, the emergence of women into almost every kind of activity—these may have been hastened, but they were most certainly not begun, by the War. So far at least as the last of these movements is concerned, the tension, in this country, had become by 1914 not only acute but general. But in the earlier days of the Women's Movement, whilst those who were engaged in it felt its implications with painful intensity, the attitude of the general public towards the new ideas was simply one of amused contempt.

So there grew up a very special, and in many ways a very beautiful, relation between the women who were claiming "the right of every human soul to enter, unhindered except by the limitation of its own powers and desires, into the full spiritual heritage of the race"* and those generous men who joined the battle on their side. As I have already suggested, new *forms* of human relation may be determined by some new coincidences of historical "climate"; they may die out when those circumstances change, perhaps for ever. The particular relation just described may well be one of these, and since Gilbert Murray is one of its outstanding embodiments, it is worth while to analyse it a little farther before it passes quite away.

How must we describe the motive which led such men as Arthur and Henry Sidgwick, T. H. Green, Bishop Talbot, Professor Pelham, and Gilbert Murray to devote themselves, with endless patience, to the foundation and management of women's colleges? It is tempting to call it "chivalry," claiming for it a romantic ancestry. Yet, looked at more closely, it is the very antithesis of chivalry. The woman of the nineteenth century had had her fill of chivalry. She was tired of offering, by virtue of her weakness, a pale occasion for protective valour. It is of the essence of chivalry to rush to the aid of the weak or oppressed—who or what they are matters little or nothing. Saint George has taken as his companion down the ages, not his rescued princess (who fades into a mere stage puppet), but the far more interesting dragon. It was the sense of being believed in, valued, wanted for their potential help in the life of the community, in the endless struggle against cruelty and ignorance

* Gilbert Murray in *Religio Grammatici*.

and needless suffering, which roused a peculiarly cordial gratitude in the women of the emancipation movement. It is characteristic of Gilbert Murray that, when he wrote the Preface to a short account of Somerville College, published just after the admission of women to the Oxford degree, he should stress this aspect of women's education.

Women [he wrote] have done fully as well in the Universities as their warmest champions expected. But the importance of the movement is not to be judged by that. Better-trained teachers have produced better schools. Better-trained wives and mothers have produced better homes. And a large increase in the number of well-trained and broad-minded citizens has had especially a marked effect on the public service. Indeed, it may reasonably be claimed that there are practical schemes of social and educational progress now before the nation which could never be realized, and would probably never have been conceived, but for the influence of a class of women such as did not exist anywhere in the world thirty or forty years ago. The only just complaint to be made of University women as a class is that there are too few of them. The nation needs twice and three times as many.

It is not too far-fetched to see in this realistic attitude of Gilbert Murray towards women the influence of his beloved Greek drama. In an essay on *What English Poetry May Still Learn From Greek*, he writes:

The romantic fiction of a generation or two ago could never look at its heroine except through a roseate mist of emotion. Greek tragedy saw its women straight; or, at most, saw them through a mist of religion, not through a mist of gallantry or sentimental romance. When people are accustomed . . . to that atmosphere, it is pitiful to see how chill and raw they feel when they are taken out of it.

Here is not the *credo* of a knight-errant, rather it is that of a man who can offer help without attributing helplessness.

This is not the place to attempt a re-writing of the history of the Women's Movement—a movement whose very success has given a curiously old-fashioned air to its earlier stages. All that need be said here is that, from the very first, it was evident that for women to bear their full part in the life of the community they must be educated, and that the way to education could only lie through the Universities, since without well-educated teachers no schools worth the name could exist. Though the younger universities have taken their full part in the training of women, the Oxford and Cambridge Colleges were, with Bedford College in London, pioneers in the field; and their founders and promoters to a peculiar degree gathered the affectionate gratitude of the first generations of university women. The generation of to-day, on the other hand, which takes its education and its opportunities so happily for granted, sometimes smiles a little at the intensity of feeling which the earlier episodes of the Women's Movement engendered. It was, they say, an obviously sensible reform no longer to leave out one-half of the population from educational advantages, but why so much fuss about it? To them the gratitude and loyalty they hear their seniors express to the founders and benefactors of their colleges at college gaudies seem probably a little highfalutin. But the fact is that nothing short of a very serious purpose, of a passionate sense of justice, of an unusual courage in the face of inertia and ridicule, could have launched the women's colleges. The violence of opposition to them, the meagre support

they received, sound to-day incredible. When Somerville opened its doors for the first time, in October 1879, with £5 in hand and liabilities to the extent of £800, its little group of founders, almost all of them people of moderate means, were giving a measurable proof of their faith.

The college had, of course, reached a different stage in its career long before Gilbert Murray first sat on its Council in 1909. Though still technically only a limited company under the Board of Trade, though still outside the University and only allowed to profit by its teaching and its examinations on sufferance, it had yet gained an educational position which practically ensured its continued existence. It could look back on a past of thirty years' achievement and boast a crowd of former students in whom it could well take pride. But there was still need for a good deal of the pioneer spirit in those who guided its fortunes—of what Gilbert Murray himself described as a "human element of personal devotion and the sense of high adventure."

In things material the College was still very poor. It had no endowment for research (funds for the Mary Somerville Fellowship were then, as now, precariously collected from year to year), and it had no hall (except a gloomy gymnasium) of capacity to hold the entire College. Meals were cooked and served separately for the two halls which still housed most of the students. And the times looked unpropitious for the collection of money. In Oxford itself the agitation for admission to degrees had not added to the popularity of the women's colleges, and in the world at large the suffrage movement was alienating one part of the nation and making a very heavy

drain on the resources in money and energy of the other.

Under such circumstances it seemed hopeless to rival the success of the tremendous efforts which Miss Maitland had made, five or six years before, to collect funds for the Library. In this difficulty the plan was suggested, then I think new as applied to college finances, of raising debentures amongst old students and other friends of Somerville, trusting to the increased income to be earned from additional rooms to meet interest and provide for repaying the principal. Gilbert Murray was the earliest and one of the most helpful supporters of this scheme. The Council was at the outset faintly shocked by a proposal which seemed at first sight a piece of wild-cat finance. Its members realized that most of the old students had slender supplies of capital, and feared that they were asking them to risk their savings upon an insufficient security. Nor did they think the money could be raised. However, leave was given for a letter to be sent out, signed by the Treasurer and a few former students of the College, to test the possibilities of success. Even the sponsors of the plan were surprised and delighted by the readiness and generosity with which the funds were supplied—a very practical proof of the loyalty of women to whom Oxford had opened the gates of fuller and more useful lives.

The Maitland Hall and the Maitland buildings, thus financed, were finished in 1913 and met one of the main wants from which the College was suffering when Gilbert Murray joined its Council. In the first step towards mitigating the other need he took an even more important part. For it is no secret that the benefaction which founded the "Lady Carlisle

Research Fellowship" was given to the College upon the suggestion of Lady Mary Murray (Lady Carlisle's daughter) and her husband. In fact, no account of Gilbert Murray's friendship for Somerville would be at all adequate which did not also include Lady Mary's help and kindness, less official than his, but as unflinching. Yet another member of the Murray family shared in this intimate connection with the College. Agnes Murray, whose untimely death in 1922 ended a life of brilliant promise along the very lines of her father's profoundest interests, who shared his intellectual tastes and his fervent idealism in the cause of peace, was for two years a student of the College, which she left to plunge into War service in 1915. When she died the sympathy of those who had known her at Somerville added another link to the chain of friendships binding her parents to the College.

It is not only in the larger concerns of Somerville that Gilbert Murray has been a most unwearying supporter. He has given time and patience incalculable as a member of various sub-committees, as a teacher of students, and as Chairman of the Library Committee, which office he still holds. The pride of Oxford is its college system and the curse of the college system is committees. There can surely be no other city in the world with so many committees in almost constant session, during six months of the year. So, for a much-sought-after and busy Oxford man, with other interests of world-wide significance, to preside for twenty-four years over the gloomy task of trying to make one pound do the work of five in the furnishing of a college library is a piece of devotion which deserves commemoration amongst more spectacular services!

Compared with the meetings of the Library Com-

mittee (where each subject is represented by an advocate who emphasizes the obvious truth that the whole income of the Library would be quite inadequate to the needs of her "school"), meetings of the College Council may be described as non-contentious. Yet College business, too, gives chances for conciliation and tact, and when Gilbert Murray succeeded Dr. Heberden as President of the Somerville Council in 1919, everyone felt that its traditions were in the safest of hands. He held the position for four years, co-operating in complete accord with Miss Penrose—now Dame Emily Penrose—in directing the fortunes of the College at one of the most important moments of its career.

During the War its buildings had been taken by the War Office for a hospital; the return from temporary quarters in Oriel to its own well-loved (if much criticized) buildings and garden seemed a rebirth of Somerville. It was a rebirth into a new world, a world where most kinds of peace are still fugitives, and where feelings have been exacerbated by war. But one very painful form of antagonism, though not quite dead, has at least lost much of its bitterness. The Women's Movement, so far as England is concerned, has gone into a new phase since the constitutional weapons of citizenship have been placed in women's hands. And what was true of the country in general was true of Oxford in particular. The granting of the degree and full membership of the University has added loyal and grateful daughters to Oxford's family. Differences of opinion—sometimes acute—there still are. Feeling ran high on the constitutional question (in which the women's colleges were defeated) as to their right to decide for them-

selves (as the men's colleges do) the number of their undergraduate members. But the squalls which rise quickly die down as fast, and there is no reasonable fear now that the women's societies will ever again be driven out of the safe harbour of the University. Into that harbour it was Gilbert Murray's happy task to steer the ship of Somerville. There cannot have been many days in his life more gratifying than that which saw accomplished his heart's desire and that of so many of his predecessors.

The change of their status involved a reconstitution of the women's colleges. They could hardly take their place in the University without more self-government. Somerville, for instance, although technically a "company," had a form of government which practically approached closely to that of a public school. The controlling body, in matters of business, was a Council chosen partly by former students who had fulfilled certain conditions and partly by co-option and nomination. The Principal alone of the staff had *ex officio* a seat on the Council, over which she did not preside. For many years the idea that the tutors should share in the management of the College was opposed as revolutionary by those who controlled its fortunes. Gradually, however, the custom had been introduced of electing one or more resident tutors as representatives of the old students, but this was a matter of courtesy and not of right.

It was understood that when the women's colleges became *societies* (though not strictly *colleges*) of the University, they would have to modify their method of government, and so bring it more into line with that of the older colleges.

This was a complicated and difficult business (it

involved, *inter alia*, a drastic curtailment of the "old students'" rights). Over the initial stage of the change Gilbert Murray presided. A difficult question presented itself. Should separate Royal Charters be sought or an Act of Parliament promoted applying to all the colleges together? In the end the first method was chosen; and a first step in the direction of remodelling the Council on the lines which the Charter afterwards laid down was taken when, in 1922, "official fellows," having by virtue of their fellowships a seat on the Council, were elected, and formally admitted by Gilbert Murray as President.

The long and slow business of obtaining a Charter and winding up the old "company" was not finished until 1926.

To-day the official fellows take a major part in the government of the College, but the Charter has preserved to Somerville, what it has always greatly valued, the co-operation of "outside" men and women upon the Council. Gilbert Murray has steadily remained one of these, though he was obliged, in 1923, to the "sorrow and regret" of his colleagues, to give up the presidency, so that he might have leisure to carry out the duties of Chairman of the League of Nations Union, duties which fell to him when Lord Robert Cecil entered the Government.

Other claims may have limited the amount of time which Gilbert Murray has been able, in recent years, to devote to the affairs of Somerville, but no one has ever doubted the constancy of his interest in all that concerns its welfare. A Somerville gaudy counts, as one of its greatest attractions, the intimate, delicate flavour of his speeches. It is perhaps through them that he is best known to the majority of its members.

For through this medium he has the happiest way of revealing himself. The humour which manages always to take you unawares, the wit which is always *malicieux* and never malicious, and then the profound feeling for the possibilities of a finer world, within the reach of human co-operation, these are the very essence of what Gilbert Murray has meant to Somerville, the soul of what Somerville feels for him.

One must admit that the subsequent history of the College has, in spite of its fine new buildings and its growing prosperity, offered no happenings outstanding enough to challenge in interest the eventful years of Gilbert Murray's presidency, in particular the consummation of forty-one years' effort in the granting of degrees.

Even the jubilee of the College seemed like a tardy celebration of the great event. And so, though no College festival would be complete without his presence, though he is always one of the first to be asked for help and counsel in any emergency, though he is still Chairman of its Library Committee and an honoured member of its Council, I, at least, as one of the earlier generations of Somerville women, whose thoughts and feelings I have tried in this brief essay to describe, shall always think of him first and foremost as the pilot who brought the ship into the haven of her hopes, as not only a much loved benefactor, but in a very real sense as an honoured founder of Somerville College.

PROFESSOR MURRAY AND THE AMATEUR PLAYER

by JOHN MASEFIELD, O.M., LL.D., Poet Laureate

IT is a great pleasure to me to be asked to write upon one of the many influences of Professor Gilbert Murray.

Those who were young between 1880 and the War may remember the deplorably low level of entertainment in this country outside the sports and organized amusement trades. The entertainments offered by sports and the amusement trades were sometimes very good of their kind and were loved by the public, perhaps far more than now. But outside these, what was there? In the North, of course, there were choral societies, amateur orchestras, and brass bands, sometimes of great ability. In the Western counties there were the Three Choirs Festivals. In the rest of England there were, in some summers, pageants (even two or three), but, apart from these, what was there? The penny reading still existed: I remember it well. Most villages would at some time in each winter organize a concert to raise funds for some cause or another; some bright spirits might occasionally organize a dramatic evening, in which farces like *Ici on parle Français*, *The Area Belle*, or *Box and Cox* would be performed. In schools there would be the yearly performance of a Shakespeare play, or of some scenes from a Shakespeare play. On speech days perhaps a senior class would totter through an act of Molière, or some prefect with his mouth shut would mumble some mangled page, in the original, from a Greek dramatist. Possibly once in a decade some English

master, not yet crushed between the millstones in which he was working, would contrive some performance of *Comus* before dying of a broken heart, or of the gin and opium which are its modern equivalents. The population of these islands, naturally fond of beautiful things, was not receiving them from any quarter: the hungry sheep, if they were looking up (which seemed doubtful), were not being fed, and those who were neither hungry nor sheep, but who would have delighted in beauty if any had been there, were seeking for its equivalents in the excitement of going fast, in the apathy of foreign picture-galleries, or in various games of ball.

It is rather more than thirty years since Professor Murray began to print his translations of the plays of Euripides, with comments and prefaces. Many thousands in these islands who knew Euripides only as one of the blackest of the curses of the public school system realized for the first time from these translations and criticism that Euripides was a great and kindling poet, and that the plays, being designed for the stage by a master of the theatre, were extraordinarily effective when acted.

To all those thousands, the effect of the translations was like the letting-in of light upon darkness. As in the revival of learning four centuries ago, this new thought was an excitement and an encouragement, especially to all younger teachers not yet deadened by routine.

To all these, in their hunger and thirst for beauty, the translations were godsend. In them they found the means of moving the powers to permit the delighting of the young. The plays were Greek masterpieces and might, therefore, fitly be played in

schools. They needed few principal characters, and, therefore, did not strain the capacities of the senior classes. They needed choruses; but here was a chance for the music teachers to invent melody and to interest the school choirs long since sickened by the wares offered at the yearly concerts. The costumes, armour, and necessary properties could be made for each play at the cost of a few shillings. Neither special lighting nor scenery was necessary. The plays could be done in the barest of school halls. (There is nothing barer, bleaker, and more dismal except, perhaps, a condemned cell.)

When once the plays were put into rehearsal, those producing had to solve the problem of speech. The speaking of verse had so decayed among us that the producers had to devise methods for themselves: any method being better than those in use at the time. Then, as the verse of the choruses has to be spoken by several speakers, the producers had to devise methods by which this could be done with force and beauty, either with or without musical accompaniments. Those who used music were prompted sometimes to use movement with it. They studied what records there are of Greek dances: they invented dances. With enthusiasm and delight the beauty-starved world of thirty years ago was pressed by these plays to kindling discoveries. The plays altered the nature of much popular entertainment throughout England.

All this was at a time when there were several living ferments at work upon the theatre. Professor Murray's influence at first was, I think, somewhat outside the theatre, among those hungry for plays which the theatre seldom or never attempted to pro-

vide. Then (some twenty-five years ago) he published a precious little book on Euripides, with an account of Greek dramatic method and of the poet's development as a playwright. Nothing so stimulating had been written in this country about the stage for generations. Had not the War been, that little book would have influenced the technique of all the young dramatists in this country. However, the War came; and much springing seed was nipped; those playwrights who survived returned with other influences.

For the first years after the War, the combatant countries were largely composed of the mad and the broken-hearted. Throughout Europe these two classes tried to overcome their fever and their misery by the excitement of dancing and the discipline of producing and performing plays. In England this fever accompanied a revolutionary movement for the bettering of social conditions. Our people danced and produced plays with a zest unknown before. Nearly every village had its dramatic society. Even in many of the bigger schools the scholars showed that they were bent on educating themselves in spite of the system to which they had been shackled.

It was at this time that the influence of Professor Murray was most keenly felt. His translations provided the kind of play which that excited society most needed: a play with much beauty and depth of feeling, new to the producers, actors, and audiences, in verse which needed fresh methods of speech, and with choruses which demanded some invention of music and the dance. Perhaps no work pleased the heart of our public more generally in the years following the Armistice. It may be said of that work that it lifted, broadened, and illuminated the taste of a decade. No living writer

has done more. He has not been in the theatre nor of the theatre, but he has reformed the theatre from without by giving the audiences new leanings. Those who in the village play or watch Greek masterpieces have less wish than formerly for the plays offered in the city.

It is largely due to the influence of Professor Murray that young men to-day discuss the possibility of establishing in London, in addition to the theatres which perform modern work, a critical theatre for those interested in the literature of the past. Each generation must necessarily prefer the work of its own time, the comment of its own critics, and the excitement of its own enthusiasts, but in every modern city there are thousands of scholars of the theatre to whom a little theatre, acting only the masterpieces of the past, would be a godsend and delight. Such a theatre would be a priceless boon to any young playwright trying to learn his technique, and to every student of literature. Greek, Latin, Spanish, Italian, German, French, Russian, Portuguese, each tongue has its dramatic literature, which can only really be studied and known on the stage. It is only an act of will that is wanting. Such a theatre will, no doubt, in time be established in London and in every university city. When it is established, people will wonder why it was not established long, long before. When it is established, it will be felt that its presence is largely due to Professor Murray, who first showed us that some of the past was inspired and brought that inspiration into our lives.

GILBERT MURRAY AND SOME ACTORS

by DAME SYBIL THORNDIKE, LL.D.

THE YEAR 1908 was a rich one for me—I met three men who profoundly affected my life. In the early spring, Bernard Shaw; a few weeks later, Lewis Casson, whom I married; and in the autumn, Gilbert Murray. In my own inside self these three are connected; the husband helped to interpret for me the other two, whose works have since been a guidance and a light to lighten darkness for us both.

It is of Professor Gilbert Murray I am to write now, and I feel it is a great privilege to have the opportunity of voicing aloud the gratitude I feel towards him for inspiration and new vision of life that he gave me. In May that year, walking along a rather grimy cinder-path in the outskirts of Manchester with some members of the Gaiety Repertory Company—a country walk, we called it—Lewis Casson, one of my companions, said to me: “If you are lucky and come back here in the autumn, you may have a chance of being in a Gilbert Murray translation, as I’m hoping to produce the *Hippolytus*.” I looked impressed, but vacant. “Don’t you *know* the Gilbert Murray translations?” he snapped. I said No, but I’d heard of Gilbert Murray, and I didn’t know much about Greek tragedy, though I’d read Kingsley’s *Heroes* and bits of translations out of my brother’s school books—and Hecuba, of course, who had seized my imagination in *Hamlet* and in *Tales of Greece*, etc. “Well, you just wait,” he muttered. “You haven’t lived yet.” I felt from the tone of the man’s voice that I was to learn and know something very wonderful.

As it happened, I *was* lucky, and returned to Miss Horniman's repertory for the next season, and in due time was handed the part of Artemis to study for the forthcoming production of *Hippolytus*. I had not gone far in the study of the goddess before I realized that a door into a new world was being opened for me, and that I was to learn of a beauty I had never even glimpsed. This may sound absurd to those who have known and studied Greek at school, and I sometimes look at the boys and girls who have the opportunity of studying this beauty when they are so young, and wonder if they get the thrill I did, and think how they must be cleansed and stimulated by it. I wish we had all been forced to study Greek—how grateful we'd be when we grew older!

The *Hippolytus* is surely one of the most beautiful plays in the world, it has every quality that makes a great tragedy. I know rehearsing and studying it for the first time was like being in a magic country, and one day when Lewis Casson had got the words and general shape of the play drilled into us, he told us that Gilbert Murray was coming for the next rehearsals. (Penelope Wheeler was the Phaedra, and she was a friend of his, and could tell us much of him and his work. She had a beautiful appreciation of his verse, and has done much since to make it understood. Evelyn Walsh-Hall was the leader of the chorus, and never have I heard those choruses spoken so exquisitely. She had a wonderful rhythmic sense which made the verse sound newly created at the moment.)

The next day we met Professor Murray, and when he first spoke to us I knew what Lewis had meant by saying I was lucky to be working under such a man. He was very gentle and quiet, but he knew exactly

the sort of effect he wanted to get, and by a word could put one on the right track. With everyone he seemed to give the keynote of the part in a phrase. He said to me, "Opalescent dawn—that is how you must think and feel as Artemis," and anyone who has played the goddess will appreciate what he meant. Even then Lewis was the interpreter for me. Professor Murray said, "Casson will show you how to do it—he moves and speaks like a Greek."

It was a glorious exciting time after a thrilling, inspiring rehearsal (new ideas and thoughts being flung at one—and there's nothing so exciting in the world as this) to go back to my lodgings and sit at the piano for hours with the music score that Granville Bantock had written specially for that production, while Lewis would fit words and music, and sometimes Evelyn Hall would come to work on her choruses. How beautifully she spoke the lines, especially the chorus, "Could I take me to some cavern for mine hiding"; and Lewis's speaking of the chorus, "Surely the thought of the gods hath balm in it always to win me far from my grief, and a thought deep in the dark of my mind clings to a great understanding." Lady Mary Murray told me that often the remembrance of his voice saying those words would help her in the dreadful years of war and grief that followed.

It was the great understanding of Gilbert Murray that called the best work from all of us. I think I shall never forget that first performance. I wonder if there is a greater exhilaration on earth than taking part in a great play. Professor Murray took no credit to himself—it was all for Euripides, and it made one realize that a man often does his finest work when he sinks himself in honour and admiration for the work of another, as

Gilbert Murray has in his interpretation of Euripides. I remember once at a performance of one of his plays the audience shouting and yelling for him, with cries of "Murray! Author!" and he got up from his seat in the theatre and said that the author had been dead many hundreds of years!

After this first performance of *Hippolytus* I started to study hard all the Murray translations; and what excitement there was when a new one came out! I used to wonder whenever there would be a chance of playing them. *The Trojan Women* and the *Medea* were the two that fired me most with the longing to play, and I have found by experience that if one longs for a thing sufficiently to study it and know it, the chance does come along sooner or later, but one must be patient and learn to wait, and still work. The Bacchae chorus is a help in times like that, "To stand from fear set free, to breathe and wait"—what advice to an actor!

I had the privilege during this time of going to the Murrays' house in Oxford, and seeing their life was another inspiration to my husband and me. The wise help and advice that Lady Mary gave me as a young married woman is something for which I have always been grateful. When the War came she sent me a pamphlet copy of her husband's *Stoic Philosophy*, and she sent one also to my husband in the trenches, and this essay has always been something to turn to for help. I was overjoyed one day many years later on going into my youngest daughter's room in Cairo, where we were playing a season, to find her sitting up in bed in a state of terrific excitement (she should have been dressed and ready for rehearsal!). I said, "What in the world is the matter with you and why aren't you ready?" She leapt at me: "Mummy, have you read this

Stoic Philosophy? It has entirely changed my life—it's the most wonderful thing that has ever happened to me." She looked utterly absurd and young in her *crêpe-de-Chine* pyjamas, and her changed life, but I calmed her down and told her the effect it had had on her father and me years before, and that she'd better get ahead and read all his essays if she wanted to continue "changed." All the same, I was very grateful that she had been so moved; it meant she was going to have something of the joy we had.

In 1919, at the close of the War, when the League of Nations was being born, a peace conference was held in Oxford, and it was thought good to give a peace performance of a play during that time. Lewis was approached to produce *The Trojan Women*, and I was very excited because here was my chance at last to play Hecuba. Alas for me! I was playing at Drury Lane every night and couldn't be let off, even for so great an occasion—but Evelyn Walsh-Hall played the part, and most beautifully, everyone said. Later on, however, my husband and I decided to put on some special *matinées* in conjunction with Bruce Winston, and at the Old Vic. and the Holborn Empire (with kind help from Lord Howard de Walden) we ran a season of this play and the *Medea*. When the League of Nations Union was formed and much talk of treaties and peace was in the air, Professor Murray asked us to give them a special performance of *The Trojan Women* at the Alhambra. It was the most remarkable performance I have ever taken part in. It was a symbolic rite—actors and audience joining together in its performance. Something of Murray's own deep conviction and faith seemed to shine through his interpretation and permeate us who were the actors. So huge a play and occa-

sion necessitated sinking of personal selves in order to transcend and become a universal self. A play must be a great one that can make this happen to its actors and audience, and we had the example of Gilbert Murray, who had rendered this play into something which was living for the present-day, striving, anxious world.

I remember an old woman friend of mine, who sold things on a barrow and lived near us, saying: "Well, dear, I walked over and saw about those Trojan Women, and I tell you I 'ad a good cry, it was just like us and this . . . War. Then I come 'ome and we all 'ad shrimps for tea to cheer ourselves up—yes, that's a good play, that is." Yes, that play spoke to a war-ridden world and made us one with those who had suffered thousands of years ago, and we knew we were all part one of another—all ages and all times—in our quest for light and strength.

The *Medea* was another revelation—not an epic poem like *The Trojan Women*, but a very fine stage play which Professor Murray said might have been written for the "Woman Movement." How glad I am that my four children in turn have been in those two plays! and Professor Murray never forgot to say a word of encouragement to them. I remember him being much amused one day when my small John had sat in the stalls with a much smaller Mary, watching the middle-size small Christopher performing as Astyanax, and in my dressing-room after I asked him if Mary had been good (I was a little anxious—she was so very tiny to be watching a Greek play, nearly two hours without interruption, but I had no one to leave her with!), and John answered, "Oh yes, very good, but I don't think she understood it *quite all*." Poor pet, I'm

sure she didn't, but John, knowing actor's discipline, had kept her quiet.

Professor Murray's help to us was tremendous. He has such a deep, instinctive knowledge of drama—of a highly coloured drama—and the restraints necessary for that full-blooded, big playing. He made us give a special performance in the Peckwater Quad at Christchurch, Oxford. What a perfect theatre that was!—perfect for sound, and the open air gave Murray's fine English words a breadth which one felt was akin to the Greek.

I cannot sufficiently express what a broad mind Professor Murray brought to the theatre. If he had come just as the learned scholar, no doubt we should have gained something, but coming as a learned scholar, plus a humility which made him as eager as we players were to find a living expression in the living present art of the theatre, it made us learn and gain infinitely more. He has the Greek conception of the theatre—a place for the best brains and the most live creative people to meet and express in play form the high emotion, the tremendous laughter, the tears, crushing grief, the pity that all live creatures know, actors and audience all taking their share in the symbolic expression. How sublime—such a conception of the theatre—how far away from the general conception of the theatre now!

Some years ago I had the pleasure of assisting Gilbert Murray at the School of Economics. He gave three lectures on three different plays of Euripides, and I was told off to read the plays after he had lectured. If in my reading I could have had anything like the effect on my audience that his lectures had on me, I'd be a very happy actor. His lecture on the Bacchae was

tremendous, and his reading, too, of some of those moving choruses. How much he can teach the actor of the value of the mind behind the words! His essay on the religion of a man of letters is something that all artists, and particularly those artists who are public performers, should read and contemplate as a daily exercise! He is one of the few people in the world whom one would follow blindly and without question, knowing that what he advocated would have no self-motive, but would be founded on a search for truth.

One of the vivid memories I have of him is of a night when a big dinner was given in his honour by the Indian students of London. Several others of us were guests, too, and among them a celebrated and brilliant Indian barrister. It was on the day when we had heard the news of Lord Irwin (then Viceroy of India) and the Mahatma Gandhi shaking hands as a public gesture of friendliness, and Professor Murray in his speech remarked that it was because of the deep religion of those two men that they were friends—because of the religious experience of each. “Religious dogma divides, but religious experience unites men,” he said, and he gave us a most wonderful sermon—amazing in an after-dinner speech—on the unity of nations and the need of ceaseless effort in understanding each other. He was a witness for the true Christian spirit, we felt, we who were listening, but the famous barrister from India who rose to speak immediately afterwards misread and, it seemed to many of us, deliberately misunderstood what he had said. So heated did he become that we anxiously watched Professor Murray to see how Christianly he was taking this. He rose in the middle of the other’s hostile remarks and protested and begged to be allowed to make himself

clear, and very clearly he did express himself, very gently, too, so that the Indian gentleman could take no offence, and could not fail to understand. It was a memorable occasion when hatreds might have thriven, but by Professor Murray's selfless attitude, understanding was reached, and friendliness.

Lady Mary and he have a family, sons and daughters, but their family is larger and spreads wider than they know. Throughout the world there are grateful men and women who, like my husband and myself, have looked to them as to parents, and would be glad to express our indebtedness to them for their example, for their work for Christian peace—and those of us who are actors would like to voice our gratitude for being shown a wider scope and vision in our work of the theatre.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS UNION AND GILBERT MURRAY

by LORD CECIL

IT MAY be doubted whether any of his work for peace has been more fruitful than that done by Gilbert Murray in connection with the League of Nations Union. Even his all too rare attendances at Geneva were in a sense part of this work. It is the purpose of the following pages to sketch the history of the Union and to indicate, however imperfectly, the immense debt which it owes to Professor Murray.

In the speech delivered to the League of Nations Assembly in September last, Sir Samuel Hoare, speaking of the League, said:

Its strength or its weakness will depend upon the number, importance, and faithfulness of its constituent members, and upon the support that the Governments of member States receive from their peoples. If this national support is strong, the League will be strong. If it is weak and uncertain, the policy of the League cannot be firm and consistent. In a word, public opinion matters to the League as much as it matters to every democratic Government.

That is true. If anything, it is an understatement of the truth. For the basic idea of the League is that the peoples of the world long for peace, and if, from time to time, countries find themselves at war with one another, it is because their public opinion has been surprised and misled into an erroneous view of some international dispute. Repeatedly the Covenant insists on candour and consideration in the dealings of members of the League with one another. Thus,

in the Preamble to the Covenant, international relations are required to be "open" no less than "just and honourable." By Article VIII the members of the League "undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval, and air programmes, and the condition of such of their industries as are adapted to warlike purposes." Again, in Article xv, which deals with disputes likely to lead to a rupture, there are express directions that any settlement of the dispute is to be made public, that any report by the Council on the questions at issue is likewise to be published, and that any member of the League is to be at liberty to make a public statement on the subject. So by Article XVIII all future treaties are to be registered with the Secretariat and published. Moreover, at the earliest meetings of the League it was decided that all meetings of the Assembly and of the Council should be in public unless in some particular case it was decided otherwise, and the same rule is in practice applied to most of the important committees of the League.

At one time during the Paris Conference it was proposed that in addition to the Council and the Assembly there should be a third body more directly representing the peoples. The proposal was set aside, it being rightly thought that the only way in which the people of a country can effectively express its will is through its Government. If, in fact, the Government is not acceptable to its subjects, it ought to be changed. So long as it remains in power, it is, and must be, the only authoritative organ of the State. Nevertheless, for some years after the League was established, it was a common, though a foolish, charge against it that it was not a League of Nations but a

League of Governments. And, perhaps in order to meet this criticism, several countries included in their delegations to the Assembly men belonging to sections of opinion different from, or even hostile to, that which the Government represented. The plan failed; for in an international assembly a country cannot speak with two voices, and the only effect of having opposition members of the delegation was that they had to be silent or to repeat the Ministerial view. But the fact that the plan was tried shows how much those who guided the early meetings of the League realized the importance of providing some method by which all sections of the public opinion of every country should be heard. It is satisfactory to note from the passage quoted that our present Foreign Minister takes the same view.

If it proved impossible to arrange for the expression of national as opposed to Governmental opinion in the formal machinery of the League, that want has been largely supplied, at least in some countries, by voluntary societies. That has been so to a remarkable degree in the United Kingdom. The League of Nations Union is by far the largest and most highly organized of any national society of the kind. It has grown in some fifteen years from quite small beginnings to a membership of several hundreds of thousands. In fact, its supporters are far more numerous than that, as was shown in the Peace Ballot, when no fewer than eleven million persons affirmed their belief in peace and international disarmament through the League of Nations. In the foundation and development of the Union no one has played a more useful or a more inspiring part than Professor Gilbert Murray.

Some months before the end of the War there came

into existence two societies for the advocacy of a League of Nations. One was called the League of Free Nations Association, presided over by Lord Davies, and the other the League of Nations Society, of which Lord Dickinson was the leader. In the spring of 1919 these two societies coalesced into the League of Nations Union, under the presidency of the late Lord Grey of Fallodon. A few months later Colonel Fisher, the then General Secretary of the Union, came to see me at Paris, where with General Smuts I was acting as delegate for the British Government on the Commission of the Peace Conference which, under the chairmanship of President Woodrow Wilson, was drawing up the Covenant of the League of Nations. Colonel Fisher found me at the Hotel Majestic, and asked me on behalf of the Union to become its Chairman, with Professor Murray as its Vice-Chairman. I very gladly accepted, for it was clear that the League was, as President Wilson put it, "a living thing," which would have to grow, and it was no less clear that national societies would be wanted not only to help in its development but more especially to explain the League to the peoples and the peoples to the League. That was my first introduction to Professor Murray, and since then I have had the privilege of the closest and most cordial co-operation with him—a "liberal education" in all senses of the phrase.

At that time the organization of the Union was in a very rudimentary condition. It was housed by the generosity of Lord Davies—to whom the Union then and afterwards owed so much—in premises in Buckingham Gate. Its numbers were small, its finances decrepit, and there were not wanting those who urged that it should proceed with caution and with

the most rigid economy. But to most of us that seemed a hopeless policy. It was obvious that the early years of the League were likely to be its great opportunity. So long as the impression of horror produced by the World War persisted, there was bound to be a large number of people who would be anxious to support the one thing which had emerged from the Paris Conference that held any promise of the establishment of peace. That impression was not likely to last for many years. A new generation would grow up who would have no personal experience of the realities of modern war and would not, therefore, easily appreciate the value and importance of this great experiment in peace. Unless we could, during the next few years, create a strong and reasoned pro-League conviction, at least in this country, there would be very little hope that the League would be strong enough to resist an outburst of war emotion such as had so frequently occurred in past years. Those of us, therefore, who held this view thought it essential at any risk to press League propaganda as hard as we could. Accordingly, as soon as the Covenant had been adopted at Paris, we held a great meeting in the Albert Hall at which the objects and machinery of the League were explained. This was followed by a number of meetings all over the country. In these we found great encouragement. From the outset we had crowded meetings, particularly in working-class districts, which readily listened to the advocacy of peace through the League. In richer districts, in Parliament, and even in the Cabinet, there was more doubt. But open opposition was rare and politically unimportant. There were, of course, as there are still, those who think that any institution in which foreigners sit on equal terms with British nationals

must be foolish and may be dangerous. I remember a distinguished peer writing an article to show that by the League we were handing over the British Empire to the sinister control of M. Léon Bourgeois (of all people in the world), who at that time was the leader of the French delegation at Geneva. Folly of this kind did us no harm. Scepticism and apathy were much more dangerous, and against these Professor Murray laboured brilliantly and unceasingly. He had the priceless gift of being able to present courageous and even advanced opinions with literary charm and a firm grasp of underlying principles. And a belief in principles was rare in the post-War world. They had not, perhaps, been knocked to smithereens in Britain to the same extent as in the vanquished countries. But even here the War was widely regarded as proof that the old social and political axioms could no longer be trusted. Going round my constituency of North Hertfordshire I found in the usually placid minds of the agricultural elector a strong current running of revolt and even revolution. To him it seemed that institutions which had produced such a catastrophe as the World War must be radically at fault. And though, with the usual tolerance and good nature of our race, he was prepared to make allowances for fallible human beings, yet he was passionately anxious to hear of some new system which would give security against future war. Failing that, he was prepared to listen to communists and revolutionaries who preached the view then, as they do now, that nothing but a root and branch destruction of existing conditions can eventually bring lasting peace.

What was true of rural districts like Hertfordshire was far more true in the great industrial centres. During the first year or two after the War no hall

in any of the great manufacturing towns was too large for the numbers who wished to hear about the new plan for the pacific settlement of international disputes. That remains very largely the case at the present time, in spite of the discouragements which the first three years of the National Government produced for our speakers and audiences. Even now we find it easy to fill halls which would be half empty for any ordinary party political meeting.

We soon discovered that propaganda on this scale required two things. In the first place it was costly. Fortunately, we never have been in serious difficulties about money. We received large donations and subscriptions from rich people in this country, and even one or two from abroad. I have already mentioned Lord Davies's generosity, and I must add one other name, that of the late Lord Cowdray, whose princely contributions were an immense help; and there were very many others. Nor must the givers of smaller sums be forgotten. Then, as now, we are indebted to thousands, and latterly hundreds of thousands, of poor people ready to give what they could in order to abolish war. A greater difficulty was organization. For some months there was something like chaos at headquarters. Secretary succeeded secretary, and no great improvement followed. And then we were fortunate enough to secure the services of our present secretary, Dr. Maxwell Garnett. He has had his critics like other people. But no one who has followed the history of the Union can deny that whereas when he came to us the Union was small in numbers, precarious in finance, and very imperfectly organized, it is now a society with paying members divided into branches and divisional councils, and a fairly steady income of some £36,000. One incident will illustrate

the change that has taken place. In 1920 we had a public dinner at a well-known West End hotel. Dr. Garnett had just become Secretary, but the arrangements for the dinner had been entrusted to another gentleman no longer connected with the Union. Our guests were a very distinguished body, including the late Lord Balfour, Mr. Asquith, General Smuts, and a number of other well-known persons. When they all arrived no adequate preparations had been made. The room was too small. No places at the tables had been allotted. No provision for the Press even had been foreseen. The result was a bear-fight, interspersed with important speeches from some of the leading statesmen of the day. The Press, justly indignant at their treatment, did not spare us next day, and it says much for the vitality of our cause that it suffered relatively little damage from the incident. Since then we have held scores of dinners and thousands of meetings, but no parallel failure in organization has ever taken place.

Though the services of Dr. Garnett have been invaluable, it would be unfair to the rest of the staff to say that the technical success of the Union is entirely due to him. He has collected round him a most admirable and able staff who, from highest to lowest, have worked with devotion for the cause. Above all, the headquarters of the Union have had behind them a great force of popular sentiment for peace and for the League, which showed its intensity in the striking results of the recent Peace Ballot.

Before I attempt to sketch the methods of work and achievements of the Union, it may be convenient to complete its history. In 1925 I received office in the first Baldwin Government and resigned my Chairmanship of the Union. Professor Murray succeeded

me, and has remained in that position ever since, while I became Joint President with Lord Grey. In 1925 the Union received its Charter, and the objects for which it exists were there set out as follows:

1. To secure the wholehearted acceptance by the British people of the League of Nations as the guardian of international right, the organ of international co-operation, the final arbiter in international differences, and the supreme instrument for removing injustices which may threaten the peace of the world.
2. To foster mutual understanding, goodwill, and habits of co-operation and fair dealing between the peoples of different countries.
3. To advocate the full development of the League of Nations so as to bring about such a world organization as will guarantee the freedom of nations, act as trustee and guardian of backward races and undeveloped territories, maintain international order, and finally liberate mankind from war and the effects of war.

I ought to have mentioned that in June 1921 the Union went into occupation of its present offices. That event, together with the grant of the Charter, may be said to have completed the establishment of the Union as a great public institution.

The only other important change in our affairs was the death of Lord Grey in September 1933. He was our first President, and so remained till his death. Throughout he was a warm supporter of the League. He believed that it was the only hope for a lasting peace of the world. When he was our Ambassador in the United States, he told a meeting there that if the League had existed in 1914 it would have prevented war. Long before the recent declaration of the Government that the League ought to be the keystone or the sheet-anchor of our foreign policy,

Lord Grey laid it down that we ought never again to go to war except on behalf of the League. It was because he regarded the Locarno agreements as in accord with League principles that he approved them. Had they been in the nature of an alliance with either France or Germany he would have taken a different view. But since the obligation involved in them operated against either country if it was the aggressor, he regarded them as a reinforcement of the League.

He spoke for us frequently, and occasionally attended the annual meetings or councils of the Union. He once came to an Executive Committee; and he was always ready to give us his counsel in any case of difficulty. His attitude was no doubt chiefly due to his agreement with the principles for which we stood. But it was confirmed and strengthened by his great personal regard for our Chairman and for his devoted work for peace. Indeed, he told me once, when he rather reluctantly agreed to attend one of our meetings, that he did so largely because of his admiration for Professor Murray.

Grey's imprimatur was of great importance to us on account both of his unrivalled experience in foreign affairs and still more of his reputation for impartiality and disinterestedness. For that was the note we endeavoured to strike in all our public work. During the first few years of the Union's existence we had been witnesses of the tragic events in the United States. We had seen how the League had in that country become involved in party politics, so that opposition to it had become a plank in the Republican platform. We had noted how men apparently of probity and honour had not hesitated in the party interest to turn their backs on their previous con-

victions and denounce the very principles in international affairs which they had before supported. I have a vivid recollection of meeting, when I was at Washington, politically minded individuals who had fought the League and chortled over a party success in that enterprise—a success which has hampered the whole peace movement ever since and may be responsible for the deaths of millions of their fellow-creatures.

We were determined that, if possible, nothing like that should happen here. No one felt this more strongly than Professor Murray. Accordingly, we arranged that as far as possible all the three parties should be represented in all our activities. Thus our Honorary Presidents consist of all ex-Prime Ministers except Mr. Ramsay MacDonald. Owing to an incident in the early history of the Union which Mr. MacDonald quite wrongly construed as a personal affront, he would never accept a Presidency, though it was repeatedly pressed on him. But we had all the others, together with Mr. Clynes as the representative of Labour. So while I was Chairman we had a Liberal Vice-Chairman, and when he succeeded me we had first Mr. Robert Hudson and later Major Hills in his place. Even the two Presidents, Grey and myself, nominally belonged to different parties. On the Executive Committee all three parties were represented. For this reason, perhaps, it is full of vitality. It spends a large part of its time in discussing current international politics and passing resolutions about them. Naturally, the members who belong to different parties do not always see eye to eye. It is on these occasions that our Chairman's wonderful power of understanding opinions which he does not share becomes of vital importance. But for him it is more than

likely that the Executive Committee would have split on several occasions. It certainly was not an easy job to keep together a body which contained a strongly Conservative ex-Cabinet Minister, a vigorous Labour ex-Member of Parliament, and a typical Liberal free-trader. But it has been done and it was worth doing. At times the Executive Committee is charged by enthusiastic members of the Union with being half-hearted, and by Tory leaguers with unpractical or even unpatriotic exaggeration. That is inevitable in a non-party or rather a "pan-party" organization. It cannot be so active as a more homogeneous body, nor can it hope to please those to whom party spirit has become a second nature. But the policy we have pursued has prevented the League from becoming a party question, and for that admirable result we owe much gratitude to the chairmanship of Professor Murray.

We have tried, generally with success, to pursue the same policy in our branches. That has not been always easy. In some cases, no doubt, the direction of a branch has fallen into the hands of persons belonging to one party—usually a party of the Left. That has been due to the slackness of the Right, and it is very difficult to correct it from headquarters. Nor have we received much help from the Central Conservative Office. I well remember when I sat for North Hertfordshire and urged on one of my associations support of the League, an organizer from London declared that it would never do for a party association to accept private and personal fancies of that kind. It is quite true that the more intelligent of the Conservative leaders have never taken that view. But the wire-pullers who, from the nature of their duties, are brought chiefly in contact with the

most unreasonable members of their party, have always in my experience been very bad advisers on any question of policy. Hence it happens that difficulties have more than once been caused to the Union, and ultimately to the Conservative Party itself, by the narrow views of the central party organization.

Still, in spite of all difficulties, we adhere to our policy. It is a standing rule that at every considerable Union meeting there shall be on the platform representatives of all parties and, if possible, of all sections of religious belief. Where it can be done we get the Mayor or the Bishop or even the Lord-Lieutenant to take the chair. No party or sectarian arguments are supposed to be used, though here we are sometimes in difficulties. The Union has always felt bound, as provided by its Charter, not only to say what the League is, but also to express its views of what the League ought to be. Where those views are in accord with the opinion of the Government of the day, all is well. But where they differ, the expression of that difference easily becomes criticism of the Government. Sometimes we have had to deplore the continuance in office of Ministers who, with the best intentions, seem to us to be destroying the League. A plain statement of that opinion is apt to be resented in official quarters. Then follow angry denunciations, and even threats, to the Union, with the inevitable accompaniment of heated debates on its Executive Committee and Council. Those are the times when the unique powers of conciliation possessed by our Chairman come into play and the controversy is reduced to its real and manageable dimensions.

In spite of these and other difficulties, I think it may be fairly claimed that the Union has rendered

great public service both to our country and to peace. On the educational side very much has been done. The educational knowledge and enthusiasm of our Chairman and Secretary have been invaluable from this point of view. Their efforts have been seconded splendidly by the teaching profession in all its branches. From the public and private schools of the rich to the elementary and secondary schools of the poorer classes, headmasters and assistants alike have with very rare exceptions recognized the vast importance of the League and have worked hard to give to their pupils knowledge of its principles and working. So, too, in our Universities, ancient and modern, English, Scotch, Irish, and Welsh, British youth stands strongly for peace and the League. That part of our work which deals with scholastic establishments is perhaps the most important of the Union's educational activities, for it has the promise of the future. But it does not stand alone. By every form of publicity we have sought to extend appreciation of the League throughout the United Kingdom. Last year we held over 5,000 meetings and contributed information or articles to 700 newspapers. To these must be added over 27,000 volumes lent, as well as pamphlets, sermons, debates in Parliament, and some 3,000 letters to the Press, and last year was not in any way exceptional. The result was seen in the Peace Ballot. In every town and almost in every village were to be found people profoundly interested in the subject and ready to help in making the Ballot a truly National Declaration.

We should, however, not be discharging fully the duties laid upon us by our Charter if we confined ourselves to giving information as to what the League was and what it had done. Indeed, in practice we

could not have stopped there. If you explain that the League has for the time being failed to stop Japanese aggression in the Far East, it is unavoidable that the reasons for that failure should also be explained, and that some idea should be given of what can be done to guard against similar failures in the future. We have, therefore, not hesitated to discuss current questions of foreign policy and to make suggestions as to the action with regard to them which would be most in accordance with the purposes of the League. For instance, we advocated in and before 1932 the principles of international disarmament approved by the Union at home and by the Federation of League of Nations Societies abroad. I am myself confident that if we had been fortunate enough to persuade the British Government to adopt and press forward that policy in 1932 it would have been accepted by the Conference and might by now have been part of an international treaty. Even those who do not accept that view must admit that the policy secured a very large measure of support at Geneva. We have taken a similarly active part in other international questions, and have certainly no need to be ashamed of our record in that respect. Again, we have continually urged the improvement of departmental machinery for coping with League questions. It is now several years since we advocated the appointment of a Cabinet Minister for League Affairs, and pressed that the support of the League should be avowedly made the keystone of our foreign policy. It is only in this year that both of those suggestions have been fully adopted by the Government. But perhaps the most striking and the most successful of our activities was the Peace Ballot, to which reference has already been made. The labour involved in that effort was immense,

the expense was considerable, but the result much more than justified both. For we have established unshakably that the overwhelming majority of the adult population of the United Kingdom stands for peace and disarmament through the League of Nations, that they accept as corollaries of that proposition that the first step in disarmament should be the abolition of the weapons essential for attack in modern war, that the members of the League must combine to protect one another against aggression, and that the system by which the slaughter of our fellow-creatures should be the subject of private profit is intolerable. Nor has this been just the success of certain argumentative contentions. The Peace Ballot has undoubtedly had a profound effect both on British policy and even on international events. I do not contend, as apparently many foreign observers do, that the recent changes in British foreign policy are due entirely to the Ballot. But it seems to me beyond question that those changes have been facilitated by the Ballot, and that without it the great efforts made by Sir Samuel Hoare and Mr. Eden would have been foredoomed to failure.

It is impossible for me to conclude this sketch of the Union and its work without a word about Professor Murray himself. To have worked for sixteen years with Gilbert Murray has been an altogether delightful experience. His quickness of apprehension, his readiness to appreciate all points of view, his disinterestedness and impartiality, combined with his wide culture, his perfect wit which illuminates everything and hurts no one, and his modesty which puts us all to shame—here is a collection of qualities as rare as it is enchanting.

GLADSTONE AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS MIND

by J. L. HAMMOND, D.LITT.

He was not perhaps qualified to give an opinion as to whether the Suez Canal would be advantageous to this country; but no man would look at the map of Europe and deny that a canal through the isthmus of Suez, if practicable, would be a great stroke for the benefit of mankind. It has the assent and good will of every Government in Europe, and specially of France, our great ally. . . . But let us not create in Europe an opinion that the possession of India by Great Britain was something to be upheld by opposition to measures that were beneficent to the general interests of Europe.

GLADSTONE in the House of Commons, August 14, 1857

My honourable friend thinks it was very unbecoming of the English Government to oppose a scheme which was approved by other countries simply because it was considered injurious to British interests. Now I must really beg to dissent from that principle. It seems to me that if the British Government are of opinion that any scheme is injurious to British interests it is their duty to oppose it, however much their opposition may thwart the political and commercial interests of any other country.

PALMERSTON

I hope that the House will have sufficient confidence in those who have had, and who have, the direction of affairs in this country to believe that there would not have been a continued opposition to this scheme on the part of successive Governments unless they had been satisfied that it was a scheme at variance with the political and national interests of the country.

PALMERSTON, House of Commons, June 1, 1858

My noble friend and the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs both say that the opening of this Canal will be dangerous to the British Empire in India. Sir, I enter a respectful but most serious protest against the whole spirit and tenour of this language. . . . In the first place I am unwilling to set up the Indian Empire of Great Britain in opposition to the general interests of mankind and the general sentiment of Europe.

GLADSTONE

WHEN MANNING and Gladstone were both old men, Manning wrote that as he had forsaken all things for faith, so Gladstone had forsaken his whole political past for Ireland. "He is as isolated now as I was then." Doubtless to his contemporaries the most striking fact about Gladstone in the last great effort of his life was his solitude. *Ultimus suorum moriatur* is bitter in politics as in life, and Gladstone was going to his grave with the worst loneliness of all upon him, the loneliness of a man who has survived not his friends but his friendships. When the Duke of Argyll accused him of adopting Home Rule for the Irish vote, Gladstone felt that something worse than death divided him from the man with whom he had been *particeps curarum* for nearly half a century. Just as Fox by his sheer charm kept at his side after the break of 1793 a few aristocrats unscared by the grim face of revolution, so a few of his friends like Granville, Spencer, Kimberley, and Rosebery braved the bitter displeasure of their class rather than desert a man whose spell still held them in its power. But such friends were few. Gladstone looked in his old age like a rogue elephant, about whom the best that could be said was said by Queen Victoria, when she reflected that his mischievous career must in the course of nature be near its end.

For Gladstone was not merely a politician who had shattered his party. He was a great Churchman who had given to the Church not less devotion than he had given to the State, and the Church condemned him. He was a man of learning with a deep interest in the humanities, and hardly a man of that world could

hear his name with patience. If you had asked of governing England or of learned England or of serious England or of fashionable England who was the most dangerous man in public life, everywhere you would have had the same answer. The grand lady who, finding herself next to Gladstone at the altar rail, rose and left the church, well represented the spirit of a society in which he was an outlaw.

Of a man who puts between his old age and the great mass of his own class and habit of life and mind so deep and wide a gulf it may at first sight seem audacious to say that, had he acted otherwise, he would not have been himself. Gladstone's friends thought that he had changed, whereas they had stood constant and firm. A truer view would be that a crisis had arisen which brought into sharp relief differences that had always distinguished, but had not hitherto divided, them. Gladstone had written to Granville in 1883 that no public man had yet looked in the face the crisis that would arise when a large and united majority of Irish members demanded some fundamental change in the legislative relations of the two countries. No public man had looked that crisis in the face because it is not the habit of British politicians to look ahead or to imagine disagreeable contingencies. Gladstone had hoped to avert that crisis by constructive reform. When that crisis came it raised a large number of questions of which different views might be held by reasonable and responsible men. Some men were Unionists because they thought Home Rule dangerous to the Empire, or dangerous to the landlord, or dangerous to the Protestants, or because they thought that Irish government of Ireland would be

worse than British. Some men were Home Rulers because as democrats they held that the wishes of the population of Ireland must be respected or because they held with Fox that "we ought not to presume to legislate for a nation in whose feelings and affections, wants and interests, opinions and prejudices, we have no sympathy." Others wished to remove from British politics problems that had proved intractable, for Pitt had answered one question in such a way as to compel his successors to answer a hundred, and the painful efforts to answer them had made up a great part of the angry and baffled history of the nineteenth century. But for Gladstone every other aspect of this problem was submerged in its importance as a moral issue, involving closely the public life of Europe and the spirit of its civilization. It was this that made him unintelligible to the Queen and the Conservatives, to Hartington and Chamberlain; for on the issue on which he and Palmerston had contended over the Suez Canal they would all have agreed, with differences of course of temper and degree, with Palmerston and not with him. Gladstone was the only man to whom the Irish problem belonged to the politics of Europe.

For Gladstone brought to politics a special perspective of his own. He was fundamentally European in his outlook. He had what we should now call the League of Nations mind. He regarded his nation as a member of a family of States, with a common basis of history and culture, of fear and hope. In this world he watched the perpetual conflict of good and evil; of the spirit of justice and the spirit of violence. "Quid civitates," he would have said with St. Augustine, "sine justitia nisi magna latrocinia?" For he saw the

moral relations of peoples with an imagination more vivid and powerful than any man who has taken part in the government of Europe, if we except the radiant hour of Mazzini's rule in Rome.

It was in this spirit that he viewed and judged the politics of Europe. "As a member of the Conservative Party in one of the family of nations," he appealed, amid the misgivings of Aberdeen, to the public opinion of conservative Europe on behalf of the prisoners of the Naples Government. He supported the Crimean War because he held that Russia had taken into her hands a question that ought to be settled by Europe, and he regarded the Allies as acting in the place of a League of Nations. Thus he was opposed to Cobden and Bright at the beginning of the war, but without shifting his ground he was opposed later to Palmerston when the war changed, as he believed, its character, its scope, and its aims. In the 'sixties he was against the opposition of the Conservatives and Disraeli, an ardent and powerful supporter of the cause of Italian freedom and unity. In the Franco-German War he alarmed Bright by his readiness to intervene for the defence of Belgium, and most of his colleagues by his desire to organize a protest of the neutrals against the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine. The Turkish atrocities brought him back from his retirement in 1876 to denounce a Government that seemed to him to pursue selfish and ignoble purposes at the expense of freedom and justice and to be about to lead England into war on behalf of a Power that was a rebel against European civilization.* In all these controversies he was concerned

* His foresight and wisdom have been demonstrated in Dr. R. W. Seton Watson's learned and striking work, *Gladstone, Disraeli, and the Eastern Question*.

before everything else for the spirit and principles of public law.

Whether in all these cases Gladstone judged or acted wisely is a question on which men will always disagree. A European outlook does not of itself give a man the clue to every problem in politics, any more than it gives him the clue to a crossword puzzle. Nobody was more aware of this than Gladstone, who in a letter to Argyll described his dilemma when the Crimean War, which he had justified as a war for one object, was being prolonged for another. "It may be good logic and good sense, I think, to say 'I will forgo ends that are just for fear of being driven upon the pursuit of others that are not so.' Whether it is so in a particular case depends very much upon the probable amount of the driving power and of the resisting force which may be at our command." To those not endowed with Gladstone's confidence in their own power of analysis and penetration, such niceties will seem to demand a subtlety of judgment that politics, with its rude surprises, is more apt to bewilder than to enlighten. Gladstone himself was used more cruelly by these surprises than anybody else, for none of his refinements in argument ever extricated his reputation, or the fortunes of his Government, from the catastrophe into which they were led in Egypt and the Soudan by a succession of calamities, all of them unexpected and some at least undeserved.

The spirit in which he viewed the politics of Europe governed his conduct when he was called on to choose between British prestige and the claims of justice. He showed his regard for public law by acting as if something that as yet only existed in his imagination could

be made a force in the life of the world by the power of a noble example. He said of his decision not to let the blood spilt at Majuba prevent an act of justice that it was a decision that only a strong Government could take, and that any Government in taking it must use up a great deal of its strength. It is not easy in the history of Europe to match that spectacle of an old man speaking in the spirit of the Sermon on the Mount, making a people of high mettle abjure the spirit of revenge. For the last twenty-five years of his life he was haunted by a growing fear that Ireland had been oppressed by his own country, and that the reproaches urged against England on the Continent had been just. He made concession after concession, throwing on one side views about property to which he had been born and banishing to Saturn views about political economy in which he had been bred. With each new concession he had hoped to wipe out this bad past and to satisfy Ireland. In 1886 it was clear that Ireland was still disaffected; the demand for self-government was now the demand of a nation. He braced himself for a final effort, believing that an act of justice and reparation on England's part would put an end to the Irish quarrel, regain for England her hold on the moral sense of Europe, and help to check the drift in the world towards force that had followed the Franco-German War. So intense was his ardour in this cause that Waddington, the French Ambassador, reported that for the first time in his life his friends could not draw him aside into a discussion of some question about Homer.

It is the purpose of this paper to discuss, not how Gladstone employed this European sense, but how he acquired it. He came from the merchant class; by

education and marriage he was in touch and sympathy with the territorial class. How was it that he put his politics into an individual setting of his own, so that he became first unintelligible and then obnoxious to the two classes with whose world and mind he was most familiar? To answer that question we must look at three volumes that are not often opened to-day: the three large volumes on Homer that he published in 1858.*

Gladstone's work on Homer does not receive much serious attention from scholars. This is not surprising, for scholars are interested in his work as scholarship, and viewed in that light his studies are dismissed as eccentric, extravagant, full of the strangest fancies and illusions. But Mr. Herbert Paul in his brilliant biography, after noting some of his fantasies and showing how grotesque they look to the scientific student of language and mythology, added with truth that the work none the less remains "a marvellous example of deep and even sublime meditation upon all that is suggested by the greatest epic poems of the world." It is those meditations that give the clue to his European sense. If we are considering Gladstone as a Homeric scholar, we are chiefly concerned to know whether he understood the Homeric poems; if we are considering him as a man holding passionately views that distinguish him from others, we are chiefly concerned to know how he understood them. For if these books are examined, not as contributions to Homeric scholarship but as revelations of his outlook on history, they help to explain how,

Of course he published other articles and books on Homer in great number, but these three volumes are the most complete illustration of the thesis of this paper.

why, and where he differed not only from men who opposed him in politics but from men who supported him.

In the noble speech which he made on Gladstone's death Lord Salisbury said that history hardly provided a parallel to the example he had set of a great Christian man. Nobody who studies his books on Homer will doubt that he has a place of his own as a Christian scholar. There is so much complexity in his character, such casuistry in the use he made of his mind, that it is dangerous to attempt to describe him simply in any aspect, but we may perhaps give a just impression of that special place if we say that he was a Christian as earnest as the Evangelicals whose fold he had quitted, who put the Greeks where they put the Jews, and Homer where they put the Old Testament. For he held that God had used the Jews to teach man how man should treat God and the Greeks to teach man how man should treat man. The Mosaic books were intended to present a picture of human society in one master relation, not a picture of human society "drawn at large." That was the function of the Greeks, and of Homer in particular. To the Jews was delivered spiritual truth; imaginative culture, the education of the intellectual soul, the development of civilized politics, these were the province of the Greeks. "It was the Greek mind, transferred, without doubt, in some part through Italy, but yet only transferred and still Greek both in its origin and in much of its essence, in which was shaped and tempered the original mould of our modern European civilization. I speak now of civilization as a thing distinct from religion, but destined to combine and coalesce with it. The power derived

from this source was to stand in subordinate conjunction with the Gospel, and to contribute its own share towards the training of mankind." Christianity after the Advent had

marched for fifteen hundred years at the head of human civilization . . . its learning has been the learning of the world, its art the art of the world, its genius the genius of the world. . . . Before the Advent it was quite otherwise. The treasure of Divine Revelation was then hidden in a napkin; it was given to a people who were almost forbidden to impart it; at least, of whom it was simply required that they should preserve it without variation. They had no world-wide vocation committed to them; they lay ensconced in a country which was narrow and obscure; obscure not only with reference to the surpassing splendour of Greece and Rome, but in comparison with Assyria or Persia or Egypt. They have not supplied the Christian ages with laws and institutions, arts and sciences, with the chief models of greatness in genius or character.* The Providence of God committed this work to others; and to Homer seems to have been intrusted the first, which was perhaps, all things considered, also the most remarkable stage of it.

It is easy to see what importance classical civilization held, on this view of history, in Gladstone's Christianity. But this does not exhaust its services to Christendom. For Gladstone thought not only that the Greeks had left mankind lessons, not to be learnt from the Bible, which it could use after Christianity

* He found a special and dramatic significance in this choice. "An unhonoured, undistinguished race, simply elected to be the receivers of the Divine Word, and having remained its always stiff-necked and almost reluctant guardians, may best have suited the aim of Almighty Wisdom; because the medium, through which the most precious gifts were conveyed, was pale and colourless, instead of being one flushed with the splendours of Empire, Intellect, and Fame."

had brought its full light into the world; he held also that Christianity itself in its early history had been saved by the influence of the Greek tradition from some dangerous and blighting errors. For of the early ascetics, like Tertullian, who, as Gibbon said, "showed no more indulgence to a tragedy of Euripides than to a combat of gladiators," Gladstone wrote that, if Greek civilization had not come to the rescue, this school "would have placed the kingdom of grace in permanent and hopeless discord with the kingdoms of nature, reason, truth, and beauty, kingdoms established by the same Almighty Hand." Christianity meant for Gladstone not merely the truth to be found in the pages of the Bible, but a whole tradition of art and letters and politics, chiefly Greek and Roman in achievement and experiment, illuminated and guided by the Christian revelation, and itself contributing to its power.

Thus Gladstone wrote this vast book with a religious purpose. When he was a boy Homer was read at school, but not much studied at the University. Gladstone was passionately anxious to persuade Oxford that Homer should be studied "for his theology, his history, his ethics, his politics, for his never-ending lessons on manners, arts, and society. He is second to none of the poets of Greece as the poet of boys; but he is far advanced before them all, even before Aeschylus and Aristophanes, as the poet of men." Society, he said, rested on four words, γάμος, ὄρκος, θέμις, θεός, and in these volumes he travels over "the great map of humanity that Homer unfolds to our gaze," tracing the fortunes and adventures of ideas and institutions in which those four words find form and colour, expression and life. Nowhere, per-

haps, in literature, so daring and wilful is his ingenuity, so passionate his ardour, so superb his rhetoric, have the sublime and the ridiculous been thrown together on such a splendid stage.

Modern scholarship has of course destroyed the foundations on which Gladstone built some of the most cherished of his fantasies, but the reader who is watching the development of his political mind will be struck by the affinities between the spirit of his reflections on the morals of Homeric society with the spirit of the *Rise of the Greek Epic*. Like everybody else he finds in Homer a strange blend of evil and good, brutality and gentleness, the savage and the civilized. Of these discrepancies in Homer's Heaven he gives an explanation that seemed less remarkable to his age than it would to ours, for he held that Olympus with its habits and morals and ceremonies represented a survival of "the truth brought by our first parents from Paradise" overlaid and corrupted by depraved human fables, partly imported, partly invented, by the Greeks. Here his Christian interpretation puts him in direct contrast to the modern view in which Olympus becomes less, instead of more, disreputable when the Greeks begin to think more about its distinguished inhabitants.* The discrepancies on earth, on the other hand, he explained not by the sins of the Greeks but by their virtue. For Homeric society was a vigorous civilization in its early youth, very close in time and space to a savage world. "The Homeric gentleman,

* He found in this Heaven traces of the doctrine of the Trinity and of the tradition that the seed of the woman was to crush the serpent's head. He was distressed that the institution of the Sabbath had faded out altogether, but he pointed out that it is quickly forgotten by Christians who settle in heathen lands or those whose energies are absorbed in a ceaseless conflict with the yet untamed powers of nature.

with his civilization, stood in respect to barbarism like him who voyages by sea

digitis a morte remotus
quattuor aut septem

Only the thickness of the plank is between him and the wilderness which he has left: and if passion makes a breach, the mood of the wild beast reappears.”*

It is this part of the work that concerns the theme of this paper. None of Gladstone’s speculations about Homer, about his date, about his geography, about his gods, or even about his Greeks affect the significance or the value of his description and discussion of this society.

Burke said that Homer gave the Trojans the virtues that make a man loved and the Greeks those that make a man admired. Gladstone admitted that “the amiable affections, with the sense of humanity, if not the principles of honour and justice, are exhibited in the detail of the Iliad as prevailing among the Trojans, little less than among the Greeks.” But he finds that the Greeks had laid “more firmly than their adversaries those great corner-stones of human society, which are named in their language γάμος, ὄρκος, θέμις. In the polity of Troy we find more scope for impulse, less for deliberation and persuasion; more weight given to those elements of authority which do not depend on our free will and intelligence, less to

* “Neither the Greeks nor the Trojans appear to have been ferocious in the treatment of their enemies. The extreme point to which they go is that of giving no quarter; but they never, even in the exasperation of battle, inflict torture with their weapons. The immolation of twelve Trojan youths over the dead Patroclus is doubtless cruel; but it falls far short of what the passions of war have produced in other times and countries. With the manner of inflicting death passion never has to do.”

those which do; less of organization and diversity, less firmness and tenacity of tissue, in the structure of the community." This is why the Greeks were chosen by Providence to give the first lessons in politics to Europe.

Looking for those lessons, Gladstone is just as ardent and as resourceful as the Christians of another school who shut themselves up with the Book of Daniel or the Book of Revelation to find some special light on the problems of their own day. It is here that we find the Gladstone with the League of Nations mind, concerned, before everything else, for "the great corner-stones of human society." Few will read these pages unmoved as they find him marking in Homeric custom "the germ of a law of Nations," in Homeric debate the beginning of Parliamentary government, in Homeric praise of the orator the sign of a society in which the renown of wisdom could rival the renown to be won in war, discovering with true Gladstonian art and skill the large part that public spirit plays in the wrath of Achilles, explaining why piracy which resembled the forays of border warfare between England and Scotland was looked on with indulgence, dwelling on the significance of *aidôs*, "too comprehensive and too delicate for our rendering by a single term in the English, perhaps in any modern, tongue," describing "the touching contrast between the chastity of Helen's mind and the unlawful conditions in which she lived," or showing how far the women of Homer excelled the women of the Old Testament in dignity and the respect they compelled in a violent age. "She is importuned," he says of Penelope among the angry suitors, "but she is not insulted. She feels horror and aversion, but she has no

cause for fear. Such, in the morning of Greek life, was the reverence that hedged a woman, as she sat alone and undefended in the midst of powerful and abandoned men."

Nobody can look upon this work as an intellectual exercise, the diversion of a man of affairs who is interested in scholarship or science, like Derby's translations or Balfour's *Foundations of Belief*. It should rather be compared with the work of a hermit in his cell. It is as serious, as absorbing, as passionate a task as the work of St. Jerome on the Scriptures or that of St. Augustine *De Civitate Dei*. The reader will find here the whole of Gladstone; the eloquence that makes the closing sentences of the first speech on the Home Rule Bill still hush the mind; the mastery of detail that never slipped over the complexities of the Budget or the impenetrable riddles of the Irish Land system; the delight in pursuing bypaths in discussion which entertained the House of Commons and embarrassed his Whips; the ingenuity, the refinements, some will say the casuistry that could find a defence for the most equivocal of his actions and the most palpable of the errors of his colleagues. Of this stupendous effort we may say, as of his speeches on the Bulgarian atrocities, or his speeches on his Irish policy

Potuit quae plurima virtus
Esse, fuit;

for there had gone into this task, as into those, all the strength of his Christian passion.

There were better scholars than Gladstone among his contemporaries. There were men whose feeling for religion was as deep and passionate as his own. But

he stood apart in sharing the religious feeling of Wilberforce and Shaftesbury, and bringing within its glowing heat the culture of Greece and Rome. Many a scholar has been moved, as he was, by the tender passages in Homer: Andromache with her child, Argos dying in the hour of his master's return, the delicate beauty of the meeting of Odysseus and Nausicaa, the deep pathos of the speech of Achilles to Priam, but few scholars read those passages as he read them with the sense that these scenes were the handiwork of God Himself, painting the soft light of a Christian dawn. If he differed from scholars as a Christian, he differed from Christians as a scholar. Though Shaftesbury was Evangelical and Gladstone High Church, they used the same language about the relations of man and God. But there was this important difference between them. Shaftesbury's Christianity, like that of most of his contemporaries, was based on the Bible. A mind fed on the Bible is not thereby drawn to Europe or European tradition or European history with any special or significant sympathy. On the contrary. The Dopper Boer, the ardent Orangemen, find no reason in their study of the Old Testament for thinking that they have common interests with Christians whose Christianity is the thing they dislike most about them. Even in cultivated minds the Bible is in this sense often an insulating influence, and Gladstone observed with justice in his essay on Italy and her Church that "in matters of religion poets might still with some truth sing of the *penitus toto divisos orbe Britannos*." Gladstone's Christianity, on the other hand, was based not on the Bible alone or chiefly, but on Homer, Aristotle, Augustine, Dante,

and Butler. Of these the two to whom he devoted most study and time were Homer and Dante. A man whose Christianity draws its breath in such an atmosphere lives in the heart and mind of Europe.*

Gladstone's book on Homer revealed in another way the bias of his mind and the colour of his character. It is essentially the work of an orator. It is the work of a man passionately anxious to establish a truth, not for its own sake, but for the sake of the lessons he can teach by its noble light. To bring out the full power of an orator, a task or a cause must engage his imagination, for he works at a high temperature, using his imagination to excite and guide the imagination of others. He serves his nation as Burke, not as Bentham, served it. A man like Bentham addresses himself to the task of reforming abuses and improving institutions in patient detail, substituting principle for custom, order for confusion. A man like Burke has his conscience or his imagination excited by some special aspect of politics, some large and generous impulse, some great and terrible wrong. The first uses science, the second art: the first will see a problem, the second a truth, that the other misses.

To understand Gladstone's special place in history we must remember that though he made himself the master of the House of Commons by other arts than those of the orator, it was by the arts of the orator that he made himself the master of the English people. He had a power of grasping and handling detail, whether of scheme or of argument, that astonished the greatest draughtsmen of his time and overwhelmed its greatest

* Gladstone's friendships are significant. He was as zealous for his religion as Shaftesbury, but nobody can imagine Shaftesbury intimate with the Catholic Acton or the agnostic Morley.

debaters. But in history, where characters live in large outline, he is known not as draughtsman or debater, but as an orator who could draw into his orbit the conscience and will of great masses of men and women. Now the imagination of a man, like that of a people, is as arbitrary as the wind which bloweth where it listeth. No law enables us to chart its course. Gladstone lived in a society that had passed through a stupendous revolution, but his imagination was hardly touched by its crowded towns and their bleak and squalid life. He was so much inflamed by the injustice of our treatment of China in 1840, on whom we forced the two curses of war and opium, that he doubted whether his strong feelings would allow him to enter Peel's Cabinet in 1841. Yet whole tracts of misery that unfolded themselves before Shaftesbury's noble compassion escaped him, just as Shaftesbury in his turn could not see beyond the rights of property when Gladstone went to the rescue of the Irish peasant. He was at the head of the greatest reforming Government of the century, and his influence, his power, his courage, and his wisdom were all essential to its success. Yet so little did he understand the needs of an age that was beginning to provide itself with the external dress of a civilized life that he wanted in 1874 to abolish the income tax, as though England was at the end, not at the beginning, of a stupendous task. Though he put aside, one after another, the prejudices of his Conservative youth, he still looked at every domestic problem as if he was still Chancellor of the Exchequer winning the splendid triumphs of which it is hard to say whether they raised his reputation more than they cramped his mind. He gave to reform as master of the House of

Commons the mind and energy of the competent and courageous Minister: he never gave to it the full power of his imagination. Once, it is true, his mind flashed with that fire. Provoked by Lowe, as Fox had been provoked by Pitt, he flung into an agitation that seemed to be choked in trivial squabbles his burning phrase about "flesh and blood." That moment of passion made him not merely the leader of the democracy but its idol.

He never gave his imagination to England's social problems because his imagination was engaged elsewhere. In 1879 he published seven volumes of his collected writings under the title of *Gleanings from Past Years*. His volumes range over Europe past, present, and future; whenever he discusses the affairs of his own country his subjects are its religion, its letters, its history. There is one paper and one paper only that is concerned with the Industrial Revolution. It is an address in 1863 delivered at the opening of an institute in honour of Josiah Wedgwood. The lecture, which is a most interesting discussion of the place of beauty in modern life, hardly touches upon the large consequences of the Industrial Revolution. It contains a characteristic passage. Gladstone observed that in the power of cheap production England stood first; that in the arts, if poetry could be taken as the chief of them, she could challenge Europe, but that in "the intermediate region where art is brought into contact with production" her position was greatly inferior. For at a most critical phase in the development of her industry England had been cut off, by the long war with France, from the stream of life in Europe.

Three revolutions were in progress in his lifetime: a

revolution spreading self-government in Europe; a revolution spreading democracy in Great Britain; a revolution transforming industry and social life in England, Germany, and America. His imagination was captured by the first; he was drawn into the second by an experience to be described later in this paper; of the third he never saw the significance.

The orator, like everybody else, has the defects of his qualities. His temperament impedes his success in certain of the arts of public life as much as his gifts help him in others. Gladstone admits that the virtue he considers specially Greek, the virtue of self-control, was once or twice overpowered by passion in the conduct of the two greatest orators in Homer's pages, Achilles and Odysseus.* It is significant that most of the great orators, even when, like Fox and Gladstone, they were men of irresistible personal charm or power, came to catastrophe at one time or another because they mismanaged their relations with other men. This is true of orators who differed as widely among themselves as Chatham and Burke, Fox and Canning. We have only to recall Gladstone's treatment

* Writing of Ulysses' punishments of the suitors and the women, "Ulysses," he says, "is the minister of public justice and of divine retribution. But he is composed, like ourselves, of flesh and blood, and he carries his righteous office, in a natural heat, to the verge of cruelty. Then the warning voice is vouchsafed to him, and he at once dutifully obeys. And is, then, a thing like this so new and strange to us? And has neither our philosophy nor our experience of life taught us that there are no circumstances in which a good and just man runs so serious a risk of becoming harsh and cruel unawares, as when he is hurried along by the torrent of an originally righteous indignation?

"Even so with Achilles. He is no more than Ulysses merely vengeful, but he resents a wrong done to justice, to love, and to decency in his person. Upon the stream of this resentment he is carried until it threatens to become a torrent. Then, by an admirable design, he is chastised in the yet deeper passion of his soul, his friendship for Patroclus; and so is recalled within the bounds of his duty to his suffering countrymen" (II, 454).

of Chamberlain between 1880 and 1886 to see how little he had learnt from his long life of the art of judging and using men, and how true it was that, as Herbert Paul put it, he had less tact in dealing with individuals than in dealing with assemblies. Selborne, describing him as a colleague, complained of his vehemence in discussion, and said that he was impatient of the dry light of facts when they told against him. Selborne wrote after their bitter quarrel over Home Rule, but he recollected enough of the old atmosphere to say of Gladstone what Burke had said in sad reminiscence of Fox: "I know how impossible it is not to admire him and how very easy to love him."

Gladstone had, besides the orator's temperament, a disability of his own; for if his European sense made him catholic in his judgment of politics, his religious instinct made him intolerant in his judgment of men. He was not nearly so far gone in this vice as Shaftesbury, in whose diaries scarcely any public man escapes excommunication, but he tended more and more to think that a man who could not see a truth that he had grasped was guilty of something more than intellectual error. His colleagues, on the other hand, were bewildered by the mass and power of his *sæva indignatio* and by the demands that his historical conscience made on theirs. To a man of the world like Hartington, a statesman who expected his countrymen to put on a hair-shirt when he told them of the scandals of the Act of Union or the cruelties of '98 seemed wilder than an Irishman who still resented Cromwell's savage violence or the more distant wrongs of Shane O'Neill.

But the qualities that made him so little dexterous in managing men made him a master in managing

Man. For nobody could rival his power in touching the imagination of masses of men and women on its nobler side, and the man who has that power can dispense with the small change needed for success in the daily difficulties of politics.

It was not till late in life, as Mr. Francis Birrell pointed out, that Gladstone learned the power of his voice. In 1850 he made his appeal to Conservative Europe on behalf of the Naples prisoners. He received a poor response, for the Conservatives of Europe agreed with Guizot, who preferred tyrants to cut-throats, and Bomba to Mazzini. At that time Gladstone was Member for Oxford University. In 1865 he lost his seat, and, in Palmerston's phrase, he was unmuzzled. He then made the most important discovery of his life. He found, when he began to address meetings, that the arguments that had left Conservative Europe unmoved had the most powerful effect on great popular audiences. In his campaign against Disraeli he held great audiences of workmen and tradesmen spellbound as he spoke of the history of the Balkan peoples, the misgovernment with which Turkey had rewarded the trust that Europe had put in her promises of reform, the place of public law in the life of the world, and the obligations of the British people to Europe. The most remarkable triumph ever won by a public man was won by rhetoric on such topics, by opposing justice to glory, duty to interest. Mr. Somervell quotes a sentence which he describes as Midlothian in a nutshell: "Remember that the sanctity of life in the hill villages of Afghanistan amid the winter snows is as inviolable in the eyes of Almighty God as can be your own." Gladstone became a democrat because, as he told the amazed and horrified

Queen, he had found that "on all the great questions dependent mainly on broad considerations of humanity and justice, wealth, station, and rank had been wrong and the masses right." To such a conviction had experience brought a man who had begun his public life by congratulating the House of Lords on its manly resistance to the first Reform Bill.

When the fate of the Home Rule Bill was in suspense some of the Liberals who were leaving Gladstone met at dinner. "At any rate," said one of them with glee, "the old man is down at last." "On the contrary," said Chamberlain, "you will never know how strong he is till he has parted from all his colleagues." Chamberlain had seen enough to know the difference between Gladstone discovering the strength of the orator in the passionate leadership of noble causes and Gladstone discovering the weakness of the orator in day-by-day negotiation with others. Gladstone, who knew where his power lay, threw aside all plans for compromise, thinking it easier to set the generous impulses of a people on fire than to disperse the difficulties of this mind or that among his doubtful colleagues.

Randolph Churchill called him an old man in a hurry, but Gladstone knew that if he was running a race against death his nation was running a race against disaster. He believed that if England and Ireland lost that chance of reconciliation, the day would come when they would separate in anger, whereas if the British people acted with justice the whole world would learn a lesson from its example. For his League of Nations mind saw this issue in its widest setting as an issue in which victory might be won for public

law not in England only but in Europe, threatened so gravely by the spirit bred by Bismarck's triumph.* He had, besides his religious conviction, a great sustaining sense of power. *Possunt quia posse videntur.*† His confidence in his strength and his faith in his cause kept his courage unabated in the loneliness of his last struggle. He failed, and death found his plans in ruin in a world eager only for Empire. The wise men of his age rejoiced that his power was spent, and that all that was left to him of the rewards of the beauty with which Heaven had crowned his words was the wonder of the common people gazing upon him, as he passed through the city, as upon a splendid shadow.‡ But if to-day the wise men of our age could summon to Geneva one giant from the Dead, will any doubt that the world would hear again that noble thunder echoing down the Christian ages from the windswept Plain of Troy?

* Björnson made two or three enthusiastic speeches at the time on Gladstone's proposals in this sense, and said that nations had sometimes acted justly from necessity, but this would be the first instance of a great nation acting justly from choice. The whole world would be deeply influenced by its conduct.

† Gladstone's Diary during the tension in the Soudan gives a striking instance of his self-confidence. There was a moment when it looked as if the blunder of sending Gordon might be retrieved if the Government would grant his request and send out Zobeir, the slave-trader whose son Gordon himself had put to death. It was known that the Government would be assailed, if they took this strong step, not only by the Opposition but by a formidable body of Liberals led by Forster. Gladstone, who was ill, believed that if he had been well enough to go to the House of Commons he could have won even that difficult battle.

‡ Od. viii, 170. Of this passage Gladstone says: "From a passage like this we may form some idea what a real power in Homeric society was the orator of the heroic age, and we may also learn how and why it was that the great Bard of that time has also placed himself in the foremost rank of orators for all time."

THE BATTLE FOR OPEN SPACES

by BARBARA HAMMOND

THOSE WHO are accustomed to live in what Meredith once described as the bracing air of a minority often find it, on the contrary, intolerably heavy. This, perhaps, is specially true now that the Parliamentary franchise has robbed reformers of that host of unrepresented followers who, in old days, could be imagined as cheering them on to victory. The following study has been written in the hope that a distinguished leader of minorities, whose love for nature embraces even the moraines of Switzerland, may take pleasure in the thought that a small body of men once saved a great deal of English scenery from vandal Governments.

To understand the change in public and governmental opinion made by this minority, it is necessary to glance at the position in the early 'sixties of last century. As is well known, in the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, under the pressure of new agricultural methods, of war, and of high prices, a large area of hitherto waste or common land had been put under private ownership, and the old system of common field cultivation, with its complicated strip system, had been practically ended. This change had been effected by Private Inclosure Acts, an expensive form of procedure, cheapened indeed by the General Inclosure Act of 1801, which standardized legal forms, but still costly enough to act as a deterrent. By the early 'forties the process was slackening down; all the best land had, indeed, been taken. Unfortunately improvements in agricultural methods and chemical

discoveries gave a fresh impetus to inclosure. New manures seemed to promise rich crops from hitherto unprofitable soils; they might even, so some hoped, weaken the demand for Free Trade. Although, as Lord Ernle tells us, in 1846 more than half the owners and occupiers of land had advanced little on the eighteenth century in their methods, the agitation for improved cultivation was directed, not to stirring up these gentlemen, but to obtaining fresh land on which experiments could be worked. The result was the Inclosure Act of 1845, which simplified and cheapened procedure. The expense of obtaining an inclosure went down from £500 or £600 to about £20.

By 1845 few people denied that the small men had suffered severely by inclosure. Lord Lincoln, who introduced the new Bill, went so far as to say that in nineteen cases out of twenty the rights of the poor had been neglected. Parliament determined that in future, whilst inclosure was to be made easy, this scandal must be prevented. A Private Act was no longer necessary for each inclosure, for a Board of Inclosure Commissioners—Government officials—was set up. This Board investigated applications for inclosure, and, if it approved, reported on them to Parliament, sending them all up in a bunch for Parliamentary assent. A person or persons representing one-third in value of the interests in the land concerned could set the Commissioners in motion, but the consent of two-thirds must be obtained before the inclosure could be recommended to Parliament. When making their inquiries the Commissioners were instructed to consider the "health, comfort, and convenience" of the neighbouring inhabitants as well as the advantage of the particular persons interested,

and when making their award they could set out an allotment for exercise and recreation, and another for field gardens to be let at ordinary farm rents to the "labouring poor." Happy in the belief that an impartial Government department would now mete out equal justice to all concerned, Parliament settled down comfortably to sleep for twenty years, merely waking up once or twice a year to register an automatic sanction of the omnibus bills presented by the Inclosure Commissioners.

What were the Inclosure Commissioners doing during these twenty years? At first sight it might seem that the passing of Free Trade must have checked inclosure. But this was not so. The years 1853-62 have been called the golden age of English agriculture. Agriculture flourished, gentlemen's parks flourished too; villas flourished, slums flourished, game preserving flourished, the Inclosure Commission flourished. The remains of the Common fields were dealt with; common after common was put under private ownership. The usual formula to justify inclosure was that the land was at present of little profit, but was capable of improvement, and could be made more productive by inclosure. Now the Commissioners were liberal in their interpretation of the word "productive"; it did not mean merely productive in the agricultural sense; it might be productive of graves (as at Woking); it might be productive of villas ("This common is rocky and useless in its present state," they reported, "but from its situation is likely to become valuable for building property"); it might be productive of slums ("houses of an inferior description may spring up," they wrote of Epping Common, but that should not stop the

reclamation of a valuable tract); it might be productive of pheasants and partridges. "Supposing," a Commissioner was asked in 1869, "supposing that there was the case of a common with gorse on it adjoining game coverts, and that the landlord desired to inclose that common merely to protect the game, without any view of turning it to a cultivable purpose, should you think it right to authorize that inclosure?" "Most certainly," was the reply. There was no limit to their enthusiasm for their work. "I believe," said one of them, "that almost every tract of land might be beneficially inclosed." The department of their activities in which they showed least zeal was the setting out of allotments for recreation or field gardens. When they set out none they were bound to give their reasons, and we read that "the population is employed in outdoor pursuits, and an allotment for exercise and recreation is not required," or the ground (a frequent reason) is "too elevated and bleak" or in a "high and exposed situation," or there is already enough land available for the purpose, or the population is so small as to make the matter "of minor importance." It is true that it must have been difficult to feel much enthusiasm about these allotments. The parcels of ground that Parliament authorized them to give for recreation were meagre scraps, varying from a maximum of four acres where the population of the parish was under 2,000, up to ten acres where the population was 10,000 or over. Though there was no limit set to the allotments for field gardens, no satisfactory arrangements for managing them were made by the Act, and the poor were usually soon paying double the proper rent, if they were fortunate enough to have them at all.

In these years the Inclosure Commission was not the only official body busy destroying amenities. The Commissioners of Woods and Forests could surpass them in vandalism. The story of this department is an example of the evils that can come from economy. Since Queen Anne's time the Crown property had been placed at the disposal of Parliament and an annual fixed revenue given to the Sovereign in return. Till 1851 the Office of Woods and Forest and Land Revenues managed this property, and also undertook various public works and improvements, such as the new Regent Street or Battersea Park, paying for them partly out of their own revenues, partly by grants voted by Parliament. Complaints of waste and negligence in the matter of these public monies led in 1851 to the transference from the Woods and Forests of all their public works activities to a new department called the Office of Works, with a Minister of its own, but no resources except grants from the Exchequer. The Woods and Forests were now reduced to an office engaged in managing Crown property, bound to pay in whatever revenue they received from it to the Exchequer. The larger the sums they paid in the better pleased was the Government. They became what they were told to be, economic man incarnate, absorbed in the task of making money. Those who seek a monument of their activities can look round the region where the famous Kings Wood of Hainault Forest once stood. Like David with his enemies, the Commissioners put the great oaks and hornbeams "under saws and under harrows of iron and under axes of iron." When steam tackle had grubbed up the roots and the devastated region was levelled, the contented Treasury received (so long as

farming was prosperous) a revenue of £4,000 a year in place of the £500 which the trees formerly brought in. And these satisfactory trees paid not only for their own destruction and for new farm buildings, but provided a considerable sum for compensation to the Lord Warden, whose duties were ended. There was no compensation for the people accustomed to wander about under their boughs.

It was the exertions of the Woods and Forests that first roused public criticism. Having finished with Hainault Forest, the Commissioners directed their attention to turning the Crown rights in Epping Forest into cash. Here the Crown owned no manors, as it did at Hainault, but it had forestal rights, dating from the time when the forest was used as a deer forest. These rights helped to keep Epping Forest in a wild, unclosed state, so that the public could wander over it as they had done from time immemorial. And the public was a far more numerous public than in former years. A Member who lived near the Forest told Parliament that in 1862 as many as seventy-six thousand persons from the East End went there in excursion trains, in addition to the crowds who went by ordinary trains and by road. But whilst the East End amused itself, the Woods and Forests were busy selling the forestal rights. By 1863 they had parted with the rights over some three and a half thousand out of seven thousand acres for about £5 an acre. In 1863, in the teeth of strong Government opposition, the House of Commons passed a resolution asking that no more sales of Crown lands or Crown rights "to facilitate inclosure" should be made within fifteen miles of London.

There were two parties amongst those who wanted

to keep Epping Forest open: one in despair at the advancing encroachments advised inclosure with the reservation by purchase of "an adequate portion" for the public; the other wished the forestal rights to be maintained, by legal proceedings if necessary, as a check on inclosure. But both courses involved expenditure, and expenditure on such schemes was anathema to the Government, even apart from its repugnance to the plan of using forestal rights "as an instrument for converting the property of private persons into a public park." Mr. Gladstone, now Chancellor of the Exchequer, his eyes fixed on the scenery described by Homer, cared little for the English landscape—Epping Forest was not in Ithaca—and there was a prospect of its becoming a burden on the public purse. "It was the duty of the department of Woods and Forests," he explained in 1864, "to administer the estate as other landlords administered theirs—in an enlightened spirit, no doubt, but for the interest of those to whom the estate belonged. Now it was not the duty of a landlord to reserve open spaces for the public. As for fresh air, the people of London were not the only persons for whom that was good; and if the claim then made were admitted, the inhabitants of other parts of England, living in crowded houses and narrow streets, would be equally entitled to apply to the Consolidated Fund." It is only fair to add that two years later, in 1866, Mr. Gladstone made, in connection with Epping Forest, a gesture of concern for open spaces. "An arrangement," he announced, "has been made with respect to these forestal rights, with the full concurrence of Her Majesty, that will have the effect of bringing them out of a state of conflict with the interests of

the community, and will enable them to be dealt with from time to time, or at the proper season, in a manner that will be satisfactory to all concerned." This arrangement turned out to be the transfer of the forestal rights from the Woods and Forests to the Office of Works, but, as the Office of Works was not provided with any funds to spend on maintaining them, the position remained unchanged, and the unsympathetic Mr. Lowe, when asked as Chancellor of the Exchequer to redeem Mr. Gladstone's pledge, described the pronouncement with some justice as "oracular."

Whilst conditions at Epping seemed going from bad to worse, the battle for open spaces was opened on another and more hopeful front, nearer London. In this case neither the Inclosure Commission nor the Woods and Forests were concerned. Lord Spencer, as Lord of the Manor, announced in 1864 his intention of inclosing Wimbledon Common, and next year introduced a Private Bill for that purpose. He proposed to sell a third of the land, and with the funds so obtained transform the rest into a pleasant park, vested in trustees and open to the public, with a residence for himself in the centre. He considered that as the commoners' rights had fallen into disuse, he, as Lord of the Manor, had the right to inclose under the Statute of Merton (1235), by which the Lord was allowed to inclose, provided that he left sufficient common to satisfy the rights of the commoners. The proposal, granted his premises, was a generous one, and no doubt was made in good faith, but Lord Spencer was not a *persona grata* to those who lived near open spaces, for the mangled remains of Wandsworth Common told a sorry tale of his father's conduct as Lord of the Manor, and he himself claimed

the right to dispose of what was left as he chose. Wimbledon, more fortunate than Wandsworth, had a number of rich, vocal, and legal residents, and they protested vigorously against the proposal. So great was public interest that in February 1865 a Committee of the House of Commons was appointed to examine how best to preserve open spaces round the Metropolis, and in the summer of 1865 the Commons Preservation Society was founded to resist inclosures round London. Both events are important landmarks. Mr. Shaw Lefevre, afterwards Lord Eversley, had started on his long campaign.

In the bewildering flood of argument on either side in regard to the intricate question of these commons, it is well to trace the main streams. First we must notice that whereas in former agitations against inclosures the wrongs of dispossessed commoners or cottagers were the motive power, in this particular agitation the wrongs of the excluded public were the constant theme. Now the law about commons is built up in a manorial framework, and by 1865 that framework was in decay. The inclosing Lords admitted this, and claimed that it strengthened their position. "The soil of the common," a Lord would say, "has always belonged to me, subject to certain rights held by the tenants of my manor. These tenants have dwindled or disappeared or have abandoned the exercise of their rights. I remain, and, by the Statute of Merton, can now do what I like with my common. As for the public, they have no rights there; they have been there only on sufferance, and I am under no obligations to consider them." The opponents of inclosure replied that the Lord's property in a common differed from his property in his park or

his fields. Its very origin, granted to him in return for the performance of certain services, made this clear. Moreover, more than a century of Inclosure Acts showed that so long as even the meanest commoner objected, he could not legally put up a fence without recourse to Parliament. Parliament, by passing Inclosure Acts, had indeed allowed him to override objections, but only on the grounds of public benefit, witness the preamble of all Inclosure Acts. Now it might have been to public advantage in the past to allow inclosures for the sake of corn production, but it was manifestly to the public disadvantage in the present to allow them near towns, hence Parliament ought to forbid them. The Statute of Merton was long obsolete, superseded by the machinery of Inclosure Acts, and should be repealed. As for the immemorial rights of the public, it was certainly a difficult legal question, and some unfortunate legal decisions had weighted the scales against the public. But the present position in which a village might have a legal right of recreation on a green, but lost that right if it became engulfed in a neighbouring town, on the ground that such rights could be exercised only by a defined body of persons, was so ridiculous that if no further legal decisions altered it then Parliament must step in and do so. The bolder spirits even said that the public should be regarded as taking the place of the cattle on commons.

It was the advocates of this second set of views who wrote the Report of the 1865 Committee. Their management of the Committee and their Report were admirable. So much impressed were the Government that though they did not try to repeal the Statute of Merton, or to pass a declaratory law giving the public

certain rights—neither of which proposals had any chance of passing the Lords—they carried the Metropolitan Commons Bill, which forbade inclosure of commons within fifteen miles of Charing Cross by the Inclosure Commission, and provided machinery for regulating the London commons, a much needed provision, since the nuisance of disorderly open spaces was a strong argument for inclosure. Commons outside other big towns were included in the Bill, but the Lords struck them out.

So far it seemed as if a triumph had been won, but the very activity of the clever minority who won it stirred their opponents to action. The Manorial Lords made haste to help themselves. Building land in and near London was valuable. The Statute of Merton was still on the Statute Book. There was no need to consult Parliament or the Inclosure Commission; put up a fence and dare objectors to take legal proceedings. Hampstead, Tooting, Plumstead, Epping Forest, Berkhamsted were all in danger, as well as Wimbledon and the remains of Wandsworth. Territorial magnates are often accused, and rightly, of predatory conduct, but in this scramble for ill-gotten land no one surpassed in shameless rapacity the learned institution of the Queen's College, Oxford, to whom a pious benefactor had left the Manor of Plumstead in 1756. Trusting to the difficulties that the commoners would have in proving the legality of rights, that had been exercised for two hundred years, the College set about inclosing and taking possession.

The handful of men who had founded the Commons Preservation Society rose to the occasion. They were poor in money but rich in brains. A few were of the

land-owning class; more were of the race of Meredith's Vernon Whitford, those "lean long-walkers and scholars" who founded the Sunday Tramps. The delight taken by the intelligentsia during the 'sixties and 'seventies last century in striding over the country was of great service to the community, and an indignant country gentleman had some reason when he denounced in Parliament in 1871 the dangers of the extraordinary doctrine "that the waste lands of the country were to be reserved for the enjoyment of tourists, or rather gentlemen-excursionists, rather than for those who had a pecuniary interest in them." Among early members of the Society were John Stuart Mill, won over to distrust of the policy of inclosure by Mrs. Grote's account of conditions at Burnham Beeches, Thomas Hughes, Professor Huxley, Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton, Cowper Temple (afterwards Lord Mount Temple), James Bryce, Leslie Stephen, and, above all, Shaw Lefevre. It was obvious that the only hope of preserving the threatened commons lay in taking legal proceedings, and legal proceedings of this kind were notoriously expensive, whilst the Society's funds were negligible. But though not rich themselves, members of the Society showed rich men how they could do a public service by risking their money in lawsuits, and rich men responded nobly. Sir Julian Goldsmid and Mr. Warwick at Plumstead, Sir Henry Peck at Wimbledon, Mr. Gurney Hoare at Hampstead, others elsewhere, made it possible for London to keep her open spaces. The campaign was organized by Shaw Lefevre, with the help of able lawyers, first Mr. P. Lawrence, then Sir Robert Hunter. More active steps were taken in one famous case when one hundred and twenty navvies

set out at midnight from Euston to pull down the fences on Berkhamsted Common.

The legal struggle was difficult and complicated, and the advisers did their work with great skill. The Lords of the Manor might disinter the Statute of Merton; able legal brains exhumed an ancient form of suit by which one commoner, on behalf of others, could claim a declaration of common rights and an injunction to restrain the Lord from inclosing. An advantage of this procedure was that the case could be tried in the Courts of Equity, where the judges were supposed to hold broad views of the matter. In the end a series of long and costly cases (some went on till 1871) established the position that, given some local indignation and an individual with public spirit and a long purse, it could be made practically impossible for a Lord of the Manor to inclose. To do so might even land him in considerable expense. To the lay mind it was a curious spectacle to see a rich man who had probably never even thought of exercising the rights of grazing or turbary which went with his property, suing on behalf of others who also had for the most part dropped whatever rights they once had. The law did not invent any legal fiction by which the general public as distinct from commoners could claim rights, but it declared that common rights did not lapse by disuse, and judges looked with favour on the claims of the successors of shadowy commoners discovered by keen eyes in musty rolls. The result, so far as access to the common went, was a victory for the public. The Lord of the Manor could not put up a fence, and the public could still wander about as, what Sir William Harcourt called, "dispunishable trespassers."

All the time, though there was this stir about

commons near London, the Inclosure Commissioners were pursuing a busy and untroubled course, shutting up some twenty-five thousand acres a year. They received a slight snub over Chigwell in 1862, when Parliament changed the five acres allotted for recreation to fifty, and in the case of Epsom Common, certain landowners with property adjoining the Common protested with such effect that the scheme was withdrawn; but, apart from this, Parliament passed the Inclosure Bills year after year as a matter of routine. Suddenly in 1869 Fawcett entered on the scene, and trouble began. Henry Fawcett, Professor of Political Economy at Cambridge, had been elected Member for Brighton in 1865. His close knowledge of the agricultural labourer's life made him oppose inclosure on economic grounds; his love of nature also made him an opponent, for the fate which had forbidden him ever again to see the English landscape seemed to have sharpened his consciousness of its beauty and its value for others. It was this blind economist who made the most impassioned appeals to an apathetic Government not to allow the English people to be robbed of their heritage.

Fawcett had been a member of the Commons Preservation Society since 1866, but had taken little part in its work. His attention seems to have been drawn almost accidentally to the doings of the Inclosure Commissioners, but once interested he did not let them out of his sight. An objection was made in 1869 to the inclusion of Wisley Common in the Annual Bill, and the Minister in charge agreed to withdraw it and to submit the question to a Select Committee, and on this Committee Fawcett sat. When he looked at the rest of the Bill he found that 6,916 acres were

put down for inclosure, out of which three were to be set aside for exercise and recreation, and six for the "labouring poor." This particular Report of the Inclosure Commission seems no worse than its predecessors, but Fawcett was profoundly shocked, and the evidence before the Wisley Committee did not make matters better. He and his friends decided to oppose the Annual Inclosure Bill. Shaw Lefevre, though in the House, was unable to take part in this campaign, as he was now a member of the Government. The Government were much annoyed at this unexpected obstruction. "It was easy," said the Under Home Secretary, in reply to Fawcett's protests, "to rise in that House and assume a popular position as the especial champion of the poor, but there were rights of property which must also be considered." The Minister in charge set the Bill down for discussion on every Government night, bringing it on at 2 a.m. or 3 a.m. in the hope that opposing Members would have gone off to their beds. But two could play at that game, and Fawcett and his little band kept in their places. Finally the Government, confessing defeat, agreed to appoint a Select Committee, to inquire not, as Fawcett wished, into the working of the whole Act, but into the working of the clauses about recreation and garden allotments. They also agreed to suspend the Annual Bill till the Report was published.

The evidence given before this Committee is entertaining reading. Officials subjected to persistent and well-informed questions from Fawcett, and to the by no means benevolent attentions of Mr. (afterwards Sir William) Vernon Harcourt, found themselves in difficulties. The inquiries into local con-

ditions made by the Commission were shown to be superficial and their reports misleading. A hasty visit of a few hours to the spot, an ill-advertised meeting at an hour when working men could not attend, and the thing was done. The Assistant Commissioner, for example, reported of Withypool Common, where he had set aside one acre out of 1,904 acres for recreation, that the inhabitants never used it for that purpose; if they wanted recreation there were "other commons where they can rove about." The parish clerk and the schoolmaster, called up before the Committee, said that the common was constantly used, and that as many as fifty-nine or sixty people could be seen there on a summer evening. Maps showed that there were no other commons within five miles. There was a similar difference of opinion about Wisley. Even the Commission's manner of reporting was criticized, and the elaborate tables in the Annual Reports were described by the indignant Harcourt as "utterly unintelligible." Sixty-six years later they are no easier to understand. The Committee published a Report, not so strong as Fawcett and his friends tried to make it, but fairly drastic in character, for it recommended changes in methods, the omission of Withypool and Wisley from the present Bill, and the postponement of further Annual Bills till the changes had been carried out. An ominous sentence at the end ran "the constant attention of Parliament will be required on the annual introduction of the Inclosure Bill."

So far Fawcett had gained what seemed a modest success. Wisley and Withypool were cut out from the Bill, but the other victims, varying in size from Tir Abbot in Denbigh with 2,550 acres, down to Hunston Common in Sussex with twelve acres, were thrown,

in spite of protests, into the machine. Pyecombe, from which in Fawcett's words, "one of the finest views in England could be seen and over which the public had wandered from time immemorial," was included by one vote. But this was not the end. The chief Inclosure Commissioner had assured the Committee that he could not conceive of an Act working more smoothly than the Act he administered. He little thought that the few troublesome members of the Committee were going to stop that Act from working at all. The Bill of 1869 was the last Bill under the Act, and for seven long years a dejected Department was forced to confine its activities to finishing work already sanctioned. Fresh applications were discouraged, and year after year with pained surprise the official Report chronicled a list of places still awaiting the sanction of Parliament, Wisley and Withypool, with enlarged allotments, at their head. Officials turned their attention to statistics, a branch of their work about which the 1869 Committee had made severe remarks. And here we may mention a remarkable instance of that democratic confidence in figures as figures, regardless of their origin, that statisticians sometimes seem to possess. In 1872 the area of common land still to be dealt with was given as fully eight million acres; two years later that eight million had dwindled down to two and a half. The urgent appeal that inclosure should proceed remained unaltered.

The seven lean years of the Inclosure Commission were due to Fawcett's vigorous campaign. He was helped by the decisions in the various London lawsuits, for the position of Lords of the Manor turned out to be weaker than was supposed. Also the enfranchise-

ment of the urban working classes in 1867 made members uneasy about the closing of commons near towns, and agricultural labourers, too, though not enfranchised, were denouncing inclosures in their Unions in the early 'seventies. There is no reason, however, to think that the demand for inclosure would have dropped during this time if the machine had been working smoothly. The agricultural depression did not begin till about 1875, and there was no depression in sport. "The passion for the preservation of game," wrote Fawcett, "which has gradually assumed such dangerous proportions, now probably exerts a more powerful influence than any other circumstance to promote enclosures. People who spend a great part of their lives in slaughtering half-tamed pheasants are naturally desirous to keep the public as far as possible from their preserves." Nobody who has lived with dogs or cats in a country of big properties will quarrel with Fawcett's words.

It must be admitted that the position of the Liberal Government after 1869 was difficult. They had advanced beyond the views of the Government in 1864, that commons were private property, and that their owners had "the right to use the ground in the same manner as other owners of private property," and they wished to deal generously by the public. But on the one hand was the House of Lords, who wished inclosure to go on as before, on the other hand were Fawcett and his Radical friends who set themselves against any inclosure at all. An attempt to smuggle an Annual Inclosure Bill through in 1870 was defeated by Fawcett's vigilance, and did not sweeten relations. After the tentative introduction and unfriendly reception of a Bill to amend procedure in

1870, a curious situation arose, for Shaw Lefevre, as Under-Secretary of the Home Office, was in 1871 in charge of a Bill embodying the recommendations of the 1869 Committee, enabling local authorities to hold common rights, and proposing an allotment of one-tenth (whittled down by the House to a maximum of fifty acres) for public purposes in every inclosure. Fawcett and other Radicals naturally fought the Bill, and relations between Shaw Lefevre and his friends were severely strained. Owing to Radical opposition the unfortunate Bill was withdrawn in 1872, only to be introduced in the Lords and rejected next year. The allotment proposals were described by Lord Salisbury as an attempt to "levy blackmail." "It was certainly spoliation," he declared, "to enact that, when the Lord and the Commoners desired to inclose, they should be forced to concede to other persons rights which were perfectly new." The Lords, prepared to accept the rest of the Bill, refused to countenance this spoliation. After this misfortune the Government turned a deaf ear to appeals from the unemployed Inclosure Commissioners, and let things slide. The questions of Epping Forest and of the New Forest were giving them trouble enough, but that is another and a long story.

When Disraeli's Government succeeded Gladstone's in 1874, a new and serious effort was made to settle the subject. The change in the atmosphere in which inclosure was discussed was soon apparent. When Cross, the Home Secretary, introduced his Bill, significantly called a Bill for the regulation and inclosure of commons, in February 1876, he admitted that times had changed, and that in future more attention must be paid to the interests of the inhabi-

tants than had been paid in the past. He advocated regulation rather than inclosure, and disarmed opposition by quoting the well-known verse:

The law condemns the man and woman
Who steals the goose from off the common;
But lets the greater felon loose,
Who steals the common from the goose.

In spite of this conciliatory attitude, the opponents of inclosure, chief among them Fawcett and Shaw Lefevre, now happily united, fought the Bill strenuously and even bitterly. To Fawcett it was torment to think that the Inclosure Commissioners would be set free again. As it was clear that the Bill would pass, some of the ablest men in the House, representing the views of the Commons Preservation Society, set themselves to improve it in Committee. They were a strong team: Fawcett, Dilke, Cowper, Temple, Lord Edmund Fitzmaurice, Harcourt, and Shaw Lefevre. After a long fight the Bill became an Act, and the Inclosure Commissioners were set to work again; but it was a sobered Commission, hedged round with restrictions, forbidden to countenance any scheme unless satisfied that it was beneficial to the inhabitants, and conscious that every scheme they proposed would be subjected to the searching scrutiny of a Select Committee in the House, on which, at first at any rate, their old critics, Fawcett and Harcourt, were sitting. It is significant that under these circumstances the Commissioners dropped eighteen out of the thirty-eight schemes they were recommending to Parliament. The effect of the alteration in methods is best seen in figures. In the ten years before Fawcett's campaign (1859-68) 259,641 acres were

inclosed by Parliament; in the ten years after 1876, under the Act passed that year, 25,476 acres were inclosed. After that the number dropped rapidly to nothing, as regulation superseded inclosure.

The achievement of this active minority is seen now to be more important than it seemed to the protagonists who were acutely conscious of their failures. The new difficulties in the way of legal inclosures made illegal inclosure, as Fawcett pointed out, more tempting, and they failed in their efforts to attach some drastic punishment to this form of theft, so often regarded, in a rich man, as a pardonable form of kleptomania. Nor could inclosure be stopped if the Lord of the Manor bought up all the commoners' rights, or persuaded them all to agree to his policy. A long battle remained, demanding perpetual vigilance, but the fact that any commons were left to be vigilant about was due to the work of this small body of indefatigable men. One final glance at Epping Forest will illustrate better than anything else the extraordinary change they effected, without help from propaganda or party programmes, in public opinion. In 1870 the Government introduced a Bill proposing that out of the 6,000 acres in question the Lords of the Manor should retain the 3,000 which they had illegally inclosed, and should be given in addition 2,000 acres. Of the remaining 1,000 acres, 400 were to be sold for the benefit of the commoners, and the remaining 600 were to be reserved as an open space for the public.* In 1878 an Act was passed by which the whole of Epping Forest was vested in the Cor-

* Even the Commons Preservation Society, we are told by Lord Eversley, only carried John Stuart Mill's motion that this Bill should be resisted "to the utmost" by one vote.

poration of London (who had provided the long purse needed for a protracted lawsuit, and had bought up manorial rights). All land inclosed within twenty years, unless actually built on, was to be thrown back into the Forest. Land built on was to be charged with a rent towards Forest expenses. The strange spectacle was then seen of 400 persons handing over some 3,000 acres of ill-gotten land, in order that it might lie, together with the 3,000 acres still uninclosed, as an open space of 6,000 acres, in an unproductive state, within a few miles of London.

MAN AND LEVIATHAN

by H.E. the Spanish Ambassador in Paris,
Señor S. A. DE MADARIAGA

"THINKING"—said Anatole France—"is a disease fortunately rare amongst men." I am not a cynic, and of this witticism I retain the kernel of truth. Few men think out their own ideas. Most men pick up right and left the handful of opinions which they need for daily use—ready-made, canned thought which has lost all trace of spiritual vitamins. Should men behave in action with the same indolent disregard for fundamentals which is their wont in thought, life would be a tragedy-comedy. What would we make of a town in which every man and woman would be going and coming in, out and about the street labyrinths, without knowing the whither and the whence of their movements nor the town they were in? And yet such is the image of many arguments amongst people who ought to know better. Political arguments, in particular, being open to all, are entered by the many with a robust faith in plain speaking and common sense—virtues assuredly, yet which can be surpassed: plain speaking by right speaking, and common sense by sense out of the common. And since they can be surpassed, they ought to be, for politics, and particularly international politics, are nowadays a matter of so grave an import to all of us that we owe to them the best of our mind and of our goodwill.

We must think out our political notions afresh. We can no longer be content with a parrot-like repetition of ideas, time-honoured perhaps, yet certainly time-decayed. New light is in our eyes; new light is on the

world, and we see differently. Let us look at the world.

Here it is before us seething with activity. Things and people come and go at vertiginous speeds on roads and railways, ships and aeroplanes. The mind and the will of man pass instantaneously to and fro on wires and cables and on the waves of invisible ether. Every morning the world reads the page of its own history which it lived the day before and which was recorded overnight. Conflicts, strife, peace, disasters, prosperity, misery, happiness, and unhappiness, like waves tossing up and down and over each other on the wide sea, rise here and there without destroying the unity of the whole. For every man in every part of the earth the world is one.

From the point of view of man this vast unity has a life, a history, a destiny, and a name. The world means mankind, and within mankind we are used to seeing two degrees of human life—individual life personified in man; collective life personified in nations.

Men, nations, and mankind—such is our contemporary view. But was it always so?

There was a time in Europe when only the two extreme terms of our trilogy were active: Christendom and the Christian. Nations no doubt there were, but rather than in our own sense, in the Latin sense of the word, peoples, tribes moving to and fro on the vast territories of Europe, unrooted and unsettled. Kingdoms came and went. Peoples were bought and sold, fought for, won and lost, sometimes inherited like cattle. There was a fluidity, due in part to the feudal order (disorder in our eyes), in part to the still unbroken unity of Christendom. The idea of a *foreigner* was vague and undefined, mostly a matter of distance. Europe was

crossed and recrossed by adventurers, scholars, monks, and pilgrims. Nowhere was to be seen an impassable racial, still less national, wall. Thus the Middle Ages lived in confusion, turmoil, and disaster, with pools of order here and there, in a welter of ideas, *coutumes*, authorities, and jurisdictions; but this chaos whirled around two fixed poles—the Christian and Christendom.

Gradually, however, the nations, collective human forms placed on earth by the Creator, asserted themselves in European life. The disembodied collective souls, so familiar to-day to all of us—the soul of England, the soul of Spain, the soul of France—seek the fulfilment of their earthly destinies in incarnation. There is something deeply dramatic in their gradual descent to the abyss of the flesh.

The nations, once moving, fluid and self-ignorant, seek first a territorial body. Their first effort is to acquire a self-contained and unified stretch of land in which to settle and to act. Frontiers appear and tend to become set. Frontiers, the outer edges of the national territory, the skin of the national body, become by natural law the sensitive lines which receive the touch of other national bodies and transmit to the whole nation the sensation of irritation and fear thus felt on the surface. Bernard Shaw has seen this phase of the nation's incarnation with his usual lucidity, not so much from the point of view of philosophical history as from that of an artist, who with instinctive eyes perceives a vital fact as it happens. He has personified it in *St. Joan*. His Maid of Orleans identifies nation and territory. For her a war is holy if it aims at driving from French soil the men of England, that is, at expelling England's soul from the body of France. Joan of Arc, in his eyes,

and I think rightly, symbolizes the territorial incarnation of national souls.

After a body, a conscience. The nation, secure in her territory, seeks to assert her personality and develops the State. The State is the personality of the nation in its executive and organizing capacity. Thus appear the first manifestations of the collective person whose strength and vitality are destined to have such far-reaching effects in European history. The tendency to growth and self-assertion which leads the nation to create the State determines two movements which are to govern European life for centuries to come, and which in one way or another are still active amongst us: one towards absolutism, the other towards sovereignty.

It is surely short-sighted history which does not see absolutism as the natural outcome of the evolution which made the State grow and feudalism perish. Better still, the development of absolute monarchy is no mere consequence of the evolution which generates the State; it is this evolution itself, carried on along its own natural lines. The tendency to evolve a collective personality could not but tend to the far end of its vitality and reach out to the limit of its possibilities. Thus is it possible to understand the separate lines of historical evolution in each European country as the several manifestations of one and the same fact, namely the appearance and indefinite growth of national consciousness. Incidentally, this argument would show the true meaning of recent experiments in absolutism. Thus the Fascist State would appear to be but the natural prolongation into absolutism of the evolution or "incarnation" of Italy as a unified nation, an incarnation which, for well-known historical reasons,

did not begin till the middle of the nineteenth century.

Alongside with absolutism the growth of national consciousness determines the evolution of the idea of sovereignty. It is worth while remembering that this idea of supreme authority appears in Europe closely attached to that of Christendom. The emperor, head of the Christian world, is the sovereign since he is the supreme fountain of temporal power. Granted the unity of the world the idea was self-consistent, and, provided its limits were defined, it contained a seed of permanent value which may yet fructify. But the breaking up of the Roman Empire, in itself a consequence of the "incarnation" of several European peoples, brought about a complete transformation of the idea of sovereignty. The sovereign was no longer the Head of Christendom. The sovereigns—in plural—henceforth were the kings and princes in whom the several nations had incarnated.

Thus between the Christian and Christendom there rose mighty human beings, the nations, with a powerful will of their own. This national will asserted itself equally in its relations with the Christian and in its relations with Christendom. To the first it opposed absolutism; to the second sovereignty.

Inasmuch as the alternative to national sovereignty was the sovereignty of Christendom and of its temporal head, the triumph of national sovereignty was fateful, and, at least temporally, beneficial. The Reformation made it easier since it split the Christian world, thus destroying the unity of mankind, on which alone the sovereignty of the whole could rest. But, in any case, the effort to unify the world on the basis of dogmatic religion was doomed to failure, if only for this reason

of permanent value: that a dogmatic religion can never hope to cover the whole world. The evolution of history took, therefore, the best possible course. Yet, when we look at it *sub specie aeternitatis* we cannot but record that the growth of sovereign States carried with it two unfortunate results: it diminished to vanishing-point the area of individual liberty; it broke the unity of mankind in so far as it existed in Europe and increased the liberty and power of irresponsible sovereigns. From this period, therefore, the middle term in our human series—men, nations, and mankind—was to prevail over the two extremes.

Such predominance has in no way been affected by changes in political doctrine. Political ideas in Europe, after a brief period during which France absorbs whatever the Continent could assimilate from English thought, fall under the leadership of France, and France is by its very nature profoundly centralizing and Statist. Thus, whether incarnated in "the king" or in "the people," whether monarchist or republican, European political thought remains at bottom absolutist in that it does not recognize any limitation to the will of the nation.

Such is the origin of the curious state of affairs which we all found when we landed on this earth for a brief spell of experience. Mankind as a unit had wellnigh gone. Two kinds of human beings remained: individuals and nations; the first bound to each other by a moral law, but bound to their nation by a national loyalty stronger in fact than all moral law. As for nations, they were privileged human beings. No law, divine or human, could check the free play of their will. Power was the only law they knew and respected.

As a result of this state of affairs, a third phase in the

incarnation of national souls had set in. Embodied in a territory, impersonated in a State, the nation—once free, unconscious, and poor—seeks wealth and prosperity. The unlimited licence which the victim finds in the absence of all international ethics will be used by it in the conquest of material gains. Thus the pre-War world shows the spectacle of nations struggling through peace and war to conquer the spoils of the world, exacting a full measure of loyalty from even the most high-minded of the men in their midst, in utter disproportion with the aim to which it was destined.

A strange sight, indeed, after centuries of Christian civilizing efforts. Individual human beings, slowly elevated from the dark ages of cannibalism to a standard of comparative civilization, are seen sacrificing their best feelings of co-operation, order, fraternity, and restraint of brutal instincts, to collective human beings capable still of devouring each other.

For intellectual honesty forces us to own that nations, considered as collective human beings, were still fifteen years ago in a period of development corresponding to the cave-dwelling epoch in individual life, and the task of the best men of our age, the men of the New Era, born in a sea of blood, must be to help our poor brethren—those mighty children called nations—to grow to true manhood and to attain the age of reason.

Let us look at them with love. A love not limited to our own nation. He does not love his child who does not love all children. He does not love his country who does not love all countries. We have—have we not?—outgrown that patriotism which is like a gregarious feeling keeping all the herd together, held by the warmth and the smell of the species—that patriotism that looks askance at everything and everybody outside

the limits of the meadows in which the herd is used to feed. We have^{*} learned to love our country as one of the manifestations of God in man placed in the world of nations, as men are placed in the world of individuals, to find itself in experience. And in this love our patriotism expands and becomes purer from animal elements, richer in human insight, more capable of embracing the other nations in its sympathy.

Nor is it necessary to renounce our sense of the deep unworthiness of this or that nation. Judged by their deserts, which of them would 'scape hanging? Our love for them, like our love for our own, must be given them as much for their shortcomings as for their deserts. As much, or perhaps more. For—let us say it again—it behoves us grown-up men who understand the language of reason to take the mighty children we call nations by the hand and lead them gently towards the light: a thankless task, a long task, therefore a task of love.

And who could not love in the sight of so much misery? Remember the calvary which twenty nations underwent twenty years ago. Madness had never gone so far. Notice that past wars had been fought by men who went mad and found the savage in them, while twenty years ago the men remained wise, and when the giant children to whom they were bound by chains of love and loyalty went mad, they took their rifle with a trembling hand and with a sad smile they went to death sighing: "'Tis a pity." For the world of men was civilized but weak, while the world of nations was still in a primitive stage but all-powerful.

Both suffered agony. Men and nations drank their fill of tears and blood. When men and nations fight the only victor is folly, and while the banners of folly waved

all over Europe their meaningless levity, the men who remained went back to their depleted homes, while the nations re-entered their caves to lick their wounds in sullen silence.

It was a privilege to be alive in those days. Men, still surrounded by the memories of the battlefields, on which Death had laid down his harvest, invented the pious myth of the Unknown Warrior—the man who had given all, even his name. The nations gradually took over the myth and made of it a rite, a cult, a worship. It was no longer a monument to the memory of the man, the fallen, but to the glory of the nation for ever standing. A subtle change, a gradual change. The tomb became an altar. And so, by a process logical though unexpected, the nations, feeling themselves all-powerful, deified themselves. The mighty and irresponsible children dreamt themselves gods.

Meanwhile, at the table of the Paris Conference, round which sat twenty nations, a man let fall five immortal words: "A living thing is born." He pointed to the New Covenant. The League of Nations, a living thing, was born. A Law for the gods.

While men were being crushed by nations, mankind was resuscitated. The old ideal of a unified Christendom came back enlarged and rejuvenated. No longer limited to Europe, nor to the Christian faith, it shone for the first time in all its inherent universality which the dogma-bound spirits of old had been unable to give it. A living thing was born, because it brought with it a spirit, and this spirit had hovered over the battlefields of Europe for centuries and centuries, waiting. It had to wait until matter was ready to receive it. Its inherent universality required a world ready to be universal. And a universal world could not become possible until

the ingenuity of man had provided the necessary means for the human person and the human mind to travel to and fro with greater freedom from material fetters than in the past, with greater freedom also from dogmatic obstacles than in the past.

And let us notice that the principle of the new Covenant which asserts the unity of mankind is universal. Its virtue is in no way destroyed, perhaps not even weakened, by the fact that several nations refuse to adhere to it in law. The League of Nations as an association of Governments is not yet universal. The League of Nations as a principle symbolizing the unified conscience and the unified consciousness of mankind is a fact, and therefore is universal. In law, Germany and the United States of America do not belong to the League of Nations. In fact, they do. The ethical principles which stand at the basis of the Covenant are too strong for any nation publicly to abjure them. Germany does not. The United States of America do not. They may fail to live up to them, but so do more than one of the official members of the League. Violating one of the Ten Commandments does not make a man unchristian.

Too great a stress is laid upon the letter of the law—a dismal sign of superficial culture and of a materialistic and formalistic turn of mind. Many are those who are more anxious to “bring the United States and Germany into the League” than to see that they apply its principles. Yet, what is best: payment without signature, or signature without payment? Law must be not the origin but the consequence of custom. No law can live unless it be life made law. Our task must be to quicken in our countries the spirit of the unwritten Covenant, so that the written Covenant may live. Now

in this age of ours, so full of wonders, national souls go through strange crises, and deep conflicts are fought in their depths. Nations are living below the Covenant, but dreaming above it. How could we expect from nations a lesser complexity than that we find in men—angels and beasts for ever chained together? Our task must not be to attack the beast, thereby giving it more vigour, but to strengthen the angel. And, as they both live so closely together, this task may require now and then a friendly stroking of the beast—not merely for safety's sake, but out of genuine love. Is it its fault if nature has made it low?

Let us befriend them, these national beasts, our proud yet humble brethren—eagles, lions, cocks, bulls, elephants, and leopards, that picturesque zoo in which heraldry manifests the deep tendencies of national psychologies. Let us recognize ourselves in them and be patient. Maybe they are easier to tame than might be feared.

Our age is old enough to be wise. It is for us, men of good will, quietly and unobtrusively to help in the new work and to spread the new message. Not in the letter, but in the spirit is our faith. The Covenant for us is not so much a document which diplomats sign and seal and parliaments ratify, nor a doctrine which jurists water down and politicians spill, as a living thing the source of which is beyond diplomats, parliaments, jurists, and politicians to check or to divert, still less to conquer. We believe in the spiritual Covenant, because we feel in our conscience and consciousness the conscience and consciousness of mankind.

We are not impressed therefore by arguments drawn from cynical experience, nor by jeering taunts at our idealism. We know that ideas precede facts, and we

discuss the ideas of to-day because we are concerned with the facts of to-morrow. We want to create a new life, so that the new law may live. Let us look at the Covenant as an idea, not as a fact.

In thus bringing back the unity of the human race to the service of the world's conscience, the Covenant alters fundamentally the relations between men, nations, and mankind. A full vista of such alterations is hardly possible. The change in the very basis of human rights is too great for any one generation to assimilate its consequences. The Covenant must have as great an effect on international law as the New Testament had in its time. We may, however, suggest a few of the most important changes which are already in sight.

And to begin with, the notion of mankind as a unity within which all nations must act harmoniously dominates the Covenant. This notion cannot envisage any conflict between a nation's interests and the interests of mankind. The conflict, though unacceptable in theory, may materialize in practice when a nation whose interests are so badly understood by itself as to put it in an antagonistic position with mankind, takes one or other of two possible courses: either it defies openly the organized opinion of mankind, or it claims that mankind's own interests are on a line with its own. But such practical conflicts can always be dealt with by the organized will of mankind, on condition that the possibility of the theoretical conflict be not admitted. For in such a case two courses again lie open: the recalcitrant nation must be brought to obedience by the organized force of mankind, or the organized opinion of mankind must adjudge as to the rights and wrongs of the case.

Thus the Covenant returns to the old principles

which the Spanish school of jurists tried to teach to the old world. The world then was a Christendom doomed to fail as a basis of universal unity. To-day true unity is established, thanks to religious freedom of thought and to mechanical freedom of movement. A conscience and a consciousness are growing in the world, and, in the name of this higher and wider unity, war is outlawed, as it was then in the name of the Christian God. War is no longer the right of any nation. War is a crime if unjust: that is, if fought against the ideas of mankind; and a duty if just: that is, if fought in the interests of justice. Private war is piracy.

It follows that mankind must be organized, firstly in order to be able to form a collective, considered, and enlightened opinion of its own interests; secondly, in order to ensure the prevalence of its interests over those of temporarily unenlightened nations which may be at variance with it.

The first of these two needs can hardly be said to be adequately met by the present written Covenant. It is true that most of the thinking and searching which an investigation of the true interests of humanity implies are and should always be done by free-lance minds working in all independence and under the stimulus of an honoured calling. Yet there is room for hope that some co-ordination of mental and moral effort may be attained in the future, in order that the forces of wisdom and goodwill may be properly canalized and utilized without impairing the vigour of their individual springs. What is wanted is some means whereby the world may slowly evolve spiritual and intellectual assizes, world gatherings wide enough for the world mind to manifest itself. The Assembly of the League of Nations is a political body. It is con-

cerned with action, with the here and now. But though it is itself international, the spiritual and intellectual inspiration which drives it is but a cacophony of national inspirations. What is wanted is some kind of world assizes which, like the Church Councils of old, but out of dogma and out of creed, should now and then take the bearings of the planet and set its course aright.

Between this high inspiration and the political application thereof some intermediary organization is necessary in order that the world may adapt its leadership to its needs and its principles to its problems. The world must work out in detail the present state of its requirements, the trend of forces and events, its technical problems. For this task mankind requires a system, the germ of which is already in existence in what Geneva calls its Technical Organizations. What is wanted here is more courage and strength in the tackling of difficulties on an international basis, and a greater measure of spiritual and intellectual inspiration in the solving of them. The first would widen, the second deepen, the work.

Nor can we say that the political organization set up by the written Covenant is more satisfactory. Mankind, we have found, must organize itself in order to ensure that its interests prevail over those of nations led astray by unruly passions. This organization implies an international judiciary and a political system; the first able to deal from an impartial and detailed point of view with problems arising out of the relationship between nations on the one hand and, on the other, between nations and mankind, or even individuals; the second, capable of foreseeing conflicts and of solving them by peaceful means and, if need be, pledged to stand by the findings of its judiciary. A war in actual

fact would then be considered a duty or a crime, according to whether it was fought on behalf of or in defiance of this system.

From the establishment of such a system certain consequences are bound to flow with regard to the rights and duties of nations and of individuals.

To begin with, a nation which indulges in private war is a pirate nation. Any measures taken against it must be considered in the light of police measures, and therefore cannot grant to the pirate nation the status of a belligerent. The notion of "belligerent" corresponds in the world of nations to that of the duellist in the world of men. It must disappear from our ethics so that it may vanish from international law. Henceforth we can recognize no right to the use of power but that of organized mankind. Pirates have no rights to power.

If a private war is a crime, a nation must not be able to force its citizens to participate in it. We come back to the tenets of the Salamanca School. The citizen has a right to his conscience, but, while in the sixteenth century there was no umpire who could decide as to who—the Prince or his subject—was right, to-day in our minds there exists a higher judiciary which can decide whether war is fair or foul. Against unruly nations fighting wars which the organized opinion of mankind has decreed to be criminal, right-minded citizens of those nations must be protected. In such cases the International Court may have jurisdiction as between a nation and a man.

Bold? Unwise? Utopian? Yes. But why should we limit the flight of our mind to the size of our back-yard? Let politicians, let even statesmen, feel bound by the chains of present-day reality. Let them even

present or imagine as additional weight of such chains the mere weakness of their conservative legs. We are not concerned with present-day facts, but with present-day vision. We want to enrich our vision. Nothing reveals the divine origin of man better than his instant recognition of the higher vision and his reluctance in accepting any lower sight than his eyes have seen. We want to open our eyes to the higher vision. Ours. Not everybody's. All eyes are not ready. But of those whose eyes are, let it not be said: eyes they have, yet have they not seen.

THE MACHINERY OF INDIRECT RULE IN PAPUA

by Sir HUBERT MURRAY, K.C.M.G.,
Lieutenant-Governor of Papua

Indirect Rule in Nigeria

“Il ne laissa pas seulement aux peuples vaincus leurs mœurs, il leur laissa encore leurs lois civiles, et souvent même les rois et les gouverneurs qu’il avait trouvés. Il respecta les traditions anciennes, et il voulait tout conquérir pour tout conserver.” Such is the testimony of Montesquieu to the administration of Alexander the Great. The passage, which was underlined by Marshal Lyautey, gives as fair a definition of Indirect Rule as one could wish to find, though this system of government is generally applauded as a comparatively recent discovery of British administration in Africa.

Nigeria is the classical instance of Indirect Rule, but Sir Hugh Clifford tells us that the method was adopted there, “not from design but from necessity”; and there it has been, as he says, “a triumphant success.” In Nigeria there were Chiefs and Courts and a native administration already in existence, and all that was necessary was to stiffen the administration, to strengthen the Courts, and to rule through the Chiefs; but what is to be done in a territory like Papua, where there are practically no Chiefs worth talking about, no existing administration, and no Courts; where there is, in fact, no one to rule through, and nothing to serve as a foundation?

The Problem in Papua

For, though village life in Papua was, in fact, ordered in a reasonably efficient manner, still there was nothing, apart from a few exceptional cases, which corresponds with our idea of government or executive control. It is true that you read about Chiefs in any account of Papua that you care to take up, and it is only natural that in any body of men there should be some of stronger personality than the rest, and such men will take the lead as occasion arises. We may call these men "Chiefs" if we like, but the name is apt to be misleading; for in Papua the power of such men is likely to be personal to themselves, and to have no connection with any recognized position in the community. They are probably merely the strong men of the moment, and when the moment is past they may easily relapse into insignificance. And in most cases their influence is too transient and fleeting to support even the most modest system of Indirect Rule.

I remember that, in the old days on the Fly, we used to see a man painted white all over who had obviously a very great influence. He would marshal the village host and draw his men up in line like trained soldiers, and, at his command, they would double down to their canoes, embark without delay and without confusion, and sally forth to meet us under arms, ready for peace or war at the signal of the man in white. We saw two, or perhaps three, of these men at different villages; they obviously had great authority for the moment, but it would be rash to say that they were "Chiefs" in any general sense. It is quite likely that they had no particular influence except in case of emergency or war.

Village Government in Papua

In many parts of Melanesia the administration is in the hands of a council of old men, but I have never heard of anything of the kind in Papua, even among our Melanesians. Certainly it is difficult to understand how our natives carry on their ordinary village life without any administrative organization. The late Mr. Hartland, in his book on *Primitive Law* (page 26), says that in societies of rudimentary organization "the seal of authority is found to rest in the people themselves," but this is merely to restate the problem, not to solve it. Professor Malinowski, in his book on *Crime and Custom in Savage Society*, finds the social nexus, in the Trobriands at any rate, to consist of the "principle of mutuality," reinforced by sorcery and suicide; and our own Government Anthropologist, Mr. F. E. Williams, explains it in much the same way. Mr. Williams suggests that in a Papuan community the "sympathetic sanction," as he calls it, may supply the motive which a highly civilized people derives from a central authority. There is, he suggests, a spirit of "mateship" running through such a community which would prevent a native from taking advantage of a fellow-villager, just as with Australians (and doubtless with other people) many a man, not otherwise remarkable for civic virtue, would die rather than go back on his mate.

Others have sought to explain the secret of this very efficient lack of organization by attributing it to the "group sentiment" or the "collective unconscious." I confess that I have but a vague idea of what these expressions mean, but perhaps if one is not inclined to accept the more intelligible theories proposed by Pro-

fessor Malinowski and Mr. Williams, one may ascribe it all to the "collective unconscious," and leave it at that.

Alternative of Direct Rule

Well, if we have no Chiefs, no Councils, no Courts, no administrative machinery of any kind, nothing but a very problematical "collective unconscious" and a few stray sorcerers, it may be argued that anything in the nature of Indirect Rule is impossible, and that we are driven to Direct Rule, even against our will. And Sir Donald Cameron is very definite on the point. He realizes "that sometimes there is no Native Authority in the form of a Chief or a Council adequate to the task of Government"; "where this is the case," he continues, "it is useless to bolster up an inefficient figurehead. The people must be ruled directly by British officers." (See *Africa*, October 1934, page 424.) And Sir Harry Moorhouse, who went from Nigeria to the Solomons to inquire into the murder of Mr. Bell and his police, takes an almost equally hopeless view. He speaks of the "shocks" received by his "preconceived notions for grafting on the Solomon Islands the principles of Indirect Government borrowed from experience in Nigeria," though he admitted, eventually, that there was "some hope, with patience and very slowly, of building up a native administration in which the people will have a real share."

And in Papua we took the chance, slight though it was. After all, the "figureheads" need not necessarily be particularly inefficient; and perhaps indeed, in the absence of a chiefly class, we have a better opportunity of avoiding inefficiency, for our choice is less restricted. It is when one is limited to a few ruling families that

one runs the risk of finding oneself burdened with the "picturesque antiquity" whom Sir James Currie mentions, and who has no administrative ideas of his own, but is ready to "dance to the piping" of those who care to play to him. (See *Africa, ubi supra.*)

Village Constables and Councils

To fill the place of the non-existent Chiefs, Sir William MacGregor appointed native officials whom he called Village Constables. He was very proud of his Village Constables, and he had every reason to be, for they have done good work; but their appointment had no relation to any principle of Indirect Rule, which, indeed, had hardly been heard of at that time. It was really an act of the most obvious Direct Rule, for these men are servants of the Government. They are selected and paid by the Government, and they hold office during the pleasure of the Government; and their duties are to act as the mouthpiece of the Government, and to carry out police duties generally. The weakness of their position is that they are not in any sense representatives of the village people; and to remedy this defect we have, in recent years, established Village Councils, in order to give the villagers an opportunity of taking part in the management of their own affairs.

The villagers select the Council by whatever method seems best to them, sometimes by popular vote, sometimes by a show of hands, sometimes as the result of a discussion among themselves; and the term of office is generally three years, though it may be as long as the villagers please. The duty of the Councils is to make suggestions for the improvement of village life, or of native life generally, either direct to the Magistrate or

through the Village Constable. The Councillors are not paid.

The two initial difficulties in native administration are (i) that the white man really knows very little about the native, and (ii) that the native knows even less about the white man; and it was thought that the Councillors, if judiciously handled, could help to remove the second of these difficulties. Thus they can, and in fact do, render good service in explaining to the rest of the village the general objects of the administration. The Magistrate explains to the Councillors, and the Councillors to the rest of the village, that the native tax, for instance, does not go into the pockets of the tax-collectors but really comes back to the villages in the shape of schools, medical treatment, and so forth; that we really are anxious that the people should live together in peace and prosperity, and that we do not make men carry heavy burdens along steep and slippery paths for our own amusement, but that we always have some definite object in view, and that nine times out of ten what we are doing is for their benefit.

These, the Village Constabulary and the Councils, are the slender machinery which we have provided to assist us in our attempt at Indirect Rule. Fanatics of that form of government would disapprove of both, for both Constables and Councils are creations of the Government and are quite foreign to Papuan ideas. The Papuans themselves are, as a rule, strong supporters of Direct Rule. There was, at first, no wish for the appointment of Councillors. "Why should we have Councillors?" they would ask. "It is the white man's business to carry on the government; we do not know anything about it, and do not want to. We are quite satisfied with things as they are."

Village Councils in Action

And indeed at first the Councils were of little use, and it looked at one time as though they were going to be a failure. The Councillors were timid, and reluctant to volunteer an opinion on any subject; but, by degrees, as they saw that their suggestions were taken seriously, they gained courage, and they are beginning now to offer interesting and useful proposals. For instance, the Port Moresby Council advised that it would be a good thing if notices were circulated among labourers and others, advising them to pay their money into the Bank instead of wasting it on gambling, or on the purchase of silly things which they did not really want. There is a difficulty in adapting the language of a Stone Age community to the conditions of modern banking, but this difficulty was overcome, and the notices were issued accordingly. And I have been present at a very interesting debate on the subject of sorcery, in which, unfortunately, the conservatives gained the day.

And such practical reforms are not limited to Port Moresby; from Councils in remote districts we get reports of resolutions which have been passed modifying such practices as the segregation of widows, and dealing with other questions of ordinary village life. Last year, for instance, a report came in of a meeting in Milne Bay. It is true that, according to the report, the Chairman presented a sufficiently absurd picture, for he made his appearance in a lady's imitation straw hat, which he insisted upon wearing throughout the proceedings, but the resolutions passed by him and his Council were sensible enough. One resolution condemned, on the ground of inconvenience, the existing custom of changing the site of a village whenever a pig

died; and another decided that roads and plantations should be cleaned every new moon and the village every Friday.

Then in Port Moresby last year we had a discussion on female education. Boys, it was admitted, should be educated, only, so it appeared, because a boy who could read and write and who knew English was likely to get a better job than one who could not; but the majority of the Council was absolutely opposed to the education of girls. Girls did not seek jobs; their work lay in the house or in the garden, their attendance at school was a waste of time, and what they learned was no good to them, and, on the contrary, was likely to lead them astray. Their knowledge of reading and writing enabled them to correspond with boys, and so to upset the arrangements which their parents had made for their marriage; and there had even been cases, so it was said, where married women, who had been to school, had actually written letters to men who were not their husbands.

Certainly there is a real danger that both men and women may lose their old skill in the garden, in the bush, and on the sea; but the arguments used by the majority are too like those which, when I was a boy, were used against all suggestions for the education of what were then called "the lower orders." The education of girls is perhaps more important than that of boys, and Lord Lugard quotes with approval an expression of opinion by Lord Dalhousie that "a larger proportionate impulse is given to the advancement of a people by the education of its women than by that of the men." And I find in a recent book on Africa a statement which appears to me to be undoubtedly true—namely, that "education for boys cannot go a

step farther or faster than education for girls, for they are the two wings of the bird which must be equal if native society is to lift itself and make substantial progress." (*Modern Industry and the African*, by J. Merle Davis, page 329.)

A pleasing feature about the Village Councils is the good fellowship that prevails. If a Councillor loses his seat his more fortunate fellows offer him their sympathy, and congratulate him on the good work that he has done, in all cases with absolute sincerity; and the elections go off without ill feeling. It may be desirable to extend the system in the future, and to arrange for the amalgamation of different Councils into one large Conference on matters of common importance; but here I see a danger. Perhaps I am too timid, but, while I do not think that there is any risk of undue interference by the Government with the social side of Papuan life, I fear that, politically, we may, if we are not careful, be led too far and too fast by an excess of devotion to our own particular fetish, which, in the case of Australians, takes the shape of an advanced democracy.

Land, Marriage, Inheritance

The guiding principle of Indirect Rule is the preservation of native custom, and there are certain departments of administration in which native customs can be adopted in their entirety, without difficulty and without injustice.

Take land, for instance. Native lands are held under native tenure; it is not until they have been purchased from their native owners (and only the Government can purchase) that they become subject to British law. To codify all the different land tenures in Papua would

be beyond the powers of man, for they vary almost as much as the languages of the Territory; but there is no need to codify them. The few disputes that arise about land concern questions of fact; the question of tenure is, I think, never in dispute.

So with questions of inheritance. Among the Motu of Port Moresby descent is much the same as with us; the custom varies in different parts of the Territory, but, whatever the custom is, we are careful not to interfere with it, and cases of disputed inheritance are practically unknown. It is difficult to see what advantage would accrue from forcing the Statute of Distributions upon an unwilling community, who would certainly not understand it, and would never willingly be bound by its provisions. Therefore we have left well alone, and I think that we have done wisely.

The question of marriage is not quite so easy. It can rarely be wise to interfere directly with native marriages, except in the case of child marriage, that is, the marriage of children of eight or ten years to grown men. I suppose that a Government would be justified in prohibiting such marriages, but in Papua we do not interfere with them; and in fact with us, and probably elsewhere, the marriage is usually not consummated until the bride has reached maturity.

It rarely happens in Papua that customs relating to land, inheritance, or marriage call for Government action; but then comes the question of offences against these customs, as, for instance, offences against marriage. What are we to do in the case of adultery? In the old days the adulterer had a bad time if he had not friends who could protect him; he might have to pay heavy damages in native wealth, or he might

even be killed. The wife too might be killed but would probably be soundly beaten, and returned to her parents.

We British, however, do not regard adultery as a crime; we denounce it as a sin and leave it at that, with a possible claim for damages in the Divorce Court. How are we to deal with a people who regard adultery as a very aggravated form of theft?

The disorder which arises in a native village when an adulterer is detected forbids us to leave things as they are; but, on the other hand, it seems illogical to treat adultery as a crime among the primitive race when we do not regard it as a crime among ourselves, and so to demand from the primitive a higher standard of morality than from the civilized. But to do so is to adopt the native point of view, and is therefore in full accordance with the principles of Indirect Rule. And, after all, native administration is often illogical. It is common enough to demand and to expect more from a native than one would ever get from a white man; and so adultery, committed by a Papuan, is a crime punishable with six months' imprisonment, though the same offence, if committed by a white man, would not be punished at all.

The punishment of adultery as a crime is one of the few instances in which native custom has compelled its recognition by the criminal law; and I think that sorcery may be taken as another instance. It appears that the same two offences have modified British law elsewhere (e.g. in Rhodesia), and in the same way (*Modern Industry and the African*, by E. Merle Davis, pages 240-1). Sorcery, that is, black magic, is a source of constant trouble in the Papuan villages; few white people believe in it, but it is very real to the

native, who in many parts of the Territory is hardly free for one moment from this terror, from the cradle to the grave, throughout the whole of his demon-haunted life. In some districts all deaths were attributed to sorcery, and the sorcerer was roughly handled, when hatred and the call for vengeance proved stronger than fear.

So to prevent, to some extent, the retaliatory violence caused by the practice of sorcery, we have made it an offence punishable with a short term of imprisonment. The native criticism, that the punishment is too light to be effective, is perhaps justified. But one is unwilling to impose a heavy penalty for what is really an imaginary offence; one may class sorcery as "deceit," as, in fact, we do in the regulation which deals with this offence, but the sorcerer generally believes in his power as implicitly as does his victim.

Criminal Courts and Procedure

There were no Courts in Papua, and consequently no law, in the judicial sense of the term. I am aware that distinguished anthropologists differ as to the meaning that should be attached to the word "law," but, as a mere lawyer, I am content to rely upon the authority of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, who have decided that the usages of peoples such as the Papuans "are not to be reconciled with the institutions or the legal ideas of civilized society." (In *re* Southern Rhodesia Law Reports Appeal Cases, 1919.)

In such primitive communities, what we regard as a crime against the public peace was essentially a private wrong, and personal vengeance took the place which police action takes with us; and "clearly a system of substantive law which proceeded on such principles as

these could not be tolerated in any part of the British Empire.”* So, in the absence of any native Courts or laws of any kind, we had to establish Courts and to apply laws of our own: Direct Rule, it must be admitted, of the most barefaced nature. But, after all, Indirect Rule was made for man and not man for Indirect Rule; and if Direct Rule gives better results, Indirect Rule must go by the board, for there is nothing peculiarly sacrosanct about either of them. However, in our Courts, and in the administration of law generally, we show our loyalty to the Indirect method by giving full effect to native custom, so far as this is possible.

The more serious criminal cases come before the Central Court upon indictment, but the indictable offences that a Papuan can commit are comparatively few in number. The more elaborate crimes are denied him; he cannot be a fraudulent bankrupt or a defaulting trustee, not because he is too honest, but because he never gets the chance. Murder, rape, and theft, however, are within his competence, and when he commits these or similar crimes he may be brought before the Central Court.

The Criminal Code of Queensland has been adopted in Papua with a few modifications, but the procedure on the trial is simplified to an extent that would horrify an Old Bailey practitioner, for the utmost simplicity is necessary if there is to be anything like a fair trial; and above all, it is necessary to see that an innocent man is not induced, by a misplaced sense of courtesy, to plead guilty to the charge of a crime which he has not committed.

* Report of an Inquiry into the Administration of Justice in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika. Published 1934, p. 57.

Consideration of Custom in Criminal Cases

And then, during the trial, the question arises what effect, if any, can be given to native custom. Most of the trials are for murder or other crimes of violence, and the evidence may show, for instance, that the murder was committed as an act of retributive justice, as a necessary part of social etiquette, or as an act of courtesy to oblige a friend; or the crime may be due to the desire of a lad of mettle to "show off" before the girls of the village, or to the ambition to wear certain insignia which are confined to those who have taken human life. Occasionally, though rarely, the custom is of such a kind that it can be used by way of substantive defence by negating the criminal intent; but in the instances that I have given the custom would be regarded as material in fixing the sentence.

Then there are many cases into which native custom does not enter at all and where the crime has been committed from motives which are powerful all over the world: cases, for example, of murders which arise out of love-affairs or private quarrels, sudden outbursts of temper, and so forth. And there are a lot of miscellaneous murders which cannot be brought under any particular heading. Such, for instance, is the case of the man who was killed because "he talked too much," another where the killing was justified on the ground that the deceased "was not very much good," and again, where two runaway carriers were killed because they "looked cold and hungry," and where the prisoner confessed to the practice of killing women, who, he said, "were easy to catch and did not carry spears." The slaying of the man who "talked too much" was

treated as justifiable homicide, but no question of native custom enters into such cases, except, of course, that allowance must be made generally for the lower culture.

Danger of Administrative Fads

I have had a long experience in Papuan administration, but I do not think that my experience has taught me very much: that is to say, I have no particular reason to believe that my administration is better now than it was twenty years ago. But there is one lesson which I really have learned, and that is to avoid making useless experiments. Experiments are unavoidable, but we should remember that we are playing for very high stakes, no less, indeed, than the lives and the happiness of human beings. Even the most prosaic and unimaginative of us have fads and caprices of our own, and we whom fate or accident has placed in control of these primitive peoples must always be on our guard against the temptation to work off our fads upon our helpless and unresisting charges. A loyal adherence to Indirect Rule and a genuine attempt to understand native custom may save us; but we must remember that the temptation is very real, for the native has little power of self-expression, he can offer no effective resistance, and he lies completely at our mercy. In our own country, if we attempted to give practical effect to our idiosyncrasies our fellow-countrymen would hang us on the nearest lamp-post, but the wretched "primitive" has no such protection; the long-suffering cannibal and the patient head-hunter can only endure in silence.

POST-WAR ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION

THE STORY OF A PROJECT

by Professor ALFRED ZIMMERN

SOME TIME in 1915 Mr. Asquith realized that the transition from war to peace would require as much forethought and detailed preparation as the transition from peace to war. He therefore conceived the idea that there should be drawn up what he called a "Peace Book," corresponding to the "War Book," which had been prepared by the Committee of Imperial Defence under the editorship of Sir Maurice Hankey. The person on whom he fixed his choice as editor of the Peace Book was Mr. Vaughan Nash, the Secretary of the Development Commission. Thus it was that before the end of 1915 a small, indeed a miniature, staff was installed in the office of the Development Commission in Dean's Yard under the imposing title of "The Reconstruction Committee."

The investigations and projects of the Reconstructionists were mainly devoted to the domestic problems which the return to peace would involve. But it is impossible to set limits to the inquiring spirit of a group of public servants seconded from routine work and asked to think for themselves—particularly when half an hour at tea-time every afternoon has been set aside for the exchange of ideas. Thus it was that the international aspects of reconstruction came within their ken and it was realized that a study of the problem of the transition from war to peace in the enemy countries would not only throw some light on the technical issues of British domestic reconstruction but might also have a bearing on the issues of the war

itself. Some time in 1916, therefore, Mr. Nash suggested that a study should be undertaken of reconstruction plans in Germany.

German discussions on post-war reconstruction began early in the war in the form of a controversy between the advocates of private trading and free initiative on the one hand and the upholders of State control in industry on the other. When it became clear, after the Battle of the Marne and the beginning of trench warfare, that an early end to the war was out of the question, the need for State control became more and more evident, but its working at the same time more and more irksome. Thus as early as May 1915 the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce declared in a resolution that "if at the end of a victorious war Germany's trade has been robbed of its independence and freedom by the introduction of State monopolies, England will have the right to claim the economic victory"; and the Government was called upon to declare itself in the matter. It did so early in 1916, when the question was debated in the Budget Committee of the Reichstag. The Government spokesman was Dr. Richter, the Under Secretary of the Interior. His speech bore witness to the embarrassment and apprehensions which were already then being felt in German Government circles. He began by saying that in his opinion a trade war after the war was unlikely and that freedom of commerce must be restored as far as possible. He then proceeded to reveal the extent of his apprehensions by discussing the provision of the most important raw materials after the war. For this purpose he said that it would be necessary to found industrial self-governing companies (the very monopolies deprecated in the Hamburg resolution) on which

the Government would be represented by a Commissioner. These companies, he said, would purchase and distribute raw materials and would act as intelligence departments. The problem of foreign exchange, he added, would be solved by a limited export of gold, but better still by the barter of commodities, in which potash (Germany's one important raw material monopoly) would play an important part.

The Economic Conference of the Allies in June 1916, resulting in the well-known Paris Resolutions,^{*} evidently hastened the practical elaboration of these projects. At the end of July the organization adumbrated by the Under Secretary of the Interior took shape. An Imperial Commissionership for the transition from War to Peace Economy was created and, no doubt in order to placate Hamburg commercial interests, the post was entrusted to a Hamburg Senator, Dr. Sthamer, who was at that time acting as civil governor of Antwerp and later became the first German Ambassador in London after the war.

The Commissioner was armed with very wide powers. He was officially attached to the Ministry of the Interior, the department responsible for commercial and industrial policy, but the detailed regulations made it clear that, within the sphere of his own work, he occupied an independent position, subject only to the Imperial Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, and his deputy, Herr von Helfferich, who happened also to be Minister of the Interior.

Under these regulations the Imperial Commissioner was to put forward requests to the Ministry of the Interior to be allowed to assume control of any war material or commodity which he might think it

expedient to submit to such treatment. When its control was handed over to him he was empowered:

- (1) to estimate the post-war demand for it,
- (2) to see that it was provided for,
- (3) to arrange for its distribution among consumers.

Under the second heading he was authorized:

- (1) to ascertain the amount already held either as raw material or in the manufactured state by individuals or syndicates (this was no doubt intended to refer to stocks held by Germans, or bought on behalf of Germans by neutrals in any part of the world);
- (2) to organize purchase by the State, either through companies already existing or by the formation of new ones or through individuals;
- (3) to finance such purchases;
- (4) to organize their transport by sea, rail, or inland waterways.

The Commissioner was to be assisted by an Advisory Council consisting of representatives of the "highest departments of State" and of the State Governments and also of experts. The Council was to be nominated by the Imperial Chancellor, but the names of experts were to be put forward by the Commissioner, who was also normally to preside over the Council. He was thus, in effect, placed in a super-departmental position.

The new organization was rapidly set in motion. By October 14, 1916, when the Deputy Chancellor, the Commissioner, and the Under Secretary for the Interior appeared before the Reichstag Committee for Trade and Industry, eight Assistant Commissioners had already been appointed, representing Finance, Shipping, Commerce and the leading industries. There

was another meeting of the Reichstag Committee on February 28, 1917, when the Commissioner reported further progress. The points dealt with, according to the Press accounts, included the exchange problem, the problem of tonnage, the distribution of home and foreign raw materials, the employment of demobilized workers, and the question of food rations, which were to be continued for some time after the signature of peace. The Commissioner declared, however, that in view of the existing situation (February 28, 1917), it would be impossible to formulate a definite programme for several months yet. As regards the powers of the proposed Raw Material Distribution Companies and the use of the purchases of raw material already made, the Commissioner said that he looked forward to the Distribution Companies being independent bodies set up within each industry, under the supervision of the Commissioner.

It is clear from this brief and discreet account that considerable purchases of raw material had been made and also that the Imperial Commissioner had been allowed considerably to extend the original scope of his department.

A few weeks later the United States entered into the war, thereby transforming the whole situation, both immediate and future.

When the submarine gamble failed and German opinion was compelled to face the reconstruction problem under the altered conditions, the gathering danger brought new policies to the front. The commercial community no longer pleaded for a return to free initiative. The demand was now for an indemnity in the form of raw materials. This was put forward both by the Lower House of the Free City of Ham-

burg, in a sitting held on May 16, 1918, and by meetings of the *Handelstag* and the *Hansabund* (an association of general trading and manufacturing interests) at about the same time. But those who were nearer to the centre of affairs realized that indemnities must by now be regarded as out of the question. What other way out, which would save Germany from economic ruin, could be found? Only one expedient remained—international action, the internationalizing of the reconstruction problem, at least so far as concerned industrial raw materials and shipping. Thus in May and June 1918 there began to appear in the German and Austrian Press suggestions that the economic issues of the war should not be settled at the sword's point but by means of international planning.

The first statement on this subject to attract notice in London was an article contributed to the Vienna *Neue Freie Presse* on May 19th by Dr. Dernburg, a former German Colonial Minister. "Even if we recovered the German colonies and a good slice of Africa besides," he wrote, "the Central Powers could not meet the demand of their peoples for raw material. Very few neutral States remain to help us out. Neither Sweden nor Spain nor the Dutch colonies can give us what we need, useful though their contributions are. The rest of the world, with the exception of Mexico, Argentina and Chile, has joined our enemies; and since all these States retain sovereign powers to regulate their imports and exports in any way they please, there is nothing to prevent them from prolonging their war-time legislation in time of peace. England and her Dominions have already shown the way in this direction."

It was therefore, he argued, not a question of "securing permission" for the free use of the seas and the delivery of raw materials. Compulsory powers must be provided in case of need to make sure that the Central Powers got their due. "This compulsion," he continued, "can only be exercised as the result of an agreement between all the sovereign States to set up an International Rationing Commission armed with powers of judicial decision, which will be *empowered to allocate, transport, and pay for the materials on the basis of standards previously laid down*. . . . The determination of quotas will be difficult, but more difficult questions have been known to be settled. What this will mean in practice is that a very large part of the merchant shipping of the world will be plying under a single control, that a long list of materials will be drawn up, and the individual States will be asked and, if necessary, compelled to deliver the products of their own territory for the benefit of the world as a whole. In other words, the distribution of raw materials and of a portion of the articles of consumption will remain in Government hands for a period which, though it will be as short as possible, will not be inconsiderable."

This bold and comprehensive scheme for a solution of Germany's difficulties on international lines was soon followed by an article in the *Kreuz-Zeitung* of June 5th, which showed that the idea had penetrated to ultra-Conservative circles. The anonymous writer of the article in question urged that Germany should demand "participation in international commissions of control for all spheres of economic interest in place of an actual war indemnity."

Thus, by the closing months of the war, the German authorities—those most closely in touch with

the actual problems which Germany would have to face in her own domestic life—had been driven to look to international action, to solutions on League of Nations lines, as the only way out of the impasse into which they had drifted.

Let us now cross the North Sea and study the same situation as seen from the standpoint of British policy. No one who watched this German situation developing month by month and week by week by means of the material available in Whitehall could avoid reflecting on its bearings upon the war-policy of the Allies or from arriving at certain definite conclusions on that subject.

Up to the time of the United States' entry into the war, little attention had been paid on the Allied side to the problem of post-war economic policy. It is true that under the inspiration of M. Clémentel, the energetic French Minister of Commerce, an Inter-allied Economic Conference had taken place in Paris on June 14-17, 1916, and had adopted a series of resolutions dealing, in part, with economic policy in the post-war period. Seen in retrospect, these resolutions are chiefly interesting in the present connection because they laid down for the first time in definite terms in an inter-Allied document the distinction between the transition period immediately following the cessation of hostilities and the normal peace-time situation to which it would lead up. For the former, certain temporary arrangements were contemplated, as compared with the "permanent measures of mutual assistance and collaboration amongst the Allies" which were to be adopted later. But neither the transitional nor the permanent post-war measures really interested Whitehall at that moment. They were regarded as a

concession to French defeatism, or to the French desire to be assured of a possible line of retreat, at the height of the Verdun fighting, in the breathless interval before Kitchener's Army had come into action on the Somme. This is certainly the most likely explanation as to why two such orthodox Liberals as Mr. McKenna and Mr. Runciman, one of whom was then at the Treasury and the other at the Board of Trade, agreed "to take the necessary steps without delay to render themselves independent of the enemy countries in so far as regards the raw materials and manufactured articles essential to the *normal* development of their economic activities" and to extend the same principle to finance, shipping, and foreign trade generally. What Whitehall was chiefly interested in was neither the transitory measures nor the permanent measures, classed as B and C in the resolutions, but the measures for the war-period enumerated under A; in other words, the tightening up of the blockade, or, in post-war language, the better organization of economic and financial sanctions.

With the entry of the United States into the war, the conditions underlying the B and C sections of the Paris Resolutions disappeared. There was no reason to fear that the Allies would be driven to accept a stalemate peace followed by a German offensive on the economic plane. On the contrary, the economic offensive after the war, as during the war, was in the hands of the Allies. Moreover, it was obvious to any close student of German internal conditions that Germany's dependence on the Allies for raw materials and the other means indispensable for the resumption of her normal peace-time economy provided the Allies with a bargaining counter which could be utilized *during the war*

itself as a means of influencing German policy. Germany was, in fact, from April 1917 onwards, economically speaking, in a prison-house and the Allies held the key to it. What price could be exacted from her for access to the free air of the outer world?

In a memorandum on "Post-War Commercial Policy in the Light of Recent Events," drawn up in July 1917, a proposal was put forward that the whole situation should be considered afresh by the Allied Governments in the light of the altered circumstances. "It is suggested"—so ran the concluding paragraphs of the memorandum—"that the Cabinet should take steps, by a new invitation to the Allies, including the United States, to secure the reconsideration of the whole question with a view to the adoption of a concerted inter-Allied economic policy during the post-war period. Such a conference would also be invaluable in enabling the Allies to present a united front in negotiating with the enemy on the many economic questions which are likely to be brought forward in the course of the peace discussions. If this view is adopted, the Reconstruction Committee desire to urge the importance of setting on foot forthwith the investigations and discussions necessary for the formulation of a policy to be advocated on behalf of this country and the Dominions."

For various reasons, into which this is not the place to enter, nothing came of this proposal at the time. But a year later, in August 1918, after much public discussion of the question both by the Labour Party and through the Ministry of Propaganda, where Mr. H. G. Wells realized the importance of the issue, it formed the subject of the deliberations of a Cabinet Committee. As a result of a detailed memorandum

drawn up in the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office, that Department was asked to put forward proposals for "the future development of the existing inter-Allied economic organization."

What these instructions involved was nothing less than a review of the whole of the existing inter-Allied machinery so as to enable it to serve the purpose of a general economic association. The inquiry had necessarily to be conducted at the British end, the British members of the existing inter-Allied bodies being called into consultation.

In the course of this process two conferences were held in which a number of Civil Servants took part. The first was a week-end meeting held at Balliol College, Oxford, on September 28th and 29th, just before the Bulgarian Armistice. The second took place in London on October 7th, just after Prince Max von Baden's first Note to President Wilson accepting the Fourteen Points.

The following is a summary of the recommendations of the Memorandum in its final form, as sent in on October 21st.

I

"Even for war purposes the existing inter-Allied economic organization is susceptible of improvement. A General Economic Board should be established as the supreme authority over the whole organization. This Board should take over much of the functions and machinery of the Allied Maritime Transport Council. A new Raw Materials Council and a new Finance Council should be established. These Councils, and also the Transport, Food, and Munition Councils, should become more purely technical administrative

bodies, the Allied Ministers exercising control over their policy through the General Economic Board. Responsibility for economic policy in each country should also be more completely concentrated in the hands of a single authority."

II

"These suggestions apply equally to the period between the termination of hostilities and the conclusion of the definitive treaty of peace, except that the Raw Materials and Munitions Councils could then be amalgamated.

"During this period the whole inter-Allied organization should be maintained. The national controls on which it is based should be strengthened in order to prevent private purchases in primary markets. The adherence of our present enemies to these controls must form one of the conditions of the peace preliminaries, and another condition must be the cession of all enemy shipping to the Transport Council, pending its eventual disposal under the final treaty of peace. The adherence of neutrals must also be secured, and the machinery of the blockade must as rapidly as possible be superseded by the system of control administered by the inter-Allied organization. Where possible, negotiations with neutral Governments should at once be directed to prepare the way for this development.

"During this period, however, the British Empire should aim at relieving itself, as soon as it can honourably do so, of its most onerous obligations towards the Allies in regard to finance, shipping, and raw materials.

"The policy of the Allies should be directed to facilitate as early a return as possible to normal trade conditions, and for this purpose it is above all necessary that some arrangement should, if possible, be made for the cancellation at least in part of intergovernment war debts."

III

"For some time after the definite conclusion of peace a nucleus of international organization must be retained. This should consist of the General Economic Board, with two advisory committees under it on finance and transport. The Board will consider the grant of credits to countries in special need of assistance, and will control a pool of tonnage for their benefit. During the period when existing national controls are being liquidated, international consultation on many points will be desirable, and the programme committees should be retained as consultative bodies for this purpose.

"Closer international control for a longer period may be necessary in the case of certain essential commodities; for instance, wheat, meat, and oil-seeds.

"During the post-war period the international organization must be more or less coterminous in its membership with the League of Nations, though not directly connected with it."

It is hardly necessary to emphasize what the adoption of such a programme would have meant to the world or how the prospects of the League of Nations would have been improved if it had been sent on its way, so to speak, with this "flying start."

What actually happened has only recently become

known in detail, through the publication at Washington in 1933 of the 1918 volumes of the State Department war-time documents. Up to that time the only published information available was that contained in Sir Arthur Salter's *Allied Shipping Control*. There we learn (page 329) that on November 13, 1918, the British War Cabinet adopted the policy outlined in the Foreign Office memorandum and decided:

- (1) To revise the representation in the Maritime Transport Council to make it a General Economic Council;
- (2) To bring the Programme Committees dealing with Raw Materials under a Raw Materials Council, on which the Board of Trade, War Office (Supply Department) and Ministry of Munitions (Raw Materials Department) should be represented.

A communication in this sense was made to the permanent representatives of France, Italy, and the United States on the Allied Maritime Transport Executive.

The United States documents reveal, however, that before November 13th, indeed as early as October 30th, plans to this effect had been approved by the British and French Foreign Offices and were to be submitted to the War Council on the following day. Colonel House, who represented the United States Government on that body, had no instructions, and a long and detailed cable message was sent to Washington urging the need for a prompt affirmative decision.

The answer was not received for ten days, and when it eventually arrived on November 8th, several days after the Armistice terms had been drawn up, it was emphatically negative. The United States Government, speaking through the mouth of Mr. Hoover, not merely refused to agree to the proposed improvements

in the inter-Allied organization, but also declined to continue its collaboration with it at all.

Thus no concerted measures of international economic reconstruction proved possible. The consequences of this omission belong to history.

RHETORIC IN THE ANCIENT WORLD

by EDWYN R. BEVAN, D.LITT., LL.D.

EDUARD NORDEN observed somewhere in his book on Greek *Kunstprosa* that the ancient Greeks seem to have been sensitive to language, as such, to a much greater degree than we of the modern world are. Probably the English care less about language than many other peoples to-day, so that when we try to understand imaginatively the ancient world, it maybe to some extent like a man who has no sensibility to music trying to understand the life of a musician. Certainly the English are much less impressed by mere eloquence than the Latin peoples or the Germans, or even our American cousins. The extraordinary success of Hitler in Germany, won by a faculty of speech which would seem to us (to judge by the bits of his discourse heard on the wireless) energetic vociferation, would hardly have been possible in England. We are made instinctively suspicious by too sonorous or torrential eloquence, and a British statesman may easily win public confidence, not only in spite of a slow, unimpassioned, rough-and-ready manner of speaking, but perhaps in part because of it. In the discourse, spoken or written, which we listen to or read, for the purposes of learning something new to us or being guided in our practical decisions, we are not concerned to seek for a particular pleasure in the words chosen, in the cadences and sequence of sounds. Even to-day some peoples care much about these things. I have before me an account in the *Temps* of a speech pronounced by Monsieur Abel Bonnard at the reception of Marshal Franchet d'Espèrey to the French Academy. The writer says of Monsieur Bonnet's discourse:

Sa parole a un charme célèbre. A la fois solennelle et gracieuse, elle distille savamment la beauté d'une phrase longue et ornée, voire fleurie, où une création perpétuelle d'expressions et d'images enchante l'auditeur. Le discours du 20 juin équivalait parfois à un poème en prose. Tout y est dit noblement, exquisément, et jusqu'au simple mot de "monsieur" prononcé par M. Abel Bonnard, ressemble à "monseigneur" ou à mieux encore. Les censeurs trouvèrent peut-être que la voix de l'orateur s'alentissait trop vers la fin, prenait le ton d'une incantation ou d'un prêche, et que parfois les métaphores surchargeaient le propos. Mais ce serait ce plaindre d'un excès de délices.

This seems very close to the descriptions given us of the displays of oratorical virtuosity in the ancient Greek world and of the kind of criticism which an audience would pass on rival orators, noting fine shades of distinction in the way each supplied the ear with the special gratifications expected. Or take another modern example, the speech by Gabriele D'Annunzio at Genoa in 1915, which is said to have been not negligible among the causes that moved Italy to enter into the War. Its occasion was the bestowal of some honour upon the veterans who had fought under Garibaldi, and D'Annunzio made it a call to the Italian people to enter into the War on the side of the Allies, against the old Austrian foe. It was constructed so as to exemplify all through just those devices which had been used by ancient oratorical technique, new striking figures of speech and carefully ordered assonance and cadence. I remember one sentence: "Delle lor bende funebri noi rifaremo il bianco delle nostre bandieri." There seems a notable resemblance across the ages to the speech by which Gorgias at Olympia called upon the Greeks to take up arms against Persia.

Amongst the physical descendants of the ancient

Hellenes in the Greece of to-day the question of language excites a passion which we find it hard to understand. Whether a speaker or writer expresses himself in phrases which approximate to ancient Greek or to the modern colloquial language used by the uneducated is a matter of the gravest concern. Disagreement about it may divide families. I think it was some years before the War, when the Greek Government's couching certain official documents or proclamations in a language too close to that used by modern Greeks in ordinary life actually provoked riots in the streets of Athens, which cavalry had to be called out to suppress.

To Englishmen to care so much about words seems ridiculous—and yet the strange thing is that in one regard the English care as much as any people—where they read or hear or write poetry.

It is a signal fact that the British people is one of those who in recent centuries have produced a large quantity of excellent poetry—in the last four hundred years more great poetry, I think it would be fair to say, than has been produced in that period by the Italians, though the Italians seem in general to care for words more. The moment an Englishman of literary culture is concerned with poetry, the shadowy suggestions of particular words and phrases, the cadences of rhythm, the combinations of vowel and consonant sounds, matter to him as such things mattered to the ancient Greeks in prose discourse. This seems to show that the English are not really lacking in the sensibility for words, but that the sensibility comes into play in one particular field only: outside that field it is dormant. But if this is so, it affords a hope that we may be able to enter imaginatively into the ancient Greeks' sensi-

bility to rhetoric: we have to understand it by the analogy of what we feel about poetry.

It is noteworthy that the ancient Greeks had a definite consciousness of their language being something exceptional among the nations of men. If we were asked to define what the essential distinguishing characteristic of Hellenic culture was, we should probably in the first instance say something about their political institutions or their plastic art. When ancient Greeks wanted to say what characteristic distinguished Hellenes from "barbarians" they were apt to say that they could express thought better than other peoples. "Men differ from beasts, and the race of the Hellenes from barbarians," says Isocrates, "in that they are better educated for thought and for its expression in words" (*τῷ πρὸς τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς λόγους ἄμεινον πεπαιδευέσθαι τῶν ἄλλων*), xv, 293.

We can see indeed, when we compare Greek with the contemporary Oriental languages which we know, that Greek had a capacity for expressing complex thoughts which those other languages had not. But we may wonder whether, when ancient Greeks claimed this characteristic for their language, they were not right by a fluke. Hardly any Greeks that we know of learned to speak any language but their own, leaving out of account the interpreters who in such places as Memphis or Susa must have known enough of Greek and another language for necessary political or business communications. To compare the respective capacities, say, of Greek and Persian, or Greek and Egyptian, would need a familiarity with Persian and Egyptian literature in the originals which, so far as we know, no Greek ever thought it worth while to acquire. Greek and Hebrew can now be compared because there are many modern

Europeans who know both. But how could Greeks who knew no language save their own institute such comparisons? Yet, somehow or other, the ancient Greeks were right when they believed that in their language they had a medium for the expression of thought of larger compass than that of any other language which men had spoken up till then. Of course, for certain purposes, other human languages were as effective as Greek, or even more effective. In solemn religious utterance, cries from man's heart to the Divine, profound poetry, we find effects produced in Hebrew—in Isaiah, the books of Psalms and Job—which are nowhere produced in Greek literature. But none of these effects depend on thoughts of any logical complexity. Comparatively simple thoughts or statements follow each other with no connection save that of “and,” “and.” It is not in Greek poetry but in Greek prose that the new capacities of this language are revealed. Greek poetry may contain contributions to human literature of greater worth than anything in Greek prose, but, if so, their mode of expression is nevertheless not so distinctively Greek, because great poetry could be produced in other languages. If we want to see what Greek alone of languages hitherto could do, we have but to take a complicated period in any Greek prose writer. Let us, for example, consider the first sentence in the *Panegyricus* of Isocrates, which, translated literally, runs: “I have often wondered, in regard to those who arranged festival assemblies and instituted gymnastic contests, that they considered bodily prowess worthy of so great rewards, while to those who laboured in their individual capacity for the general good and prepared their souls in such a way as to be able to help others also—to these they assigned

no honour, though it would have been reasonable that they should take the greater account of these, seeing that, suppose athletes acquired twice the strength they have, the rest of the world would be none the better for it, whereas if one man alone has right thoughts the people as a whole gets profit of it, all at any rate who wish to participate in that individual's wisdom." That is what no language hitherto but Greek could do. One sees a large number of different propositions—some men arrange festival assemblies: some men institute gymnastic contests: those who do either of these things consider bodily prowess worthy of great rewards: some men labour as individuals for the general good: these men prepare their souls in a particular way: the preparation is such that they can help others also: to these men the people who considered bodily prowess worthy of great rewards assigned no honour: it would have been reasonable that they should have assigned honour to these rather than to the others: if athletes were to acquire twice the strength they have, no one else would be the better for it: if one man has right thoughts, everyone else who desires to participate in his wisdom gets profit of it. But all these propositions are not simply stated in sequence. They are stated in such a way as to show varying logical relations between them: the thing stated in one proposition is sometimes the reason of the thing stated in another proposition, sometimes it is the consequence; sometimes it offers a noteworthy contrast indicated in English by "though"; sometimes it expresses a mere possibility which would be realized, or would have been realized, if the thing indicated in a separate clause were or had been a fact. And when all the different propositions are brought together in their logical relations, they form one single

thought, the mind holds the whole mass of facts and possibilities hanging together in just those relations in one conspectus. Finally, a statement may be made about the emotional quality of the thought which contemplates this mass: "I have often wondered." The assertion of my wonder at the mass of things makes the whole long sentence a single proposition, the statement of one complex fact.

We can understand that when once the Greeks had become conscious of possessing in their language a peculiar means of expression, they should take delight in the instrument itself. One of the things which may seem wearisome and senseless to us in some of Plato's dialogues, notably in the *Euthydemus* and the *Parmenides*, is the long-drawn-out play with words by which paradoxical conclusions are reached by purely verbal manipulation. We must think of that generation, its sophists, and the young men who gathered round them, discovering in the logical forms of expression a new toy whose possibilities it was a fine pleasure to show off. But the sophists who taught the way to play with words in this kind of eristic, professed also to teach the young how to use words so as to impress and persuade common men gathered in the popular assemblies, and obviously skill in such use of words was what young men mostly resorted to the sophists to acquire. It was such skill which was meant by the term *rhetoric*.

How far, we may ask, was the kind of eloquence which moved a popular assembly anything distinctively Hellenic? The capacity of Greek, which we have noted, to express complexes of logical thought in a way other languages did not, would serve for philosophic writing or subtle argument rather than for stirring men in the

mass. For this latter purpose the languages of barbarians might serve quite well. One has heard that among primitive tribes there are often speakers with a surprising command of passionate oratory, perhaps as effective in their environment as the discourse of Demosthenes in the Athenian *ecclesia*. This may be true, but it may also be true that if the discourse of an Attic orator were compared with the discourse of an eloquent savage, it would be found that the Athenian did appeal more to the logical reason and the savage orator more directly and exclusively to the emotions and passions. The fact that in the living language of Athens greater prominence was given to the logical relation of propositions than in other living languages would affect the mentality of the Athenian people as a whole, and in order really to be moved they would require a clever manipulation of ideas in public speakers as well as emotional appeals.

In the days of free Greece, rhetoric was no doubt valued mainly as a means for inducing masses of men to act in a particular way, not simply as an art for display. Men were more concerned then for the end than for the means. Yet even then there were ominous exhibitions of the delight in words as such. Already in the fifth century the wandering sophists would give displays of virtuosity in the use of words to select audiences. And already the pleasure in words was not simply pleasure in them as the effective means of expressing ideas which had theoretical or practical importance. For, besides being signs which convey ideas, words also have a quality as mere sounds. Sounds, and sequences of sound, can be pleasant or unpleasant in themselves apart from any meaning which may attach to them. Already with Gorgias it became an object to

arrange the sounds of a public discourse in such a way that they gave, through the nerves, a pleasure akin to that of music. This would not imply that the meaning of the words therefore did not matter. The meaning would not be obliterated by the emotional effect of the sound but reinforced, just as it is in poetry, or in a song, when the effect of the music combines with the emotional appeal of the idea conveyed by the words. Gorgias, when he addressed a speech to an assembly of Greek citizens, as at Olympia on the occasion referred to just now, would have a double object. He would desire to present such ideas to the mind of his audience as impelled them to make a great practical decision, to engage in war with Persia, but he would also seek to give them, as something extra, a particular kind of pleasure in the sound of the words. Such a pleasure might, of course, also in its measure contribute to the persuasive power of the speech, for it would promote a feeling of goodwill to the speaker who gave the pleasure and bring about an emotional frame which might make the audience more ready to receive intellectually the ideas presented and make the corresponding act of will.

The pleasantness of the sound consisted partly, we can see, in an arrangement of similar vowel sounds and recurrences of the same consonantal groups—for instance, in the *Funeral Oration* of Gorgias, τῷ φρονίμῳ τῆς γνώμης παύοντες τὸ ἄφρον τῆς ῥώμης (if we accept Sauppe's conjecture). This has an effect very like that of the sentence I quoted above from D'Annunzio's Genoa oration, with its assonance of *bende* and *bandiere*. Plato's jesting use of ὦ λῶστε Πῶλε in his *Gorgias* illustrates the same device. But the pleasantness consisted even more, one would judge, in the one phrase

being constantly balanced by another phrase which had a similar audible run—*εἰπεῖν δυνάμην ἃ βούλομαι, βουλοίμην δ' ἃ δεῖ, λαθὼν μὲν τὴν θεῖαν νέμεσιν, φυγὼν δὲ τὸν ἀνθρώπινον φθόνον. οὗτοι γὰρ ἐκέκτηντο ἔνθεον μὲν τὴν ἀρέτην, ἀνθρώπινον δὲ τὸ θνητόν*, and so on.

There was one other kind of pleasure which a rhetor, from Gorgias onwards, tried to give his audience—neither a pleasure in the sounds as such nor a pleasure in the forcible expression of a valuable idea. This was the pleasure got from new and striking figures of speech. A stock instance was Gorgias' description of vultures as *ἔμψυχοι τάφοι*, "live sepulchres." That rhetorical device persists in public speakers down to our own time. It is probably dearer to American orators than to British. An instance would be the phrase of W. J. Bryan when he was declaiming on the subject of Bimetallism, a phrase that ran through America like wildfire, that someone—if I remember right it was England with its gold standard—"crucified mankind on a cross of gold." It might be interesting to inquire why such striking figures of speech have the effect they do on men's minds. Why did a Greek go away from listening to Gorgias and say with lively appreciation to his neighbour, "How clever that was—vultures, live sepulchres!"? The pleasure, I suppose, is in the discovery of some point of resemblance which no one up to then had ever seen between two things otherwise quite unlike. If the sort of resemblance is far-fetched and yet seems, when you come to think of it, to be really there, there is the feeling of a successful intellectual feat which puts one in the position of seeing something he would generally not see and so creates an agreeable sense of superiority. A live animal is an object so unlike a tomb that you will never have con-

nected them in thought, but a vulture and a tomb are both receptacles of dead bodies. That had never occurred to you, but when it is pointed out, you see that it is true, though a sense of the dissimilarity between the two objects remains to make the similarity seem strange. In the same way, a man undergoing crucifixion and a number of people embarrassed because of the exchange value of silver and gold in the money market are so unlike that you will never have connected them in thought, but when Mr. Bryan points out that the distress of a man who cannot get rid of the inconvenient fact that gold has just the value that it has and the distress of a man who cannot free himself from a cross resemble each other, you see suddenly that the resemblance is really there and you realize the distress of the man financially embarrassed and the wickedness of those by whom in either case the distress is caused more vividly because of the resemblance.

In the great days of Greece, as has just been said, skill in the use of words was subordinate to the ends for which words were the means. Demosthenes may have been pleased if he heard that a speech of his had been admired for the perfection of its language, but what he certainly cared most about was that the Athenians should be induced to act in a particular way against Philip. No writer had greater literary skill than Plato, but what Plato cared most about was that men should be led to understand certain important truths about the universe. After the Greek world had passed under the dominion of Rome, the Greeks came more generally to take delight in words, apart from any further purpose which the words might serve; virtuosity in the production of particular verbal effects was a main object in education; great prestige was won by any

learned man who acquired it, and schools of the chief teachers in rhetoric in Greece or Asia Minor drew immense crowds of young men from all over the Greek world.

A "Sophist" in those days meant a rhetorician—a man who himself could give displays of virtuosity in language and could teach the art to others. Some sophists established themselves at the head of a school in one of the great cities, Athens or Ephesus or Smyrna; others travelled about from city to city. Even the sophists generally stationary seem to have travelled about from time to time, giving exhibitions in different cities. The coming of a famous sophist was like the coming of a *prima donna* or a great pianist or violinist to a European city to-day. The hall where he spoke was thronged by people who had come to get a pleasure we can hardly understand in the use of words. A book of great interest, as letting us into the mental atmosphere of the Greek world in the second and third centuries of the Christian era, is Philostratus' *Lives of the Sophists*.

The speech of a sophist, we can see, was successful in proportion as he gave three kinds of pleasure, the first two of which had characterized rhetoric as far back as Gorgias in the fifth century B.C. There was, to begin with, a pleasure in the sounds as such, and this meant not only in certain sequences of vowel and consonant sounds, but certain rhythms and cadences. We ourselves in poetry feel the particular emotional effect of different rhythms. So far as pleasure was given by the sounds, a great deal, of course, depended on the delivery, the tamber, and modulation of the speaker's voice. The emotional effect of the sounds was further reinforced by a corresponding appeal to the eye in the

speaker's bodily attitude and gestures. Scopelianus of Clazomenae, Philostratus tells us, had a voice of very agreeable quality, and he would repeatedly strike his thigh during an oration, as stirring up both himself and his audience. When he was delivering certain of his stock speeches, his bodily movements became so violent that he seemed to be in a Bacchic frenzy. A critic accused him of beating a big drum (*τυμπανίζειν*). "My drum," Scopelianus answered, "is the shield of Ajax!" Of Polemo we are told: "His utterance was admirably clear and strong (*ἐπίτονος*) and the ringing quality (*κρότος*) of the sounds which his tongue produced was wonderful. Herodes says that he would leap up from his seat at the critical parts of his subject, so superabundant was his *brio*, and when he rounded off a period he would deliver the concluding sentence with a smile, to show with how little effort he found the phrase; in the principal passages he would neigh no less proudly than Homer's horse." The visit of the Gallic orator Favorinus to Rome created a *furor*. "His oration was not lost even on that part of his audience which did not understand Greek: they were charmed by the mere sound of his utterance, the significance of his look, the rhythm of his tongue." Similarly we are told about Adrianus of Tyre, after he had been given the chief chair of rhetoric in Rome, that he gave delight even to those ignorant of Greek. "They listened to him as to a melodious nightingale, carried away by his marvellous elocution, his attitudes, the modulation of his voice, and his rhythms, whether those proper to prose or those like a song."

Philostratus gives, in the case of some of his sophists, phrases from their speeches which were

specially characteristic or memorable. We can recognize sometimes assonances resembling those in the sentence quoted from Gorgias just now and the sentence from the speech of D'Annunzio—for instance, a phrase of Dionysius of Miletus in a speech on the Battle of Chaeronea, ὦ Χαιρώνεια πονηρόν χωρίον. How sensitive the audiences were to variations of sound is shown by the fact that particular rhythms and cadences were detected as characterizing this or that orator, and a connoisseur could tell on the strength of them whether an oration attributed to some orator was really his or not, just as a modern connoisseur of painting can tell by signs hardly perceptible to the ordinary man whether a picture attributed to Canaletto or Zoffany is genuine.* Apollonius of Athens is censured by Philostratus because he was too apt to fall into anapaestic rhythms; Antipater of Hierapolis spoilt the effect of his ideas through his rhythms being wrong.

That the ancient Greeks had sensibilities to the sound of words which we have not is shown by the rule against hiatus. That goes back to Isocrates in the fourth century B.C. and continued through the rest of antiquity a rule of rhetoric and fine writing. It is impossible for us to feel the disagreeableness of hiatus as the Greeks felt it, just as impossible as it is to a person with no sense of music to know why a particular combination of sounds is agreeable or disagreeable to a musician. If we had not been told that the Greek sensibility was offended when a word ending with a vowel was followed by a word beginning with a vowel, and if we

* οἱ δὲ ἀνατιθέντες Διονυσίῳ τὸν Ἀράσπαν τὸν τῆς Πανθεῖας ἐρῶντα ἀνήκοοι μὲν τῶν τοῦ Διονυσίου ἔνθυμῶν. *Vitae Sophist*, I, v, β' III (page 37 in the Teubner text). "Those who attribute to Dionysius the speech entitled 'Araspas in love with Panthea' have no ear for his rhythms."

had failed to notice that the rule was carried out in practice, we should never have guessed it. This may show that in other respects the language of the ancient rhetoricians was probably framed to gratify sensibilities we cannot divine, and that rules were instinctively observed we have never discovered. There is an indication of this in one of the sentences given by Philostratus as a specially notable one from the speech of Dionysius on the Battle of Chaeronea already referred to—*ἐπέρχεται πόλεμος αἰτίαν οὐκ ἔχων*. It would seem to us a fairly commonplace sentence. If we were to read in *The Times*, "A war is imminent for which there is really no cause," we might remember the opinion of *The Times* as agreeing or disagreeing with our own opinion about a particular international complication, but we should hardly be struck with the sentence as a very remarkable or clever one. It is likely that our eye would pass over it, as we scanned the columns of our morning newspaper, without special note. But there must have been something in the rhythm of that Greek sentence, the three short syllables of *πόλεμος* followed by two cretics, which gave those who listened to Dionysius a peculiar thrill and reinforced emotionally the logical meaning of the words, as the rhythm of a poem does to us.

The second kind of pleasure which the rhetoric of Gorgias aimed at giving was, as we saw, that produced by new and surprising figures of speech. That also is exemplified in the rhetoric of the second century A.D. A phrase from an oration by Nicetas of Smyrna was admired: the Persians in the time of Xerxes are represented as saying in reference to the island of Aegina, which they intend to conquer, "*ἐκ τῆς βασιλείου νεὼς Αἴγιναν ἀναδησώμεθα*" ("Let us attach Aegina in tow

to the royal ship"). Or again, Arabia, which produced precious gums, was spoken of by Alexander of Seleucia as "fortunate in the matter of its sweats" (*περὶ τοὺς ἰδρῶτας εὐτυχεῖ*). But to judge by the specimens given us, it was not so much startling metaphors with which the rhetoric of those days operated as what our ancestors called "conceits"—ingenious fancies which might be suggested by the appearance of things, though, while you played with the idea, you recognized how absurd it would be to take it for fact. Alexander of Seleucia again furnishes an instance: "It seems to me that the Creator of the universe has flung the plains low down, as consisting of less honourable matter, and exalted the hills as high in rank. It is these whom the sun first greets and last leaves. Who would not love a place that has days of longer duration?"

But there was a third kind of pleasure which orators of the second and following century A.D. strove to give and which had not been aimed at in the rhetoric of the great age of Greece—the pleasure of making their audiences feel for a moment transported from the dreary present into that great past. This, no doubt, was the psychological reason why Attic Greek in those days had such power to charm—the old words and turns of phrase which men had long ceased to use in ordinary life but which brought back the Athens of Demosthenes and Plato. Here again poetry is our guide to understanding. The reason a Greek of the Roman Empire was emotionally affected by an obsolete Attic phrase was the same reason why Englishmen—perhaps one should say Englishmen of the generation now passing away—receive particular emotional suggestion when Swinburne says "holpen" instead of "helped." It called up a world of ideal dignity like the

image of ancient days we get from the Bible. Attic words and phrases were made a chief point of both in rhetorical speaking and in written literary discourse. In his satirical advice how to attain prestige as an orator, Lucian writes:

"Next you must scrape up some fifteen old Attic words—say twenty for an outside estimate; and these you must rehearse diligently till you have them at the tip of your tongue; let us say ἄττα, κᾶτα, μῶν, ἀμηγέπη, χῶστε; that is the sort of thing; these are for general garnish, you understand; and you need not concern yourself about any little dissimilarity, repulsion, discord, between them and the rest."*

But while a proportion of Attic words and phrases was required to create the necessary illusion, the archaism must not be overdone. It then became too conscious affectation, which spoils the effect.

A writer of Lucian's *Lexiphanes* parodies this mannerism. *Lexiphanes'* discourse in conversation consists of a string of obsolete Attic phrases, largely queer words dug up out of the Old Comedy. But the line between what was permissible Atticism and what was affectation was plainly a wavering one. Some of the phrases stigmatized as ridiculous by Lucian—ἦ δ' ὄς, and ὦ λῶστε—are used freely by Philostratus. It is curious to note the analogy there is to this problem, how strong the Attic infusion may be, in modern Italian. The Tuscan dialect is to ordinary Italian very much what Attic was to the *koiné*. To bring in a proportion of Tuscan idioms discreetly is a virtue of style in an Italian writer or speaker; but the peculiar Tuscan element must not be excessive or it becomes ridiculous.

* Lucian, *Πητόρων Διδάσκαλος*, 16: translation by H. W. Fowler and F. G. Fowler, Clarendon Press, vol. iii, p. 225.

It was, however, not only by Attic phrases that the audience of a sophist in the second century A.D. was transported into the past: it was also by the subjects chosen for speeches. These were very largely, as Philostratus shows, speeches supposed to be spoken by Demosthenes or some other Greek of the great days and dealing with the events of the fifth or fourth century B.C. It may be worth while to give here a list of the subjects of the notable speeches dealing with the past to which Philostratus refers. (1) A Persian of the expedition of Xerxes *loquitur*, page 27 in the Teubner text; (2) the Spartans debate whether to build a wall round Sparta, page 27; (3) speeches dealing with the Persian Achaemenian kings, page 33; (4) Demosthenes addresses the Athenian *boulé* after Chaeronea, page 35; (5) "Araspas in love with Panthea," page 37; (6) Leptines accused because the corn supply of Athens from the Pontus is cut off by the enemy, page 39; (7) speech against the proposal that the Athenians should sell Delos, page 39; (8) a Spartan advises his countrymen not to receive back the Spartans who have surrendered at Sphacteria, page 40; (9) Demosthenes defends himself against the charge of having received money from Alexander, page 48; (10) speech against the setting up of trophies at the end of the Peloponnesian War, page 49; (11) speech on the proposal that Athens, after Aegospotami should be broken up into demes, page 49; (12) Xenophon begs to be put to death together with Socrates, page 53; (13) Solon asks to be allowed to cancel his laws after Pisistratus has seized the power, page 53; (14) Demosthenes assesses his own punishment as that of death after the Harpalus scandal, page 53; (15) Demosthenes urges the Athenian

people to take refuge on the triremes, page 53; (16) the Athenians wounded in Sicily beg the Athenians, who are being allowed to go home with Nicias, to kill them before they leave, page 80; (17) Pericles exhorts the Athenians to go on with the war in spite of a Delphic oracle in which Apollo declares himself on the side of the enemy, page 81; (18) someone advises Darius to bridge the Danube, page 81; (19) Artabazus warns Xerxes not to make a second expedition against Greece, page 81; (20) an address to Xerxes, in which he is taxed with folly, because he conceived the idea of cutting through the promontory of Athos, page 82; (21) Aristogiton accuses Demosthenes of Medism and Aeschines of Philippism, page 85; (22) a force coming uninvited as would-be allies from some Greek city is dismissed with thanks, page 86; (23) mercenary soldiers demand land for settlement, page 88; (24) the Spartans are exhorted not to build a wall round Sparta, page 89; (25) a denunciation of Philip and Alexander, page 89; (26) Isocrates advises the Athenians to give up trying to be a sea-power, page 89; (27) an invective against Callixenos for not burying the ten generals, page 89; (28) a debate on the Sicilian expedition, page 89; (29) a speech put into the mouth of Aeschines about the corn he expected to receive from Kersobleptes, page 89; (30) a speech against making a truce after a massacre of the γένη, page 89; (31) Hyperides speaks in support of Demosthenes, when Philip is at Elatea, page 93; (32) a Greek boy carried away from one of the Greek islands as a slave by the Persians writes home to his father, page 97; (33) the speech of a Theban orator accusing the Messenians of ingratitude, because they will not receive the Theban exiles after the destruction of Thebes by Alexander, page 99;

(34) a speech against Leptines on the question of *ateleia*, page 103; (35) Callias exhorts the Athenians to give up the practice of cremation, page 104; (36) a speech dealing with something in the history of Catana, page 119; (37) Demades exhorts the Athenians not to revolt from Alexander, while Alexander is in India, page 120.

No doubt, as we can see from Philostratus, these second-century rhetoricians did also to some extent apply their eloquence to questions of the day. They were especially employed by the Greek cities as envoys to the Emperor, when the cities desired to gain some favour or get some grievance remedied. But their great speeches, which circulated afterwards in writing and from which the phrases came which the Greek world repeated with delight and admiration, were speeches dealing with the matters of five or six hundred years before. Aelian, who attained eminence among the Greek sophists of his time, although he was a native of Praeneste and his mother-tongue was Latin, went so near contemporary events as to compose an invective against the Emperor Elagabalus, after Elagabalus was dead. As his friend Philostratus said to him, "I should have admired you if you had directed your invective against the man when he was alive."

But eloquence was now not valued because it affected the practical decisions of the present, but because it transported men into the past. Probably more than any other generations of men, before or since, the Greeks of the first Christian centuries found their pleasure in living by imagination in a past five hundred years gone by. The events of those hundred and eighty years long ago, from the Battle of Marathon to the death of Demosthenes, stood out in peculiar

illumination; all that followed was grey. It was as if those hundred and eighty years were the only ones that counted in human history: things had then really happened, events in which it was worth being interested. When you went from the commonplace streets of your town into the hall where a great orator was to speak and submitted yourself to that flow of words, the rhetoric acted, as some drugs do, to carry you into a wonder-world. If the cities of the Greek world had ceased for centuries to have the determination of great events in their hands, Greeks could still, as in an opium dream, find themselves among the multitude in the Pnyx and listen to Demosthenes thundering against Philip. How much the interval of time between the fourth century B.C. and the present was considered, so far as was possible, non-existent, one may see by the rhetorical sermons of Maximus of Tyre, a contemporary of Marcus Aurelius. They are full of illustrative references and anecdotes, but no allusion, I think, to anything later than the fourth century B.C., except a few references to Epicurus in the third century, and a solitary reference to Carneades in the second. We forget, while the spell of Maximus holds us, that such a thing as Rome, such a person as Caesar, has ever existed. A still odder indication of this habit of thought may be found in a reference to Stoics in the *Protrepticus* of Iamblichus, a Greek writer of an even later century than Maximus of Tyre—an indication all the more striking because it is incidental and not supposed apparently to cause any surprise. Iamblichus, round about the year A.D. 300, refers to the founders of the Stoic school as οἱ νεώτεροι (page 118 in the Teubner text). His standpoint is that of Pythagoras or Plato, and thus philosophers of

the third century B.C. appear as "the moderns," or "the more recent"—philosophers separated from Iamblichus by an interval of time as great as separates us from Dante or Chaucer! Centuries later than the third century B.C. do not count.

It was, of course, a weakness in the ancient civilization that words came in this way to be loved for the pleasure they gave by their emotional effect or their imaginative suggestion, carrying men away from the present reality which they could shape by their decisions. The habit of mind was fostered by the established method of education—predominantly literary. To be able to compose and recite speeches for characters in past history was, as we know from Juvenal and others, the great accomplishment in a boy which made his parents proud. It would be wrong to consider such accomplishments as wholly worthless. To use words effectively is an art which we should reasonably wish, most of us, to possess more than we do. Probably we English especially, as compared with Frenchmen or Italians, do not care enough for grace, lucidity, and distinction in speech. The ancient Greeks, on the other hand, were too apt to be satisfied if statements presented to them were plausible in their ideas and agreeably expressed. All ancient thought and ancient science and ancient historical writing suffer, as a whole, from a defective sense of the need of verification by reference to facts, of what experimental proof implied. If modern science has gone forward by a twofold operation of the mind—the forming of hypotheses which seem reasonable on the basis of facts already known and then the testing of each hypothesis by a further examination of facts—ancient Greek thought was strong in the first movement, but weak in the second.

Of course there are ancient Greek historical writers like Thucydides and Polybius, in whom the interest in actual truth predominates over the desire to compose an agreeable narrative. But how far most ancient historical writing was in essence rhetorical, not scientific, may be seen in what ancient Greek writers tell us about the Oriental civilizations with which they came in contact—Egyptian, Persian, and Indian. Herodotus and Hecataeus of Abdera gave an account of Egyptian history and Egyptian religion derived from the patter of bilingual *ciceroni*, or perhaps from some few Egyptian priests who had learnt a little Greek and wanted to impress the Greek traveller by the picture they drew. It is from Herodotus and Hecataeus that later Greek writers such as Diodorus drew, and no Greek, as was said at the beginning of this essay, thought it worth while to learn to read Egyptian and verify what those pleasant writers said by reference to the documents. When Manetho, an Egyptian priest who *could* read the documents, gave an account of Egyptian history in Greek, he seems to have been taken hardly any notice of in the Greek world, because his literary form was unattractive. Or consider the case of India. Books about India were written by some of the Greeks who went there with Alexander, and one important book by Megasthenes, who visited the court of Chandragupta as the envoy of Seleucus I. These books were based on first-hand observation, though even Megasthenes seems to have had no knowledge of Sanskrit, and got only the vaguest and most confused ideas of Indian religion and Indian thought. These books, produced at the end of the fourth century or the earlier years of the third century B.C., continued for the rest of the time the ancient civilization lasted to be the standard

authorities for the knowledge of India. Strabo and Arrian, three hundred and four hundred years later, do little more, when they undertake to give an account of India, than copy out bits of Megasthenes. All the time there had been commercial contact with India; some Greek merchants no doubt actually visited the Indian coast, some Indians were to be found residing in Egypt; yet a Greek writer of the quality of Strabo, seems to have had no desire to ascertain what changes had taken place in India since three hundred years before or get any fresh direct knowledge. There the old book of Megasthenes was, and from that a readable account of India could be extracted: that was all the Greek public wanted, and all that Strabo felt any concern to give.

The great thing which distinguishes our modern rationalistic civilization from the ancient Greek rationalistic civilization is the predominance to-day of the scientific over the rhetorical interest. Probably this is all to the good, for the rhetorical habit of mind inevitably issues in an indifference to truth of fact, which in turn makes action ineffective. Yet, on the other hand, while action guided by scientific knowledge is effective for the attainment of human purposes, science cannot tell us what ultimate human purposes ought to be, and in recent years the vast power given to European man by modern science seems to have been largely used for cruelty and mutual destruction. Ancient rhetoric may have been directed too much to producing particular emotions, but perhaps we are coming to see that it is particular emotions which largely determine what ends men desire to pursue, and if there are any words that have power to make men feel kindly to each other and lose the belief that to trample on the weak is a

splendid exhibition of racial strength, there may be a rhetoric which our time would be the better for; even many of the old moral commonplaces to which the Greeks gave a rhetorical frame, if they were brought home afresh to men of the twentieth century of the Christian era, might help to make a better world.

THE INVENTION OF SPACE

by Professor F. M. CORNFORD

LAST YEAR (1934) the President of the British Association opened his address on a despondent note. In the last half-century, he remarked, the main edifice of science had grown almost beyond recognition, as whole armies of labourers added wing after wing, storey upon storey. "Yet the theoretical physicist must admit that his own department looks like nothing so much as a building which has been brought down in ruins by a succession of earthquake shocks."

Laymen have heard the rumbling of these earthquakes. We understand that they have irreparably damaged the framework of space and time, which formerly served like a skeleton of steel girders to support the structure and determine the outline of the external world. We are more or less disconcerted by the news. When I was taught geometry, geometry and Euclid were synonymous terms; and it never occurred to me to doubt that I lived and moved in Euclidean space, extending, quite obviously, in all its three dimensions, without limit. I suspect that, if we look into our minds, all but a few accomplished mathematicians will find the old framework of space and time still unshaken. Common sense lags a good way behind the reasonings of revolutionary thinkers. We have not yet readjusted our perspective and redrawn our map to accommodate such statements as these, which follow in the President's address:

Neither space nor time is found to exist in its own right, but only as a way of cutting up something more comprehensive—

the space-time continuum. Thus we find that space and time cannot be classified as realities of nature, and the generalized theory of relativity shows that the same is true of their product, the space-time continuum. This can be crumpled and twisted and warped as much as we please without becoming one whit less true to nature—which, of course, can only mean that it is not itself part of nature. Space and time, and also their space-time product, fall into their places as mere mental frameworks of our own construction.

So what we took for the steel structure of the universe turns out to be less like steel than india-rubber; and the india-rubber itself exists only as an arbitrary figment of the human brain. It will be some time yet before common sense assimilates this doctrine and begins to think easily in terms of its concepts.

I am not now concerned with a problem that might perplex the simple mind: How can a ray of light be sure of travelling all round a space that can be twisted and crumpled at the mathematician's pleasure? And if it cannot, what becomes of the astronomer's hope that, if he can only wait long enough, he will see the back of his own head through "a sufficiently powerful telescope"? But there remains a question of interest to those who still care to know something of our inheritance from the past. How did the illusion of the steel framework, as an external fact, come to be imposed upon common sense? If the infinite extent of three-dimensional space is no more than a construction of the human brain and only one of many possible alternatives, all equally agreeable to nature, when and by whom was it constructed? Did the Euclidean era, from which we are now emerging, stretch back, with no definable limit, through all recorded history into the darkness of the Stone Age? Was the geometry set

forth by Euclid in the ordered steps of logical deduction simply an explicit formulation of what common sense, from the dawn of human life, had always implicitly conceived? That might naturally be assumed so long as Euclidean space was taken either as a given fact of external nature or as an equally given fact in the constitution of our own minds, needing only to be discovered and displayed in rational argument. But now that it is being replaced by an arbitrary fabric of non-existent india-rubber, the assumption may be questioned.

By whom, then, was the framework created? Professor Eddington's suspicions fall upon Euclid himself. "The only thing," he writes, "that can be urged against spherical space is that more than twenty centuries ago a certain Greek published a set of axioms which (inferentially) stated that spherical space is impossible. He had, perhaps, more excuse, but no more reason, for his statement than those who repeat it to-day."* Euclid was teaching at Alexandria round about 300 B.C. Probably he had been trained in Athens by Plato's pupils at the Academy. But he was, in the main, only codifying a geometry which had been built up piecemeal in scattered theorems by Greek mathematicians of the preceding three centuries. The work was begun in the sixth century by Thales and Pythagoras, the first parents of the two parallel traditions of philosophy. I seek to show that the belief in infinite space as a physical fact can be traced back to the Greek philosophers of the three centuries between Thales and Euclid, but no farther. Granted that we are dealing here with a fabrication of human brains, the brains in question were active

* *The Expanding Universe* (1933), p. 40.

between 600 and 300 B.C. Their figment came to be finally imposed on science in the Euclidean era now ending, and to be so deeply ingrained in common sense that we shall find it hard to assimilate the india-rubber substitute.

If this is true, we are concerned with a product of Western civilization in its Hellenic phase. It would help my thesis if I were in a position to show that the Indians or the Chinese, before Western science spread all round the globe, had some different scheme of conception. This seems to me likely, but ignorance confines my argument to the history of Western thought and to the documents that I can read and hope to understand.

Within these limits we start from the known fact that Euclidean geometry was constructed, from beginning to end, by the Greeks of those three centuries. How did they arrive at the notion of that familiar space in which straight lines travel on for ever farther and farther from their starting-point? If, as we are told, such a space does not exist, of its own right, in nature, the construction does not come immediately from observation. Nor can we fall back on the assumption that the mathematicians were simply formulating the implicit conceptions of immemorial common sense; for the ordinary man, no more than the philosophic geometer, could observe what was not there. The inference is that the belief in the infinite extent of space, implied by this geometry, was not implicit in the mind of the Homeric or pre-Homeric Greek. There was a pre-Euclidean common sense, whose conception of the world in space had to be transformed into the Euclidean conception, just as our Euclidean common sense has now to

be transformed into the post-Euclidean scheme of relativity.

The evidence for that earlier transformation is to be found in the philosophic literature of our three centuries. As present experience shows, a readjustment of this order cannot be made suddenly; for several generations the old ideas may persist, while common sense lags behind the fresh discoveries of the most advanced minds. In antiquity knowledge spread slowly. When Democritus came to Athens, which lies about 220 miles from his native city, he complained that no one had ever heard his name. A revolution of thought such as may now take one or two generations, might well take a couple of centuries in ancient Greece. The literature of the great creative period preserves abundant traces of the resistance offered by pre-Euclidean common sense to the then revolutionary doctrine of infinite space.

For our purpose the essential property of Euclidean space is that it had no centre and no circumference. In its full abstraction, as conceived by the mathematician, it was an immeasurable blank field, on which the mind could describe all the perfect figures of geometry, but which had no inherent shape of its own. For the physicist it was the frame of the material universe, partly occupied by visible or tangible bodies, whose number and extent were again without definable limit.

Now this physical frame figures in the atomistic systems of antiquity as the Void. The illimitable inane of Lucretius is taken from Epicurus, the contemporary of Euclid. Epicurus took it from the earlier atomists, Leucippus and Democritus, who were at work in the second half of the fifth century. It was

these atomists who maintained the existence of an unlimited Void, as a fact in nature. I would suggest that, in so doing, they were endowing the abstract space implied in Greek geometry with physical existence.

As I read the story, what happened was briefly this. As geometry developed, mathematicians were unconsciously led to postulate the infinite space required for the construction of their geometrical figures—that space in which parallel straight lines can be produced “indefinitely” without meeting or reverting to their starting-point. In the sixth and fifth centuries no distinction was yet drawn between the space demanded by the theorems of geometry and the space which frames the physical world. We know from Aristotle that the earlier Pythagoreans did not even distinguish the solid figures of geometry from the bodies we daily see and handle. Hence the considerations which led mathematicians to recognize infinite space in their science simultaneously led some physicists to recognize an unlimited Void in nature. These were the atomists, whose system was the final outcome of a tradition inspired by Pythagorean mathematics. The atomists broke down the ancient boundaries of the universe and set before mankind, for the first time, the abhorrent and really unimaginable picture of a limitless Void.

If this summary account is correct, the space framework finally accepted by physical science in the Euclidean era is simply the Void of Lucretius. We asked how that framework came to be constructed and imposed upon common sense. It remains to substantiate in more detail the answer suggested: that it was constructed by the reasoning of Greek geometers and imposed by the atomists.

Consider first the progress of geometry towards its final form in the thirteen books of Euclid. We find it presented there as a rigid chain of logical deduction, starting from a number of indemonstrable premisses—definitions, postulates, common notions—and proceeding to more and more complex theorems, in which every step is guaranteed by some previous conclusion. But this form gives no picture of the process by which the various parts of the structure were first discovered. The proposition that the square on the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle is equal to the squares on the other two sides is said to be due to Pythagoras himself, one of the founders of the whole science. There is no reason to doubt the tradition, and I hope it is also true that Pythagoras sacrificed an ox in the joy of his discovery. Now in Euclid this theorem stands as the last but one in the first book, preceded by forty-six prior propositions and by all the ultimate premisses. But Pythagoras lighted upon it as an isolated truth, and had no idea that he ought to demonstrate forty-six other propositions before he would be warranted in sacrificing his ox. Geometry, in fact, was discovered piecemeal by many independent minds, who attacked particular problems or hit upon particular theorems without co-ordinating their results. So might an unexplored country be mapped by a number of surveyors, each working outwards from a different point and covering as large an area as he could manage. Later some geographer might piece these fragments together. He would find gaps needing to be filled in, and only then would he see the outlines of the country as a whole. In geometry this work of co-ordination was partly done in the fourth century by Plato's colleagues and pupils, and it was trium-

phantly completed by Euclid. The task involved working backwards, as well as forwards, along the chain of deduction. Among the last things to be established would be those which stand first in the final presentation, the irreducible collection of premisses on which the whole structure depends. In the *Republic* Plato complains that the examination of first premisses had been neglected. It was left for his own school to undertake the task and to carry it, as they supposed, to completion.

I suggest—though I cannot directly prove this—that geometrical space itself may be compared to the outline of a country revealed for the first time to the co-ordinating geographer. It was not realized from the first that the figures employed in the scattered theorems demanded a space of infinite extent. If we suppose this discovery to date from about the middle of the fifth century, then, since the theorems seemed to be established beyond doubt, we can understand why the space they implied was accepted by the atomists as the framework of reality.

I am led to this conjecture by the history of the Void—a curious history traceable through the philosophic writings of our period. I have suggested that the infinite Void is simply Euclidean space credited, as a matter of course, with physical existence. But its existence was maintained by the atomists only in the teeth of very considerable opposition. At the end of our period it was still denied by Aristotle; and his immense authority, fortified by ecclesiastical prejudice, held atomism at bay until physics began to move forward again at the Renaissance. Here, however, we are concerned with the question why the infinite Void met with opposition in the fifth and fourth centuries.

The answer lies, at least partly, in the resistance of pre-Euclidean common sense, persisting in the minds of most philosophers. It follows that the space of Euclidean geometry was not the accepted framework of nature before the geometers had mapped it out.

Our first glimpse of the Void in philosophic literature we owe to a passage in Aristotle's *Physics*, recording a feature of the primitive Pythagorean cosmology:

The Pythagoreans too asserted that Void exists and that it enters the Heaven itself, which, as it were, breathes in from the boundless a sort of breath* which is at the same time the Void. This keeps things apart, as if it constituted a sort of separation or distinction between things that are next to each other. This holds primarily in the case of numbers; for it is the Void that distinguishes their nature (*Phys.*, IV, 6, 213b, 23).

The very obscurity of this statement is witness enough to the archaic character of the system described, which must go back to the sixth century. We are to imagine a spherical universe called "the Heaven," a living creature, whose breath is drawn in from the boundless air enveloping it outside. The important point is that "the Void" is another name for this air or breath. As Aristotle notes in the neighbouring context, we still speak of a vessel as empty when in fact it is filled with air. Within the Heaven, the function of this air or vacancy is to keep apart the solid bodies we see and to give them room to move in. Thanks to these vacant intervals, body or matter is not one solid immovable block, but a

* Reading *πνεῦμά τι* for *πνεύματος*: *πνεῦμα* Heidel: *πνεῦμά τε* Diels. The Oxford translation retains *πνεύματος* and renders: "and that it enters the heaven itself, which as it were inhales it, from the infinite air" (*ἐκ τοῦ ἀπείρου πνεύματος*). The variation does not affect my argument.

plurality of discrete things that can move about. The physical picture is not hard to imagine.

What baffles us at first sight is Aristotle's last sentence: "This holds primarily in the case of numbers; for it is the Void that distinguishes their nature." The Pythagoreans represented numbers by patterns of dots or pebbles or counters, arranged in squares, triangles, and other figures, as on our dice and dominoes. Hence we still speak of "square numbers," "cubes," and so forth. The Void which distinguishes their nature is the blank intervals between these units, or the gaps separating the terms in the series of natural integers.* Moreover, since these units were disposed in regular geometrical shapes, the Void is also the blank field (χώρα) marked off by the boundary lines of geometrical figures.† Under this aspect the Void was the space of geometry.

To our minds it is barely possible to confuse the empty gaps between terms in a series of numbers with the physical air or vacancy that keeps solid bodies apart, or even with geometrical space. But we are dealing here with the most primitive form of atomism, older by perhaps half a century than the atomism of Leucippus. These Pythagoreans simply identified the units of number with geometrical points having position in actual space and an indivisible magnitude. They held that physical bodies actually *are* numbers—a number being defined as a plurality of units. Visible and tangible bodies are built up of

* Cf. Simplicius, *Phys.*, 652, 4 (on this passage): "For what else separates 1 from 2 or 2 from 3 but the void, there being no existence between them?"

† Proclus (on *Euclid*, I, Def. xiii, p. 136, Friedlein) remarks that the geometrical term "boundary" (ὄρος) belongs of right to the primitive "land-measurement" (γεωμετρία), whereby areas of land were measured and their boundaries kept distinct.

these monads, which are the units of arithmetic, the points of geometry, and the atoms of body, all at once. The monads are preserved in discrete plurality by intervals of vacancy—gaps between terms in a numerical series, space between the boundaries of geometrical figures, air between the atoms of body and between the surfaces of different bodies.

The essential function of the Void in this system is to keep things apart inside the spherical Heaven and give them room to move in. For that purpose the living Heaven breathes in the vacant air that laps it round. Obviously this internal Void (as we may call it) raises no question of infinite extension. The arguments in defence of the Void, reviewed and criticized by Aristotle in the context, are arguments for the internal Void. It was alleged that bodies could not move without empty spaces to move into; that bodies could not otherwise expand or contract; and that the growth of animals could occur only if the substances they eat could find vacant spaces to occupy.* The whole controversy about the existence of such vacant intervals could be carried on without raising the question of an infinite extent of Void outside the Heaven.

But there is something outside the Heaven; beyond the circumference is the enveloping air which the world breathes. So far there is no occasion for an infinite extent of Void or air outside. The life on our planet is sustained by an envelope of air a few miles in depth; we do not need that air shall spread to the limits of the galaxy and beyond it for ever. Must we suppose that the air round the Pythagorean Heaven was strictly unlimited?

When Aristotle speaks of the Heaven inhaling its

* *Physics*, IV, 6; cf. Lucretius, I, 329 ff.

breath "from the boundless" (ἐκ τοῦ ἀπείρου), some would take that word as meaning just that unlimited extent which belongs to the Void in later atomism. Were that so, my thesis would fall to the ground; because here, at the threshold of Greek cosmology, we should find infinite space already established in physical existence. Everything hangs on the meaning and implications of "the boundless" in sixth-century Greek. "The boundless" figures in the still older Milesian systems of Anaximander and his successor Anaximenes. Anaximander taught that our cosmos was formed of materials drawn from a "boundless" body which at all times encompasses the world. Anaximenes identified this body with air—that very air which the Pythagorean Heaven breathes. Scholars have debated whether the word ἀπείρου meant "indefinite in quality" or "unlimited in extent," or both. Some who hold that quantity, rather than quality, is in question have assumed that "boundless" implies the infinite and shapeless extent of Euclidean space or the Lucretian Void. But the word by no means excludes the idea of shape. On the contrary, it is frequently and specially used of circular or spherical shape, because on the circumference of the circle or the sphere there is no beginning or end, no boundary separating one part from another. A scholium on the *Iliad* (E, 200), discussing the phrase "the limits of the earth," quotes Porphyry to the following effect. The circumference of the circle and the surface of the sphere are the only figures that can be called in every way uniform. Hence the ancients with good reason described the circle and the sphere as "boundless." Thus Aristophanes has the phrase "Wearing a boundless bronze finger-ring," meaning a ring having

no juncture, no limit as beginning or end. Rings having a bezel with an inset gem are not "boundless," as not being uniform. Aeschylus again speaks of women standing round an altar "in a boundless company," meaning the circular arrangement. Euripides calls the seamless tunic "a boundless texture," and speaks of the ether as boundless because it is round (*κυκλοτερής*) and embraces the earth in its arms.*

The last quotation is specially significant. Porphyry takes "boundless ether" to mean the round encompassing sky, which the speaker in Euripides identifies with Zeus or god. So Anaximander described his "boundless," encompassing the world, as "the divine"; and Empedocles calls his divine universe "a rounded sphere altogether boundless."† Thus the word "boundless" in itself affords no reason to suppose that the enveloping air of Anaximenes or Pythagoras was of infinite extent. There is, on the contrary, some ground for thinking that it actually implied spherical shape.

This interpretation becomes still more probable when we consider the slightly later system of Parmenides. The whole of being, he declares, "since it has a furthest limit, is complete on every side, like the mass of a rounded sphere, equally poised from the centre in every direction." We naturally ask, what is outside this finite sphere of being? Parmenides does not raise that question; apparently it did not occur

* Ar. *Danaids*, fr. 250, δακτύλιον χαλκοῦν φέρων ἄπειρον (cf. Aristotle, *Phys.*, 207a, 2, τοὺς δακτυλίους ἀπείρους λέγουσι τοὺς μὴ ἔχοντας σφενδόνην). Aesch. fr. 279, ἐν λόχῳ ἀπείρονι. Eurip. fr. 279, ὕφασμα ἄπειρον, fr. 941, ὁρᾷς τὸν ὕψους τόνδ' ἄπειρον αἰθέρα | καὶ γῆν περίξ ἔχονθ' ὕγραῖς ἐν ἀγκάλαις; | τοῦτον νόμιζε Ζῆνα, τόνδ' ἡγοῦ θεόν.

† Emped., fr. 28, πᾶμπαν ἀπείρων Σφαῖρος κυκλοτερής. Ar. *Met.*, 1074, b1, "The ancients from the most remote ages have handed down to posterity a mythical tradition that these (the heavenly bodies) are gods and that the divine encompasses the whole of nature."

to him that such a question could be asked. On the other hand, we are left in no doubt as to the answer by what he says about the internal Void of the Pythagoreans. He flatly denied its existence. The Void, to his mind, is simply "nothing," and what is nothing can have no existence. The internal Void, as we saw, was to keep things apart and to provide room for motion. Parmenides accepted the consequence: since the Void, being nothing, cannot exist, a plurality of separate things and motion is impossible. Reality becomes one solid immovable block. The appearance of plurality and motion must be somehow illusory. Now, if nothing cannot exist inside the world, neither can it exist outside. If we do ask the question he ignores, the only possible answer is: Outside the One Being there can be neither something (for all being is inside) nor nothing (for nothing cannot exist or even be conceived).^{*} If we find this answer baffling, the fault lies in our own Euclidean preconception that space must extend without limit; therefore, beyond a finite sphere containing all being there must be an endless waste of nothing. The difficulty vanishes when we realize that, at Parmenides' date, no one had seen any reason why there should be an infinity of unoccupied space.

It appears, then, that in these earliest cosmologies the universe of being was finite and spherical, with no endless stretch of emptiness beyond. Space had the form of that which filled space—the form of a sphere with centre and circumference. The point in dispute was, whether the sphere was entirely compact

^{*} Cf. Plato, *Theat.* 180 E. Parmenides declared that the One Being is at rest within its own limits, "having no room in which it moves." There is no vacant space outside, in which it could move about.

with body or there were vacant intervals inside. Parmenides' denial of these intervals shows that the distinction between air, which is something, and the true Void, which is nothing, was beginning to be drawn. The true Void had its origin in the mathematical Void invoked by the Pythagoreans to separate the units of number. As mathematics became more independent of physics, the confusion of intervals between numbers with the air keeping apart physical bodies could not long persist. So the true Void came to be distinguished from air. Anaxagoras, in the fifth century, demonstrated by experiments with "empty" wine-skins and waterclocks that the spaces we call empty are really filled with air, which is something, since it resists pressure. By proving the substantial existence of air he thought he was disproving the existence of any true Void.

After Parmenides, the first task of physics was to restore the possibility of a plurality of things and of motion in space. Atomism was revived in a less questionable form by Leucippus and Democritus. They met Parmenides' denial of the Void with a bold reply. "I admit," said Leucippus, "that the Void—sheer emptiness—is 'nothing' or 'not-being.' All the same, this nothing does exist no less than the something, the compact being, we call body." Thus the internal Void was reasserted, no longer as air, but as the true Void. By this time, if my hypothesis is correct, geometers were realizing that their science called for a space of unlimited extent. Geometry, moreover, was detaching itself from arithmetic. It was now denied that space is made up of points that could be identified with the units of number separated by intervals of emptiness, the discontinuous arithmeti-

cal Void of the Pythagoreans. Geometrical space was seen to be continuous, not a pattern of empty gaps interrupted by solid things; it penetrates the solids that partly occupy its single continuous medium. At the same time the theorems of geometry were seen to require that parallel straight lines shall travel on for ever through this medium without meeting or returning upon themselves. The atomists now take the revolutionary step of ascribing to a physical Void, outside the visible Heaven, the infinite extent of this geometrical space.* Atoms, they held, must be illimitable in number and therefore demand an unlimited extent of space.

The consequences were far more outrageous to pre-Euclidean common sense than we, who have assimilated infinite space, can easily realize. Space was now robbed of its circumference, and therefore of any centre. The immemorial claim of the Earth to be at the centre of the universe was impiously denied. The Earth might still be at the centre of our finite world; but our world has been cut adrift in a limitless waste that has no centre. And now, for the first time,† appears the consequent belief in innumerable worlds (*cosmoi*) scattered over endless space. At all times some are coming into being, others passing away. These other worlds were not the same as any stars,

* Simplicius, *Phys.*, 648, 11, "These asserted the actual existence of an interval between bodies which prevents their being continuous, as Democritus and Leucippus held, who declared that there is a void, not only inside the cosmos, but also outside—a thing which clearly will not be 'place,' but something with an independent existence."

† In the minds of most modern writers the whole question of infinite space has been prejudiced by Burnet's attribution of the doctrine of innumerable worlds to Anaximander and other pre-atomists. I have argued (*Classical Quarterly*, XXVIII, 1934, pp. 1 ff.) that the evidence he relied on is worthless.

or clusters of stars, that we can see: all the stars belong to our world. They were what might now be called "island universes," whose existence, entirely beyond the range of observation, was asserted on *a priori* grounds as a reasonable probability. Thus Metrodorus of Chios argued: "That there should be only one world in the infinite would be as strange as that a single ear of corn should grow in a large plain." Epicurus pointed out that no limited number of worlds could exhaust the unlimited supply of atoms, and Lucretius followed. This doctrine could not arise until the ancient boundaries of spherical space had been broken down and the belief in its strictly infinite extent had deprived space of any centre for our Earth to occupy.

Thus atomism created the picture of illimitable and shapeless vacancy with its sparse population of unnumbered worlds. Once drawn, the picture could never be forgotten so long as men could read Lucretius. It remained to be accepted by the physicists who revived atomism in modern times. Meanwhile its truth was strenuously denied by philosophers who clung to the spherical image of pre-Euclidean common sense. Commentators on the *Timaeus* have doubted whether Plato admits even the internal Void. Aristotle denied any Void, whether internal or external. He demonstrates that there cannot be more than one world, and that the encompassing Heaven is necessarily spherical. Outside the Heaven, he says, there can be "no place or void or time." The Void had been defined as that in which the presence of body, though not actual, is possible. Body cannot exist outside the Heaven. Therefore there is no external Void (*de caelo* i, 9).

It only remained to point out that the space of geometry, if it really required infinite extension, was not, after all, the same thing as physical space. For Plato the objects and truths of mathematics belong to an intelligible realm; the physical world is no more than an imperfect copy or reflection. Geometrical space could be disposed of as an object of thought, not of the senses, or as in some way imaginary. The geometer may claim that his straight lines can be produced "indefinitely"; but no one can actually draw a line of infinite length. All the mathematician needs, says Aristotle, is a finite line produced as far as he pleases. Aristotle's theory, Dr. Ross remarks, "is here somewhat obscure. He holds strongly that the physical world is a sphere of finite size. The mathematician cannot have a straight line greater than the diameter of this sphere present to him in sensation, and the meaning must be that he is free to *imagine* such a line if he chooses, and if he can."*

So tenacious was the resistance of pre-Euclidean common sense. The Greek mind recoiled in horror from the boundless vacancy its own reasonings had conjured into existence. It would be fantastic to suggest that a sound instinct held it back. But listen once more to Sir James Jeans:†

Are there any limits at all to the extent of space?

Even a generation ago I think most scientists would have answered this question in the negative. They would have argued that space could be limited only by the presence of something which is not space. We, or rather our imaginations, could only be prevented from journeying for ever through

* Aristotle (1923), p. 85. *Ar. Phys.*, 207b, 27.

† *The Universe Around Us*, p. 70.

space by running up against a wall of something different from space. And, hard though it may be to imagine space extending for ever, it is far harder to imagine a barrier of something different from space which could prevent our imaginations from passing into a further space beyond.

So the Euclidean has argued ever since Archytas, Plato's contemporary, reasoned thus:

If I am at the extremity of the heaven of the fixed stars, can I stretch outwards my hand or staff? It is absurd to suppose that I could not; and if I can, what is outside must be either body or space. We may then in the same way get to the outside of that again, and so on; and if there is always a new place to which the staff may be held out, this clearly involves extension without limit (Eudemus, frag. 30).

So, too, Lucretius:

If for the moment all existing space be held to be bounded, supposing a man runs forward to its outside borders and stands on the utmost verge and then throws a winged javelin, do you choose that when hurled with vigorous force it shall fly to a distance, or do you decide that something can get in its way and stop it? for you must admit and adopt one of the two suppositions; either of which shuts you out from all escape and compels you to grant that the universe stretches without end (1, 968, trans. Munro).

Some two thousand years after Archytas, John Locke repeats his argument:

If body be not supposed infinite, which I think no one will affirm, I would ask, Whether, if God placed a man at the extremity of corporeal beings, he could not stretch out his hand beyond his body? If he could, then he would put his arm where there was before space without body. . . . If he could not stretch out his hand, it must be because of some external hindrance . . . and then I ask, Whether that which hinders

his hand be substance or accident, something or nothing? . . . I would fain meet with that thinking man, that can in his thoughts set any bounds to space, more than he can to duration; or by thinking hope to arrive at the end of either (*Essay*, ii, 13, 21).

But this argument, Sir James Jeans continues, is not a sound one.

For instance, the earth's surface is of limited extent, but there is no barrier which prevents us from travelling on and on as far as we please. A traveller who did not understand that the earth's surface is spherical would naturally expect that longer and longer journeys would for ever open up new tracts of country awaiting exploration. Yet, as we know, he would necessarily be reduced in time to repeating his own tracks. As a result of its curvature, the earth's surface, although unlimited, is finite in extent. Through his theory of relativity, Einstein claims to have established that space also, although unlimited, is finite in extent. The total volume of space in the universe is of finite amount, just as the surface of the earth is of finite amount, and for the same reason; both bend back on themselves and close up. . . . As a consequence of space bending back into itself, a projectile or a ray of light can travel on for ever without going outside space into something which is not space, and yet it cannot go on for ever without repeating its own tracks. For this reason it is probable that light can travel round the whole of space and return to its starting-point, so that if we pointed a sufficiently powerful telescope in the right direction in the midnight sky, we should see the sun and its neighbours in space by light which had made the circuit of the universe.

This post-Euclidean finite but unbounded space takes us back to the pre-Euclidean finite but boundless sphere of Anaximander, Parmenides, and Empedocles. These philosophers did not know as much

mathematics as Einstein; but they had the advantage over Newton in knowing much less mathematics than Euclid. They had not been misled by geometry into projecting its infinite space into the external world under the name of the Void. The Euclidean era thus presents itself as a period of aberration, in which common sense was reluctantly lured away from the position that it has now, with no less reluctance, to regain. The whirligig of Time has brought in his revenges upon the impious assailants of spherical Space.

Tantum irreligio potuit suadere malorum.

* * *

The subject of this essay lies only towards the margin of that field of study to which Gilbert Murray has brought gifts of insight and imagination not often combined with exquisite scholarship. The better, perhaps, its claim to stand as a tribute to the breadth of interest of one who has been willing to lay aside his chosen pursuits for the service of mankind.

ON TRANSLATING GREEK TRAGEDY

by HARLEY GRANVILLE-BARKER, LL.D.

SOPHOCLES, EURIPIDES, ARISTOPHANES: sixteenth-century Oxford and Cambridge saw them all three acted; now and then in the Greek, more often in Latin, once or twice perhaps in English translations. They were acted in the halls of colleges, whose statutes dictated the staging of so many plays a year; the undergraduates acting, tutors or professors directing. The seventeenth century sees the Puritans putting an end to such frolics. Much had to happen before the drama showed its face again in the universities, and just about three hundred years to pass before the Regius Professor of Greek at Oxford could be found directing his students in the acting of his own translation of the *Agamemnon*.

The Tudor universities, however, had taken more kindly to Seneca. He, for them, was the supreme dramatist. And since their main object, presumably, in letting their men act was to practise them in rhetoric, in the sort of rhetoric, moreover, which could be trusted to stir the crowd at Paul's Cross, his thundering screeds will have answered very well. Possibly in his ruthless violence, too, there was something sympathetic to the theologians and controversialists of that age. He is commonly said to have had great influence upon the English drama. I fancy it would be truer to say that he had none at all, that English drama did not begin to be itself till it had shaken free of the influence which Seneca-trained dramatists attempted to impose upon it. Because drama, to be a healthy growth, must be a native product and a homogeneous product too. Dramatists, actors, subjects for plays, methods of

staging—they must all be, so to say, in blood relation one with another, and, again, with their audience, or that spontaneous illusion, which is the life of the theatre, can hardly be created. This is not to argue that all external influence is inadmissible. But it must be absorbed and converted if it is to be effective. It cannot be imposed. Dryden's age saw another, a more deliberate, and a worthier attempt to shape the English drama in foreign—this time in French classicist—fashion. But it was as sterile. And the height of the influence of the French contemporary theatre in the nineteenth century marks about the lowest point ever reached in our own theatre's credit.

So if I were asked what influence the long array of Murray's translations from Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes, and all the happy familiarity with the plays (unattainable otherwise) given by them to English audiences during these last thirty years—what influence this was likely to have upon the future of English drama, I should answer: Almost none; and better so. And I find, incidentally, that the modern plays which ape the Greek form and the Greek formality, with their chorus to mediate between us and the action, are, at their best, curiously lacking in life. They are themselves more like translations than the product of a native dramatist, happily at home in his medium; timid translations too. For the dramatist, as for the actor, self-consciousness is fatal.* This again is not to argue that there is nothing the modern dramatist may learn from the Greek drama. But he must learn it and forget it before he sets to work himself.

* I use the word in its vulgar sense. There is a consciousness of self which is necessary to every artist. But any artist will know where the difference between the two lies.

Nor am I suggesting that the modern English theatre has no place for translations from the Greek, but simply that their due place must be recognized, that we should learn what to expect of them, what not. We cannot hope to re-create this ritual art in its integrity, and the effect of it. Granted some semblance of the art itself, what could the ritual be made to mean to us? These are not our gods. But another approach is possible, has become so now that we have something like four centuries of our own drama behind us. We have learned to look at drama historically. To Elizabethan audiences—the first we need count—the theatre was a fresh and lively and absorbing wonder; they remembered only crudities besides. Since then the theatre and its methods have been continuously changing, as all living art will change; yet till quite recently the drama of the past has always been adapted to the methods of the theatre of the day. But at last it was seen that the gap had grown too wide to be so bridged; that something like Shakespeare's stage must be restored to him if his art was to be appreciated, Sheridan's to Sheridan, and that even the plays of a generation back might be better understood in the light of the manners and customs of their day.

From us to the Elizabethans and to the Greeks, the difference is as between a yard and a mile. But the new, the detached point of view being found, the rest is a question of adjustment. And once we are prepared to accept some other dramatic convention than that to which we habitually and instinctively respond, there may be gain in the very extent of the difference. For this in itself should arouse our interest. It will be refreshing to turn for a change from the close-woven realism of the modern play, or the swift panoramic

action of the Elizabethans, to the spaciousness and repose and observable beauty of form which belong to Greek tragedy; more particularly if as much is made of the difference as possible, if the peculiar virtues of Greek stagecraft are thrown into relief.

Circumstantial loss there must be in bringing the *Agamemnon* or the *Hippolytus* into an English theatre. The mere transference from outdoors in will prove deadening. And no one who has ever sat in a Greek theatre, and felt how the choric movements, patterned in the circle of the orchestra, both relieve and enhance by contrast the dignity of the individual action uplifted against the proscenium, will easily be reconciled to the disfiguring of all this behind footlights. But our new historic point of view has already destroyed the fetish of the footlights; and if the theatre-architect still does not serve us as freely as he might, a play's producer may, without offence, break any barriers of this sort that he can.

What mainly matters, however, is to grasp the underlying purpose and to preserve the essence of such effects. Dramatic form can best be appreciated, needless to say, in the external conditions which gave it birth. But form in Greek drama transcends these, even as it transcends the famous Unities, into which a less creative age tried to cut and dry it. Those also are incidental, not essential. In no drama that I know of is the form alone so satisfying—hence, largely, its appeal to mature taste; and the beauty of it lies not even simply in the clear and massive construction of the plays, but is innate in all the subtler relations between set speech and stichomythia, between the direct march of the main action and the comment of the choruses, and, within these, in the balance of

strophe against antistrophe and their relation to the steady epode. The general scheme of all this was, I take it, sufficiently fixed and recognizable for very slight individual touches to be at once appreciated; merely incidental effects had not to be given a prominence out of proportion to their importance to the play. The form as a whole would be familiar (the subject as a rule also), and in the certitude and repose of that the beauty of every detail could be felt by the accustomed spectator. To such effortless familiarity we cannot—in this either—expect to attain. But luckily there is an absolute beauty in form; or, if not, our sense of it is now at least so much a heritage from the Greeks that we need lose little here.

The acting of Greek drama cannot be subdued to methods wholly foreign to it. As between Hedda Gabler and Phaedra, even as between Hamlet and Orestes, the mere mechanism of expression differs too widely. But the antithesis does not follow, that the modern English actor should be set to imitate—even as far as he may be able to—the Greek. For it is not a question here of architecture or the disposition of scene, or even of the effect of a change from sunlight to limelight, but of that relation between the actors and their audience by which emotion will be stirred. And while we cannot, as I argue, hope for such a spontaneous response to (say) the passage between Athena, Orestes, and the Furies as Aeschylus will have won from his audience, yet if some emotion is not generated—be it the most rarefied—the play will not be a living thing at all but a “museum piece,” and out of place in a theatre. There is the dilemma. Could a performance be authentically Greek, it would be to most of us a curiosity only; at the best we should have

to ask our imagination to cheat us of some emotional response. Attack us by the means to which we most readily respond and the play's specific art will be more or less mangled and betrayed. No one certain solution to the problem is to be looked for. No principles can be invoked. There must be compromise, and upon a practical basis.

Some questions must be answered with a yes or no. Should mask and cothurnus be worn? Will a masked Clytemnestra purge us with pity and terror? Thirty years ago I should have said confidently that the sight must purge an average audience with uncontrollable laughter. I am not so sure now. The historical point of view is more easily adopted. But the question, when we analyse it, comes to this: Can the actress of Clytemnestra make us forget that the mask, however appropriate, is still a very peculiar thing? If she cannot, we shall, by just so much preoccupation, have our response to the play impeded by it. Is its orthodoxy worth this, on the balance?*

What of the Chorus? We shall hardly recover Greek music, nor might it stir us emotionally if we did. Are we to provide such as does normally stir our emotions? It will be found to distort or to smother the poetry if we do. Something of the sort, then, that we believe the Greeks to have had? But such calculated artifice is apt to result in a very bad sort of music, offensive by its falsity or its feebleness. Luckily there are more modes of music than one that, nowadays, do genuinely appeal to us, and among them a fairly suitable one may well be found. Here, certainly, it will be better to try to forget for a moment all about the Greeks and

* I seem to remember that Murray does not admit it to be beyond controversy that masks were worn.

face the plainly practical aspect of the problem. There must be chanting (or we shall have no contrast to the speaking on the stage), and instrumental music however exiguous (or the voices will lose pitch and colour); but the words of the choruses must be heard. There must be dancing, or rhythmic movements at least (or again we shall have no contrast to the weightier action on the stage), and this must not be a separate addition to the chanting (or the interruption to the main action will be too prolonged). Each play presents a slightly different problem in this kind. There is bound to be much loss of the original effect. One must minimize it as best one may.

But the first and chief compromise will be in the translation. I have heard Murray's translations severely dealt with by critics of a certain school. They have known the original Greek better than I (they easily might), so I have been disabled from argument. I could only hope that they knew it as well as Murray does. I have had to point out that, in any case, something more than what they are calling translation is involved. First as well as last, at the desk as well as in the theatre, it will be a question of interpretation. What has to be done is not to translate so many Greek sentences correctly or even poetically, but to take a play which was a living thing two thousand years ago and provide for its interpreting as a living thing to an audience of to-day. The translator is the first of the interpreters, and he must provide his actors with a text which they can not only understand but feel, by which they may express themselves (being identified with the characters) as spontaneously as possible, and to which their audience may as spontaneously as possible respond. And by however much the result lacks this

essential vitality the interpreters will—however excusably—have failed.

How did it happen that, with so much—I have no doubt admirable—translation of Greek drama lying sterilized on the printed page and left to lie there, Murray's *Euripides*, and later his *Aeschylus*, found their way into the theatre? For one reason because drama itself was already a living art to him. Let us remember *Carlyon Sahib* and *Andromache*. For a better, because Greek has evidently never been a dead language to him, nor Athens a thing of the past. Its streets must be as familiar to him as Oxford's; there may even be times when he feels more at home in them. But it is *his* Athens that he knows so well; and we must accept this. He has realized it by much study; and as far as facts about it go, he shares the property with others, and may not even mind being told that he is out in a measurement here and there. But he has brought to his view of it a very loving perception also, into which study and facts have been absorbed; and the vision resulting cannot but be peculiarly his own. Is it an unduly biased one? Unadulterated enthusiasm is a danger in scholarship as in other things. Without its basis of learning it might be. But if a man knows about all there is to know of his subject and acts honestly by his knowledge, then, for the rest, his perception, his vision, are what we ask of him. And as to bias; this is how I have been disposed to counter my anonymous critic: You, for your part, see this present world around you, the political situation, men and women, nature itself, in one light; I in another. There is no deciding which of us is right; there is no precise "right" in the matter. You tell me that Murray's is not the "real" Athens; but it is as real as yours, and

neither is any longer real. You tell me that his *Euripides* is largely the product of his own imagination, and, more precisely, that he uses three or even four words where *Aeschylus* only uses two. Really? So do our schoolboy cribs; and even Browning, determined "to be literal at every cost save that of absolute violence to our language" (but he did more than a little nevertheless in his *Agamemnon*), could hardly reach closer compression. This is surely mere silliness. The Greek language is one instrument, the English very much another; and, however important a part of *Aeschylus* his syntax may be, the very sum and spirit of his art can hardly be there. And if we are to have a *living* *Euripides*, and cannot for ourselves re-clothe the bare bones of the text with all that is needed—the wide collateral knowledge, the searching sympathy—to give it full meaning, this can only be given to us as the product, for the most part, of somebody's personal vision. And, all things considered, my dear critic, Murray's must be about the best available.

He has made the plays live again as plays, that is the capital achievement. They have been proved in our modern theatre and, alien as it is to them, they will live and move there. It has yet to learn, I think, how to do its best for them. But give it the means to learn, and what an enlargement of its too narrow scope, what addition to its dignity and power, their austere and aristocratic art could bring! The means to learn will lie, of course, in the stable opportunity for study and devoted discipline, in the encouragement to care for the thing for its own sake which belongs to scholarship, but which our modern professional theatre does not yet—alas!—provide. It must be a discipline too selectively severe for any but those who give them-

selves wholly to such work to face. Technically, no task, I fear, for the aspiring amateur. But devotion must be brought to it too. For how hope to act Greek tragedy unless by approaching it in something like the spirit which animated the actors for whom it was written? But this spirit also, I fancy—for it is ageless, and it knows its own—lives again in Murray's scholarship; and enough of it may be captured by his fellow-interpreters.

The true translator is a rarity. To begin with, the particular combination needed of the receptive, the critical, and the creative (re-creation there must be) is not too often found in one man; and when it is, and of a quality to cope with masterpieces, he is seldom disinterested enough to surrender himself to the task. It seems so much more satisfactory to do something which will at least appear to be one's own. Nor, in this case, I believe, is it to nothing more urgent than Murray's love for the dramatic art of Aeschylus and Euripides—deep though this may be—that we owe the long list of translations. These two are more to him, surely, than writers of plays. They are among the chief apostles of that Greek gospel in which he steadfastly believes; no mere matter of historic facts, but something as far transcending them as the beauty of their poetry transcends the syntax in which it is cast. Facts must be honestly faced, but they alone are ever but shabby witness to our faith. It is not mere facts about the Athenians that are still a light to us across the centuries, but the faith by which the finer spirits among them tried to live and make their city live. And could Euripides return to take his friend here by the hand, might he not say: Yes, indeed; my Athens, mirrored in my work, was no more Cleon's Athens or

ON TRANSLATING GREEK TRAGEDY

another's than the England of the yellow press is yours. That city of brute fact is gone. But you have helped to keep the Athens of my faith alive; and, by that, faith in your England too.

Nor do I find the self-dichotomy, by which, as I understand, during the last few years Murray has been left half a Regius Professor of Greek and half a delegate to the League of Nations, at all inappropriate. He does but carry on at Geneva in another form the work done at Glasgow and Oxford, for a few quiet years among the Surrey pinewoods, wherever, indeed, he has happened to be, and once—as I can remember—upon a steadily tapping typewriter in the grilling deck-house of a Mediterranean cargo-boat. Whether with his pen, at his lecturer's desk, or over a committee table, he will still be found bearing witness to the Greek ideal, his lifetime's lesson, learnt to be taught again. And it is even not without significance that while the sixteenth century, the age of nationalist disruption, found Senecan violence much to its taste, we to-day—those of us, at least, who try to learn the lessons of history—should be seeking quite other inspiration from the past. For our present salvation lies, it would seem, in restoring Europe to a tougher and more supple unity than that then broken; and the task may well tax the accumulated wisdom of the ages, Christian and Pagan too.

What end shall fall?

Or peace, or death outswEEPing all.

It is with every fitness that we have spared our most humane Greek scholar to Geneva.

SOME PROBLEMS IN THE
"ACTA JUDAE THOMAE"

by Professor D. S. MARGOLIOUTH

ALTHOUGH AS early as 1823 attention was called by Thilo to gnostic matter contained in the apocryphal Acts of Thomas, of which he edited a fragment, supplemented by Tischendorf in his edition of 1851, special interest was first aroused in them by W. Wright's edition of the Syriac text in 1871, since which many valuable contributions to both text and interpretation have been made. Nöldeke observed cases in which the Greek evidently mistranslates the Syriac, to which additional proof that the Syriac was the original language of the work was furnished by the late Professor Burkitt; and, indeed, this is not only evinced by mistranslations. Such a phrase as *ἐπιθες τῇ κεφαλῇ αὐτῶν** for "punish them" would suggest a Syriac original, the rendering being only too accurate. The gnostic material was skilfully enucleated by Lipsius†; though the sect to which it belongs cannot be accurately determined. Bedjan, with the aid of a Berlin MS., was able to improve Wright's text. Bonnet, who edited the Greek text in 1883, was able twenty years later to furnish a far more copious *apparatus criticus*, with alternative recensions of numerous passages, and a Greek version of the so-called *Hymn of the Soul*, which was wanting in the earlier editions. Bishop Medlicott‡ did good service by producing facsimiles of coins bearing the name

* Bonnet, 1903 (the edition which will be regularly cited), p. 192, line 12.

† *Die apokryphen Apostelgeschichten*, 1883-90.

‡ *India and the Apostle Thomas*, 1905.

of King Gundaphor, to whom there is a reference in the Acts, evincing some accurate knowledge of the history of the first century, and indicating a fairly early date for the compilation, but no more showing the Acts to be historical than the mention of Harun al-Rashid in the *Arabian Nights* would justify a similar inference about those fairy tales. Nor, indeed, can we infer anything more from the statement of St. Ephraem that the Apostle Thomas suffered martyrdom in India than that he was acquainted with some form of these Acts; it is, however, surprising that he should have accepted its statements if his copy was heavily charged with gnostic doctrine. More recent literature, largely based on materials which have lately come to light, is summarized in the work of Günther Bornkamm,* who among other things has succeeded in identifying a quotation from the works of Bardesanes, in making it probable that the text contains Manichaean interpolations, and rendering attractive a theory that the hymn mentioned refers not to the soul, but to the career of Manes himself. This writer seems somewhat to overdo the discovery of gnostic ideas, just as Burkitt seemed unreasonably to minimize it.

The presence of a Jewish source was detected by Gressmann,† who showed that some of the matter in the Dragon's speech in *praxis* iii agrees word for word with a passage in a document called the Prayer of Cyriacus, of which he produced a Greek text with a Syriac translation. The prayer would appear to have been for the restoration of the twelve tribes, and the series of atrocities to which the Dragon confesses are

* *Mythos und Legende in den apocryphen Thomas-Akten*, 1933.

† *Zeitschrift für neutestamentliche Wissenschaft* xx.

SOME PROBLEMS IN THE "ACTA JUDAE THOMAE"

all taken from the Old Testament; in the Acts of Thomas the enumeration proceeds into the New Testament, indicating that what was originally a Jewish document has been remodelled to suit Christian ideas; the point to which I wish to call attention first is that the speech in the Greek recension of the Acts contains two statements which find their explanation in Rabbinic literature.

A passage which is regarded as particularly obscure is where he says (148, 15) "I am the son of him that hurt and struck (τοῦ βλάψαντος καὶ πλῆξαντος) the four brothers the erect" (τοὺς ἐστῶτας). The sentence is not found in the Syriac, yet the doublet "hurt and struck" is clearly a tentative rendering of either Hebrew *makkeh* or Syriac *makke* by someone who was in doubt whether the Hebrew or the Syriac sense should be given to the word. Lipsius (i. 322) says he can find no other mention of these four; Bornkamm (p. 26) compares four sons of salvation found in Mandaic texts. It seems to me that the reference here must be the same as that in a tradition found in the Babylonian Talmud (Shabbath 55a, Baba Bathra 17a) according to which four persons died by the — of the serpent, these four being Amram, Jesse, David's son Kilab, and Benjamin. This agrees with the passage in the Acts in making four persons die through the agency of the serpent; reasons will be given for the introduction of the epithet "standing"; but it must be admitted that the word "brethren" must be taken loosely if it is applied to persons who lived at very different periods.

The tradition is cited as an objection to the doctrine that death is in all cases earned by sin. The word which has been left untranslated is of uncertain signi-

fication; Rashi renders it "counsel," supposing the reference to be to the counsel given by the serpent to Eve; the sense would then be that these four died through the fault of Eve and not through their own. The person who cites it observes that three of the cases rest on *gemara*, i.e. tradition, whereas that of Jesse is explained. This is further elucidated. In 2 Sam. xvii. 25, Joab's mother Abigal, sister of Zeruiah, is said to be the daughter of *nahash* "serpent," but in 1 Chron. ii. 16, where she is called Abigail, she is said to be a daughter of Jesse. Hence "daughter of serpent" in the former verse must mean "daughter of him who died through the agency of the serpent." This is stated at greater length in the Targum of Ruth iv. 22, where we are told that Jesse was a righteous man, who committed no sin earning death; consequently he lived on till the counsel of the serpent to Eve was recalled before the Almighty, which brought death on all mankind; and Jesse was called "serpent" in consequence. Doubtless equally cogent arguments were found in the other cases, though they have not been preserved; the word "standing" in the Acts may be regarded as a synonym for "righteous" in the Targum, though the statement in Exodus vi. 20 that Amram lived 137 years would justify the paraphrase "persistent." David's obscure son, Kilab, whose mother was Abigal, perhaps owes his inclusion in the list to an etymology of his name "like to the father," i.e. whose death was due to the same cause as his mother's father's; Benjamin perhaps to an interpretation of his name as "son of days," i.e. a man who might have lived on continuously. If this is right it would suggest that the "standing" of the Acts has that sense.

The passage in the Acts proceeds: *I am he who entered into Paradise through the hedge and talked to Eve*. Lipsius, followed by Bornkamm, finds the reference to a gnostic doctrine of a hedge or screen between the realm of light and that of evil. They do not furnish any evidence that the serpent broke through such a hedge. Further, it may be observed that the atrocities to which the dragon in this passage confesses are all taken from Biblical narratives, whence it may be assumed that the speaker is dealing with the Garden of Eden and not with any gnostic conception. Now this entering through the hedge finds an easy explanation in a Midrash given most fully in the treatise Aboth d'Rabbi Nathan, but also found in the Midrash Rabbah. Adam, it is said, made a hedge to his words, by adding to God's command (Gen. ii. 17) *Of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat* the words which appear in Eve's reproduction (iii. 3) *neither shall ye touch it*. A "hedge" in this terminology means "an additional prohibition to prevent the original prohibition being disobeyed." The serpent found here in a gate whereby he could enter, since he showed that death did not result from touching the tree, whence Eve inferred that the fruit could also be eaten without death resulting.

It would seem that the Rabbinical interpretation of the hedge is in this case certain, since we have a distinct statement in the Midrash that the serpent entered through the "hedge" on this particular occasion. And it will probably be admitted that the Talmudic reference in the former clause furnishes a better explanation than the parallels adduced from Mandaic works, which do not go beyond the number four. We are justified in concluding that the author of the

Dragon's speech was a person with some Rabbinical training, and so originally a member of the Jewish community. The reviser of the Syriac text probably omitted these clauses because there was to his mind no authority for them in the Bible.

One other case which belongs to the same source is to be found in the Syriac text, though absent from the Greek. This is in the thanksgiving uttered by the Apostle in *praxis* vii, when the wild asses have offered to haul the chariot. In spite of exhortation by the prophets, Israel, he says, would not obey because of the evil inclination, *yetser ha-ra*, a Rabbinical technicality, which does not seem to have been taken over by the Christian communities.

It was observed above that the doublet *βλάψαντος καὶ πλῆξαντος* looks like a tentative rendering of a word *makke*, which has the former sense in Syriac, the latter in Hebrew. To suggest that any part of the Acts of Thomas was originally in the latter language would seem audacious were it not for two statements which we find to that effect. The Prayer of Cyriacus referred to above was, it states, uttered by its author in his own language, which Gressmann supposes to have been Hebrew, and of this, it says, the Greek is a translation. This, then, would be an assertion, credible or otherwise, that the speech of the dragon, or at least some part of it, was originally in Hebrew. The text of the Acts says much the same of the first Hymn of Thomas. It was sung in Hebrew, and therefore understood only by a Hebrew woman who played the flute.

In the Dragon's speech, besides the phrase already quoted, where the Hebrew sense "who smote" is clearly what is meant, we find in the Greek repeatedly

the doublet *ἐξάψας καὶ πυρώσας* "who kindled and inflamed" with the sense "who incited," for which the Syriac text has an appropriate equivalent. This doublet is found in the corresponding passage of the Prayer of Cyriacus, so that we are justified in seeing whether a Hebrew original will help to explain it. It may be suggested that the original had the Hebrew word *massiḥ* used for "inciting," misread as *matsiḥ*—"kindling." Neither of these words is used in the other dialects.

Since the Syriac of the Acts has in these places the correct "incited," we should have to infer that the Greek and the Syriac in this passage were independent renderings of a Hebrew original; for the Syriac translation of the Greek prayer of Cyriacus reproduces "kindled and inflamed" accurately. It is not easy to say whether this hypothesis suits the Christian passage which follows, where the Dragon in the Syriac says "I am he who induced Judas to take a bribe having subjected himself to me, that he should deliver Christ to death," in the Greek "I am he who kindled and bought out (*ὁ ἐξάψας καὶ ἐξαγοράσας*) Judas that he should deliver Christ to death." It seems likely that there is here an underlying derivation of the name Iscariot from the Hebrew *sakhar*—"to hire," with a suggestion of *shahar* Aramaic for "to commandeer." This would account for the Syriac form of the passage; in the Greek *ἐξάψας καὶ* is omitted in some MSS., and may have got in from the preceding sentences. If this account is correct, the etymology which suggested "bribing" is from Hebrew, as the word is not used in this sense in the other dialects.

The question now arises whether the statement in the text that the nuptial hymn sung by Thomas was

in Hebrew is likely to have any foundation. That it has undergone dogmatic interpolation is clear, and indeed Bornkamm has shown that the conclusion of the ode in the Greek text is Manichaean. W. Bousset, in his *Hauptprobleme der Gnosis*,* endeavoured to show that the hymn was originally in praise of a moon-goddess, and supposed it to have been borrowed by some gnostic sect from a pagan *Mysterienverein*. This view does not seem to furnish a satisfactory key to many of the details, and if it were correct, it would not only be futile to seek in it for any traces of a Hebrew origin, but the incongruity could scarcely have escaped the compiler of the Acts. Moreover, it should have been possible for the author of this suggestion to produce something analogous from the material which he and Reizenstein have collected about the Hellenic Mystery-religions, and this he has not succeeded in doing.

According to Bornkamm's correct analysis the ode consists of three parts—description of a bride, of a nuptial chamber, and a nuptial banquet. The bride, however, appears to be neither a person nor a mythological figure, but a city, as in Rev. xxi. 2 the new Jerusalem descends, prepared like a bride for her husband. This seems to be a fair inference from the detail, *On the peak is established the king, feeding with his ambrosia those that dwell beneath him*; in the Syriac, *On her head dwells the king and supplies his inhabitants beneath*, a phrase which bears some resemblance to the Targum paraphrase of Cant. vi. 3, *And the head of the assembly from whose merit the whole world is supplied*. There would seem to be an attempt in what follows to establish correspondence between the

* 1907, p. 68.

SOME PROBLEMS IN THE "ACTA JUDAE THOMAE"

features and limbs, and objects to be found in the city, but it must be admitted that it is not carried out consistently. Moreover, both texts seem to have undergone alteration and accommodation to the views of different communities. The opening words in the Syriac, *My church is the daughter of light*, remind one of the Jewish interpretation of the heroine of the Canticles as the synagogue of Israel; the Greek, *the Damsel, daughter of light*, is generally agreed to be gnostic. Where the Syriac has *Her tongue is the curtain which the priest lifts to enter*, doubtless with reference to the Veil of the Temple, the Greek has *Whose tongue is like the curtain of the door which is shaken out by those who enter*, where it would seem probable that the Jewish allusion was in the original, but was removed by a translator. On the other hand, where the Greek has *Thirty-two are her eulogizers*, the Syriac has *The twelve apostles of the Son and seventy-two sound in her*. Since the figures intended in the Syriac are those of the Apostles and chosen Disciples according to St. Luke, and the latter were not seventy-two, but seventy, it is reasonable to suppose that the *two* are a relic of the thirty-two of the Greek, a figure which has given much trouble. If, then, in the last case there was evidence of something Jewish having been removed in the Greek recension, in this case we have something definitely Christian inserted in the Syriac, which is not found in the Greek.

It is in this clause that we may perhaps find a trace of Hebrew. Since the tongue of the bride is identified with the veil of the temple, it is to be expected that some correspondence would be found for the teeth, one of the most celebrated among the beauties of the Oriental fair ones. Thilo suggested that the thirty-

two stand for the teeth, and if this is right the words *her eulogizers* must be a misunderstanding, and indeed what is wanted is some feature of the city. The Hebrew for "her towers" could be so vocalized as to signify "her eulogizers." Since in Psa. xlviii. 13 people are commanded to "count her towers," it might have been expected that this would be done. It is not, however, necessary to identify the number, if we assume that "the thirty-two" stand for the teeth.

The clause which in the Syriac reads *Her mouth is open and becomes her* differs only slightly in the Greek *Her mouth is open and becomingly for her*; the feebleness of the sentiment in both forms suggests mistranslation. Possibly the original meant *Her mouth is the beautiful door*, which is mentioned in the Acts of the Apostles, and identified from a description by Josephus.

If the author found some correspondence for the hands and fingers, neither text has preserved it. The Syriac has *Her two hands proclaim the place of life; her ten fingers open the gate of heaven*. The Greek: *Her two hands signify and suggest the chorus of the happy aeons proclaiming; and her fingers suggest the gates of the city*. Bonnet's emendation $\chi\omega\rho\omicron\nu$ for $\chi\omicron\rho\omicron\nu$ is probably right, and brings the two texts somewhat nearer, and the three Greek words $\sigma\eta\mu\alpha\iota\nu\omicron\nu\sigma\iota\nu$ καὶ ὑποδεικνύουσιν κηρύσσοντες may all of them be attempts at rendering the Syriac "proclaiming"; in neither version do we find any such correspondence with the numbers of the hands and the fingers as might have been expected. It might be suggested that the ten fingers which open the gate of heaven are the Ten Commandments.

It is rightly observed by Bornkamm that whereas this ode forms part of the story, the so-called Hymn

of the Soul has no connection with it, the narrative proceeding as though it had no place therein. Nor is it suggested that the latter was sung in Hebrew. If the indications of a Hebrew original of the former have any evidential value, the reference to the priest raising the veil and entering would suggest an early date, and we might suppose the ode to have been a Jewish treatment of the *ἱερὸς γάμος* which the remarkable researches of Reitzenstein have shown to have been known to those members of the community who found room in their system for the Hellenic mysteries.

One further observation which seems of interest is that the translator of the Syriac text of the Acts into Greek would appear to have been more familiar with Hebrew and the Jewish Aramaic than with the Christian dialect. There are several indications of this, but the most convincing is the rendering of *nuhamta* (Syr. 250, 7; Greek 196, 5) by *ἀνάπαυσις* "comfort." This latter is the sense of the root and its derivatives in Hebrew and the Jewish Aramaic. Since it is coupled with a word rightly rendered in the Greek by *ἐγερσις*, there can be no doubt that the sense "resurrection" is intended. An example which is only slightly less convincing is in the address of the wild ass to the Apostle (Syr. 248, 8; Greek 193, 19), who is asked the question *Why dost thou notice this temporal life, when every day thou art meditating on eternal life?* For this the Greek substitutes *οὐδὲν ἐνθυμεῖσθαι*, "thou meditatest not at all," a most unjust accusation to make against the Apostle. It seems fairly clear that the translator mistook the Syriac *kulyum* for the Talmudic *klum* "at all." It would follow, then, that the translator was someone who had been a member of the Jewish community.

THE EVIDENCE FOR TELEPATHY

by Mrs. W. H. SALTER

SOME FIFTY years have now passed since anything that can be considered a systematic inquiry into apparently telepathic phenomena first began, and although a belief in telepathy is still far from commanding any general acceptance in the scientific world, it does appear to be gradually strengthening its position. Not only has the occurrence of telepathy been almost universally admitted by professed students of psychical research, it has also been admitted by many students in other fields, well qualified to express an opinion. I will quote as an example the words of Professor C. D. Broad speaking as a philosopher in his recently delivered Presidential Address to the Society for Psychical Research: "For my own part I have no doubt that telepathy among normal human beings happens from time to time. And it is quite clear to me that in order to account for the information sometimes conveyed by good trance-mediums and automatic writers, a very extensive and peculiar telepathy among the living is the very least that must be postulated."

The present position, however, leaves much to be desired, and further progress is not likely to be easy, whether our purpose is to convince the sceptic, or, being ourselves believers in telepathy, to determine just what it is that we believe. Two difficulties (among others) stand in the way: first, a great deal of the available evidence, because it is neither statistically assessable, nor obtained under conditions clearly understood and controlled, leaves a wide margin for individual judgment as to its value and implications;

and secondly, we know at present almost nothing of what the telepathic process actually is. These two difficulties act and react on one another, and so long as we are unable to give a clear answer to many fundamental questions which must arise in every inquirer's mind, it is not much to be wondered at if we find the sceptic stubbornly entrenched, and perhaps all the more inclined to maintain his position from a reflection that whether one happens to be a mechanistic philosopher or a decapitated saint, "*ce n'est que le premier pas qui coûte.*"

The case for telepathy, as it stands now, is built upon two types of phenomena, spontaneous and experimental. I do not think it necessary to take up space here by giving examples of spontaneous experiences—veridical apparitions and the like—for all my readers will in one way or another have had such experiences brought to their notice. I have heard it suggested that whereas a large amount of good evidence for spontaneous cases was obtained in the early days of psychical research, there is little to be had now. This change, I am convinced, is only apparent. In the early part of 1934 I took part in a series of broadcast talks, the subject of my talk being telepathy. I received from listeners a large number of letters describing personal experiences of much the same various kinds as will be found recorded in such classics of psychical research as *Phantasms of the Living* and F. W. H. Myers's *Human Personality*. It has never been easy to collect these cases and put them upon a sound evidential basis, and perhaps one reason why they seem scarcer now is that the present tendency is rather to suggest that the spontaneous case has had its day and we must look to experimental work for the future.

I should accept this verdict only with important reservations. I think it is true that we must experiment under conditions as rigidly controlled as is possible with mental phenomena, if we are to make further progress, but we must never allow spontaneous experiences to drop out of sight, for they present us with a range and variety which is not experimentally obtainable; to mention only the most obvious example, we cannot experiment in apparitions at the time of death, and yet any theory of telepathy we adopt must be able to include such cases within its framework, for they are certainly telepathic, if such a thing as telepathy exists at all.

The experimenter must therefore bear these spontaneous cases in mind in any working hypothesis he adopts, and he is likely to find them useful in suggesting some of the problems which his experiments should be designed to solve. Consider, for instance, the fundamental problem which may be shortly expressed as that of agent versus percipient: it is commonly assumed in experimental work that the percipient is the more important element in the partnership, and in many cases this is clearly true; for whereas a great many people consistently fail to give evidence of telepathic powers under experimental conditions, some good percipients will succeed with several different agents. On the other hand, in many spontaneous cases it would seem, *prima facie* at least, that the agent is the dominant factor in the sense that his circumstances and his mental state are the immediate cause of the phenomenon rather than any exceptional faculty in the percipient, who, it may be, has never given sign of telepathic powers on any other occasion. But obviously a phenomenon which consists in A becoming

supernormally cognizant of the thoughts of B is not the same as a phenomenon which consists in B supernormally causing A to become cognizant of his thoughts. These two phenomena probably have some common factor, there may be some one cause underlying both, but we do not *know* at present what it is, and telepathy can be little more than a label so long as we have to apply it without further discrimination over so wide a field of varying manifestations.

Cases in which the agent's circumstances seem to play a decisive rôle have very frequently a strong element of emotion, the agent having been subjected to a sudden shock, either by illness or accident. We shall, however, be going beyond our book if we assume that emotion is a necessary condition; the most that we can say with any confidence is that it is perhaps a predisposing factor by releasing the mind from some inhibition which governs it in a condition of normal stability. The faculty, whatever it may be, whereby one individual causes another to become supernormally aware of his thoughts seems to be more easily exercised in a state of sudden emotional tension, but it can be exercised apparently without any emotional tension at all; and in the case of the percipient emotion, it would seem, may be a definite barrier.

Spontaneous cases also serve a useful purpose in reminding us of the bewildering variety of forms which a telepathic impression may take: it may emerge in a non-sensory form as a thought or mental impression, hardly formulated in words even; it may on the other hand be associated with definite and fully externalized hallucinations, visual or auditory. Perhaps the form which the impression takes is in part at least determined by pre-existing tendencies in the per-

cipient's mind or by the accidental circumstances of the moment, linking itself with any thought or sensory image which happens to lie ready, and taking, so to speak, the line of least resistance. Professor Murray, to whose experiments in telepathy I shall refer in greater detail later, has recorded an instance in which a correct impression of Savonarola burning books in Florence was apparently brought into conscious focus by the dropping of a coal from the grate. We have need here of much more observation and experiment, and possibly hypnotic experiments may be found useful, for sensory hallucinations can undoubtedly be induced by hypnotism, and we have here a link with the sensory hallucinations not infrequently associated with telepathic experiences.

Assuming that all telepathic experience is fundamentally of the same nature, have we any idea what its nature is? Myers was inclined to the hypothesis that telepathy between the living was most easily explained as a mind-to-brain relationship supernormally extended; that is to say that, whereas normally a particular mind is only able to influence the brain with which it is individually associated, it is sometimes able telepathically to exert its influence upon the brain associated with another mind. A direct mind-to-mind theory of transmission is also tenable, and has been argued on good authority; the only theory for which no serious student seems able to find anything to say is a brain-to-brain relationship, giving telepathy a physical basis analogous to the basis of sense-perception.

To this theory many objections may be made; I will only mention one, and here again spontaneous cases are useful: "The intensity of any physical transmission varies inversely with the square of the distance

from its source," but we have on record a number of excellently attested cases in which a telepathic impression has travelled from one end of the earth to the other. What form of radiation can we conceive which will operate with equal intensity over a few feet and several thousand miles, and what transmitting or receiving organs can our bodies be supposed to possess?

But if we reject the brain-to-brain theory, as it seems we must, then it follows that *between telepathy and every form of sense-perception there is a sharply dividing line; they differ in kind, not in degree.*

Professor Murray, who has proved himself in his own field one of the most successful telepathic percipients on record,* suggests in his Presidential Address to the Society for Psychological Research that "the basis of these telepathic impressions is unconscious sense-perception; but we must be prepared for the possibility that this sense-perception is not confined to the canonical five channels of Sight, Sound, Smell, Taste, Touch"; in other words, he suggests that the faculty in his case is an extension of hyperaesthesia, differing from it only in degree. I think Professor Murray must be considered a rather suspect witness on his own behalf, for any suggestion that the faculties of a perfectly respectable professor of Greek might have a supernatural taint is confessedly repugnant to him. Mrs. Henry Sidgwick, discussing his results, and able, perhaps, to take a more objective view, considers that if hyperaesthesia "has acted at all, it has done so rarely." I cannot here discuss these experiments in detail, but I should like to suggest that in considering them we shall find ourselves forced to the following

* For reports on his experiments, see *Proc. S.P.R.*, Vols. XXIX and XXXIV.

conclusion: if, as Professor Murray himself suggests, his faculty is some extended form of sense-perception, then it differs radically from the faculty whereby A (in England) becomes aware supernormally that B (in Australia) is dying. This conclusion is possibly true—for Professor Murray operates only over a short distance—but, as anyone who has been privileged to witness his experiments will agree, the distance and circumstances are such that no mere acuity of hearing will suffice to explain the result; hyperaesthesia of a most unusual kind is the least we can postulate.

If we adopt this theory of extended sense-perception, we shall do well to drop the word "telepathy" in relation to Professor Murray's experiences, because in using it we confuse the issue. But I do not myself think that extended sense-perception is an adequate hypothesis; it certainly did not seem to me adequate to explain the experiments I myself witnessed. I incline therefore to Mrs. Sidgwick's verdict that we have in Professor Murray's case to reckon with telepathy (that is, a form of extra-sensory perception) as well as hyperaesthesia. It is not *a priori* unlikely that these two phenomena should appear in conjunction: "The hyperaesthesia [says Myers] which I have claimed for the subliminal self seems sometimes to pass gradually beyond the point which any sensory influence can be stretched to cover. We must then assume at least a mingling of some form of supernormal acquisition of knowledge." In suggesting that hyperaesthesia might pass gradually into some form of supernormal cognizance, Myers cannot have meant to say that there was no essential difference between these two phenomena, for he certainly did not hold that any theory of physical radiation would account for supernormal acquisition

of knowledge. Hyperaesthesia and telepathy may occur simultaneously in such a way that it is difficult to disentangle them, just as two factors of Mendelian inheritance may be mingled in something which is the product of both; but for all that the underlying factors remain fundamentally distinct.

The records of Professor Murray's experiments certainly suggest that hyperaesthesia plays some part in the results obtained, and we have possibly an additional reason for suspecting that some faculty besides telepathy is operating in his case in the fact that his ratio of success is much higher than usually obtains in pure telepathy. So much I am willing to concede to Professor Murray's desire not to be thought any more peculiarly endowed than the rest of us! But, as matters stand, the question must be considered open, and the whole problem of the possible relationship between telepathy and hyperaesthesia needs further inquiry. Is it permissible to hope that Professor Murray's regrettable retirement from his professorial duties may at least have the advantage of leaving him free to plunge into the Charybdis of supernormal phenomena?

I have written so far of spontaneous phenomena and of a type of experiment which, valuable and important as it is, suffers from the disadvantage that its results are not accurately assessable by quantitative analysis. Both these lines of inquiry should certainly be pursued, but if we are to make further advance in knowledge, and especially if we are to put telepathy definitely and incontrovertibly on the scientific map, we must also pursue the line of quantitative experiment, the essential characteristic of which is that it is possible to demonstrate mathematically to what extent the results deviate from such results as would be

attributable to chance. If this deviation exceeds a certain figure, which is ascertainable by statistical calculation, we can be mathematically certain that some other factor than chance (let us call it X) has been at work, and if we have devised our experiments well and carried them out under sufficiently controlled conditions, we can be, humanly speaking, certain that X is the particular factor we are investigating—for instance, telepathy.

The quantitative method is not easily applied to supernormal faculties, which appear to function more readily with the minimum of restraint. In particular we have to find some way of guarding against loss of interest on the part of the percipient. Quantitative experiments are inevitably monotonous, for they involve doing the same thing over and over again, and however much the percipient may be consciously determined to stay the course, he is apt to become subconsciously bored, with a consequent diminution in his ratio of success. Nevertheless, interesting work has been done in the quantitative field, among which may be mentioned Dr. J. B. Rhine's recent experiments at Duke University on "Extra-Sensory Perception." I propose to limit myself here to a summary of some interesting results obtained during the last year or so by a member of the Society for Psychical Research, Mr. G. N. M. Tyrrell, together with a description of two types of apparatus Mr. Tyrrell employs. I am indebted to Mr. Tyrrell and to the percipient with whom he has worked, Miss G. M. Johnson, for permission to use some unpublished material, and to the Council of the Society for Psychical Research for permission to quote from a report by Mr. Tyrrell printed in the Society's *Journal* (April 1935).

Mr. Tyrrell's earlier experiments were carried out with a simple piece of apparatus consisting of "five small wooden boxes placed in a row with sloping lids overlapping the sides and facing the percipient. Behind them was a large wooden screen on the other side of which the agent, or operator, was seated, completely screened from the percipient. The backs of the boxes were arranged so as to open towards the operator, who was provided with a long, flat pointer." The experiments consisted in the agent thrusting his pointer into one of the boxes and the percipient lifting one of the lids, a success being scored whenever she lifted the lid of the box into which the pointer had been thrust.

The chance expectation of success with this apparatus is one in five—that is, 20 per cent. Between October 1934 and February 1935, 30,000 trials were made, of which 9,364 were successes—that is, 31.21 per cent. If we submit these results to statistical analysis (using the tables given by Dr. R. A. Fisher in *Statistical Methods for Research Workers*, p. 74), we find that their deviation from chance expectation is so immensely beyond the standard error that the influence of some other factor than chance must be regarded as certain. The result may be expressed statistically by saying that p (probability) "is of the order of $\frac{1}{2} \times 10^{-460}$." But "no one regards chance as being a possible explanation of any phenomenon if the probability falls to 10^{-6} or anywhere near it; or, in other words, if the odds against chance are anything like a million to one."

I have not space here to report these experiments in detail; I can only call attention to the following points: (1) Although most of Miss Johnson's work

has been carried out with Mr. Tyrrell, she has obtained results well above chance expectation with three other operators. (2) Some critics have suggested that the high ratio of success is due to the operator having certain number habits which the percipient has come to know. To answer this criticism, 1,004 trials were made with numbers selected beforehand by chance; 309 successes were obtained—that is, 30.9 per cent—as compared with 31.21 per cent in the total number of trials—a negligible difference. (3) Many of Mr. Tyrrell's results have been obtained in the presence of competent observers (I have myself witnessed them), who have recorded their belief that they give evidence of extra-sensory perception on the part of Miss Johnson. I have used here the wider term "extra-sensory perception" because under the conditions in which these earlier experiments were carried out it was impossible to determine whether the results were due to telepathy or clairvoyance—that is, extra-sensory perception of an object or event, as distinct from extra-sensory cognizance of a thought. I am not here concerned with clairvoyance, but if this phenomenon occurs—and there is some quite good evidence for it—the necessity obviously arises of devising experiments in which it can be clearly discriminated from telepathy; otherwise the issue between these two phenomena will be confused, as we have seen that the issue may be confused between telepathy and hyperaesthesia. As the case stands now, many experiences usually reckoned telepathic may in fact be clairvoyant.

Mr. Tyrrell has now devised, and used with success, an electrical apparatus which has the advantage (amongst others) that it makes discrimination between

telepathy and clairvoyance possible, and he has kindly sent me a description of this apparatus.

With the pointer apparatus described above, no distinction is possible between telepathy and clairvoyance. Either or both may be acting, since each event is known to operator or agent. Therefore a new apparatus was constructed which should enable this distinction to be made. In order to test pure clairvoyance it is necessary that the event presented for cognition by the subject should be unknown to the operator and to every other person; and the "event" provided by thrusting the pointer into the box could therefore no longer be used. Other improvements were also seen to be desirable, and I designed a new apparatus which incorporates the following features. (1) The apparatus provides that the event submitted for cognition may be either known or unknown to the operator at will. (2) It provides that the order of the events can be selected mechanically instead of being selected by the operator. (3) It provides for an automatic record of all the results.

The event chosen (although provision is made for varying this) is the lighting of a small electric light in one of the boxes. To guard against leakage of light, the lamps are lit rather dully; the lids of the boxes fit accurately, and being rabbeted on four sides, faced with fine velvet, and closed with strong springs are as light-tight as it is possible to make them.

The procedure of an experiment is then as follows: The operator, by pressing a key, lights a lamp in one of the boxes. The percipient, seated at the other side of the table and completely hidden by a large wooden screen, raises the lid of one of the boxes

according to inclination. To deal first with provision (3), the act of raising this lid closes an electric contact which brings the trial-recorder into operation and registers the trial on a moving strip of paper. If a wrong box has been opened, the trial is recorded as unsuccessful by a single mark on the paper; if the right box has been opened, the trial is recorded as a success by a double mark. Thus the number of successes is obtained by counting the number of double marks on the tape, and the total number of trials is recorded on a counter worked by a key, as well as by the total number of marks on the tape. There is an arrangement of automatic switches which ensures that a success can only be recorded if the right box is opened. If more than one box is opened at a time, whatever the number or combination of the boxes opened may be, and whether this combination includes the right box or not, only a failure can be recorded on the tape. Also when a box-lid is opened, the contact closes so early that the result has been recorded as a success or failure before the lid is sufficiently far open for the percipient to see into the box. In this way the arrangement is proof against error by fraudulent or careless manipulation.

Conditions (1) and (2) are provided for by two distinct pieces of apparatus. (a) By means of a commutator the telepathic element can be either retained or eliminated at will. In this method five keys are placed in a row before the operator and hidden from the percipient by means of a screen. By pressing a key the operator lights one of the lamps in the boxes. The keys make contact with globules of mercury and are thus rendered silent in operation, lest the sound of each key should be recognized and associated with

the lighting of a particular lamp. If the keys are connected with the lamps in straightforward order, so that each key lights the lamp occupying a similar position in the row, the operator knows each time he presses a key which lamp he is lighting, and the element of telepathy is present as a possible cause of success. But if the wires joining the keys to the lamps are transposed in some order which is unknown to the operator, the latter does not know when pressing a key what lamp he is lighting and telepathy is eliminated. Success, if attained, can then only be due to perception of the event itself—that is to say, to pure clairvoyance. It is the function of the commutator to effect this transposition of connections. It is, in effect, a rotating switch, which can either connect the keys to the lamps in straightforward order or can transpose the order of the connections in various ways according to the position in which it comes to rest. The instrument is enclosed in a box, with a door in front which can be opened, and it is operated electrically by pressing a button. It can be set to any known position; or the door can be closed and the setting done at random and remain unknown until after the experiment.

The design of this apparatus, although intended to provide for telepathic experiments of the kind described above, was more especially directed towards the testing of pure clairvoyance and precognition. It therefore includes a second piece of apparatus, (*b*) a selector, which places the selection of the lamp to be lit entirely beyond the control of the operator. This selection is determined by purely mechanical means according to a chance distribution and is carried on without the operator's knowledge by the simple pressing of a key.

Hence telepathy, in any conceivable form, is excluded, and the experiment is a test of the possibility of the direct perception of an event without assistance from the normal senses or from telepathy.

The further step to the test of precognition is effected by simply inverting the order of the processes, the box being opened before the selection of the lamp to be lit has been made. All these processes can be carried out with great rapidity.

In a general way the advantages possessed by Mr. Tyrrell's apparatus speak for themselves. He has called my attention to one particular advantage—namely, that the recording is automatic and the operator does not know the order of the subject's selection of the boxes. Hence the possible objection that the operator may be learning the subject's number habits and allowing himself to be influenced by them is ruled out.

Working with this new apparatus without differentiation between telepathy and clairvoyance (with pure clairvoyance, as I have said, I am not here concerned), Mr. Tyrrell and Miss Johnson have obtained the following results: 4,662 trials have been made with 1,256 successes, that is, 27 per cent. These results give a probability value of $\frac{1}{2} \times 10^{-27}$, which means that in this case also, as with the pointer apparatus, they cannot be accounted for by chance alone. With reference to any suggestion of hyperaesthesia, it should be noted that these later experiments have all been carried out with lights in boxes, made as light-tight as possible, and with silent keys, as described by Mr. Tyrrell.

Investigation of such supernormal faculties as

telepathy has up to the present time been carried on with but little help or encouragement from orthodox academic science. In defence of this aloof attitude the argument has been adduced that this faculty is so uncertain in its operation, and the conditions under which it seems to occur so variable, as to make anything in the nature of scientific inquiry impossible. This argument does not seem to me to apply to experiments with the kind of apparatus Mr. Tyrrell is now using; the conditions under which the experiments are carried out can be accurately controlled and observed, their results can be accurately assessed, and the automatic recording reduces to a minimum any possible error arising from the "human factor." We have the further advantage that the apparatus makes it possible to carry out a large number of experiments in a short time. With Mr. Tyrrell's pointer apparatus 100 trials could be made in a few minutes; with the electrical apparatus the speed is greater still. This advantage will be obvious to any of my readers who have taken part in some other kinds of telepathic experiment; it reduces to tolerable proportions that element of boredom to which I have referred as an inhibiting factor.

It is evident that Mr. Tyrrell has found in Miss Johnson an admirable subject for this kind of work. At the same time, I know that Miss Johnson would be the last person to claim that her faculty is unique! Obviously what is now required is that many more experiments of this type should be carried out with other subjects and other operators, and perhaps with other types of apparatus, for a device which suits one subject may not suit another, and the personal element must always be considered in work of this kind.

THE EVIDENCE FOR TELEPATHY

Perhaps some of those who have not hitherto concerned themselves much with supernormal faculties may be encouraged by Mr. Tyrrell's results to give the matter more consideration, and with their help we may put behind us once for all the necessity of proving that telepathy occurs, and pass on to a further study of its nature and implications.

THE PRESENT AND FUTURE
OF
CLASSICAL SCHOLARSHIP

by Professor J. A. K. THOMSON

THERE USED to be a controversy about the relative importance in education of Science and the Classics. It is now over, or audible merely as the distant and random gun of sullen retiring armies. There are two main reasons for this. One is that the quarrel came to be seen for what it was, stupid and unnecessary. The other reason is this: classical scholarship, which used to be an art, is becoming a science.

If this be news to most people, it is probably because scientists and scholars, although for different reasons, are both reluctant to admit the fact. The scholar still likes to think of himself as a literary character, while the man of science remains gravely doubtful if literature offers a field for methods which he would regard as strictly scientific.

Yet the analytic and comparative study of language, palaeography, epigraphy, archaeology, the study of ancient art in bronze and clay and marble, numismatology—all these, with parallel and subordinate matters, are now pursued by methods at least as scientific as those achieved in certain branches of psychology, let us say, or in sociology or political economy, which receive or assume the title of sciences. The ministers of “pure” science—the mathematician, the physicist, the astronomer—may smile a little ironically; but if political economists or the people who write about money do, it can only be out of

ignorance. Between these, indeed, and the scholar the chief difference would probably be found to lie in the far greater importance attached by the latter to the verification and the exact statement of evidence. For the mathematicians, on the other hand, every scholar has an instinctive respect; for he also is in his way a purist. A solecism has upon him the same effect that a piece of false reasoning has upon the mathematician. A misused word, an ungrammatical sentence, a false quantity, a mistaken meaning—such are the crimes of the scholar's world.

Such are or such were his crimes. But of recent years there has arrived a great and significant change both in the extent and in the nature of his activity. It used to be thought enough for a scholar to expound a text. (The exposition might, of course, involve a fresh attempt at settling and correcting the text itself.) This is what Porson did; this in the main is what was done by Munro and Jebb. Even then Munro's discussion of the effect of Lucretius upon Newtonian physics was regarded by the more austere as a mere dragging in of strictly irrelevant matter; while by some of his older contemporaries Jebb was criticized for asking too often not merely what Sophocles said, but what was the intellectual process which led him to say it. Jebb, in fact, was a pioneer, interesting himself not only in the finer points of language, but in the social and spiritual "background" of his author. For all that, everything in Jebb is related to what he reads, with a view to the better understanding of it as literature. Now, however, such an approach to antiquity is coming to be thought less and less necessary. The literary scholar is rare and even a little suspect. What you have are authorities on the fresco-painting

of the Minoans, the ritual of Eleusis, the coinage of Sicily, the pottery of Corinth, the phonology of Ionic, the inscriptions of Magna Graecia, the trade-routes of the Roman Empire, the principles of ancient music—and they are all admirably and intimidatingly scientific. They also tend to have, some of them, the ordinary scientific man's distrust of the literary type of scholar—the “mere,” the “verbal” scholar—as of one whose business is rather with words than things. As if words were somehow less “real” than things.

All along the line the specialist is winning. Less than a century ago Schliemann, an amateur of genius, excavated Troy. His method was to dig a great hole in the site, with the result that the contents of one stratum were apt to fall into the next. Later Dörpfeld exposed and explained the architecture which Schliemann had overlooked or misunderstood. Now Blegen is working on the site, and even at this time of day making discoveries. For archaeology has become a science.

When Birch in 1873 published his useful and excellent book on Ancient Pottery he was content, as in fact even later authorities were content, to classify vases in quite a general way as “black-figured” and “red-figured” and the like. Now Beazley will tell you who was the potter of a cup and who its painter; and very likely, if the vase be in fragments, he will tell you that one piece of it is in the Hermitage and another in the museum at Lecce. Perhaps there is only one man who can do a thing like that, but that it should be possible at all proves how exact has become the study of Greek ceramics.

Much less than a century ago eminent scholars,

editing an ancient text, were content to rely on what they considered the best manuscript, correcting it by conjecture or by means of variant readings found in other manuscripts. Now Lindsay can often tell you of a Latin *codex*, when and where it was written, how and how often it has been corrected, its relation to other *codices*—in a word, its whole private and family history. He can do this because palaeography is now as scientific as botany.

One could multiply examples equally striking from every branch of classical study. What conclusion are we to draw? That scholarship in the old sense is dead? The mere fact that it now has so many branches means that nobody can master them all; perhaps nobody can really master more than one. If Bentley could revisit the earth, nothing would astonish him more than this, for Bentley took all classical knowledge to be his province. In his day it was just possible to do that; now even Bentley could not begin to do it. Or take Gibbon. Wilamowitz once said of him—not by way of disparagement, for who could disparage Gibbon?—that he differed from an historian of to-day in not criticizing his sources. He finds a statement in, let us say, Ammianus Marcellinus, and makes use of it; he does not in general ask what was Ammianus's authority for the statement and what was the credibility of this authority. We know better than that now. For Gibbon we have substituted the Cambridge Mediaeval History, a composite structure, a monument of accurate industry—but not, on the whole, a monument of literary skill.

There is no reason at all why the technical expert should not write well. He often does. He often writes better than the man who professes to take a wider

or more artistic survey, for it is unhappily true that those who write on literary subjects are sometimes themselves not rich in literary graces. But the combination of a gift for research with a gift for expression is rare, and it is difficult to retain as research becomes more extensive and minute. Hence scholarship tends to change its character. The classical scholar has (with notable exceptions) ceased to be a writer; he has ceased to be a critic of literature; he is ceasing to be even a critic of language. He works now with the spade, the "rubbing," the magnifying glass, the photograph. He feels nothing but contempt for the non-specialist who uses the expert's results to support some wider and vaguer hypothesis of his own. His annoyance is human and natural; but there is a dilemma involved. It is highly important that the charlatan or the half-educated popularizer should not steal, and misrepresent in stealing, the discoveries of the specialist. But if the expert will not or cannot state his results except in a form which is intelligible only to other experts in that particular line—what then? Scholarship ceases to have anything to do with literature as such. It loses all unity and becomes a heap of unrelated specialisms.

Is this a real dilemma or not? You may argue that it is not. You may say that scholarship has nothing to do with archaeology and numismatics and similar studies on the one hand, and has nothing to do with literary criticism on the other, the business of the scholar (you may say) being merely to establish the text of ancient authors. But this clearly is too narrow a view. An editor is bound to accept light upon his author, from whatever quarter it may come; and who will deny that light has been shed by archaeologists

and students of comparative religion—to name no others—upon many passages of ancient literature? To put it in a more challenging way, who will maintain that Sir James Frazer or Sir Arthur Evans is not a scholar in as genuine a sense as any purely textual critic? Against literary criticism the case may seem much stronger. In reality it is even weaker. Nobody except a fool reads a book without forming some opinion about its literary qualities. It may be a good opinion or a bad one, but, good or bad, he is bound to form it. The fact that the really first-rate critic of literature, as Mr. Housman, following Tennyson, has observed, is rarer than the poet, is quite without relevance. Great moral philosophers are perhaps as rare as great literary critics. Is the ordinary man, then, not to think about his duty to his fellow-men on the ground that he is not likely to say anything new concerning it? Think about it he must. In the same way we simply cannot help forming literary judgments, and it is of vital importance that these should be the best at which we can arrive. The value, in a sense the very existence, of the classics depends upon their interpretation and reinterpretation as literature. Only petulance or obscurantism can deny that. What may be denied is that anyone is bound to publish his literary opinions. But then neither is anyone bound to read them.

Can we find any common ground at all? This perhaps. Every classical scholar is nurtured on tradition. It is not merely that he inherits antiquity; his very instruments of research have been perfected by a long succession of exact and subtle students. New instruments may be discovered and old discarded, but they are discovered or discarded as the result of

a continuous process of investigation. The old knowledge is embodied in the new. It is not, as so often happens in the natural sciences, made obsolete by the new, except where it can be shown that earlier scholars were misled upon a point of fact. In any full commentary upon an ancient author 90 per cent or more of the information is derived from previous editions. The ancient language is there; you cannot alter that. The ancient grammar and syntax are there; the ancient text is there. You cannot seriously alter these. The main business of the scholar must always be transmission. If he is not like a scientist interested only in results, still less is he like an artist creating something out of nothing.

Yet in some degree he must be both one and the other, and it is just this combination (so far, of course, as it is possible, and within the limits of his special province) that makes the true scholar. He will proceed *sine ira et studio* to the strictest investigation of the facts before him by the most accurate instruments of research at his disposal, but even in doing so he will display a feeling for words and a skill in his own use of them which is necessary—not an added grace but an indispensable necessity—if his criticism of ancient literature as literature is to have much value. It is in this latter respect that he differs most clearly from the historian, whose business also is transmission. What the historian transmits in the main are events; what the scholar transmits in the main are words. The historian need not be a verbal critic, but the scholar must.

Johnson in the Preface to his Shakespeare wonders whence “the acrimony of a scholiast can naturally proceed. The subjects to be discussed by him are

of very small importance; they involve neither property nor liberty; nor favour the interest of sect or party. The various readings of copies, and different interpretations of a passage, seem to be questions that might exercise the wit without engaging the passions." Johnson understood human nature too well to feel the wonder he expresses; the passage has in it something of irony. In any case, he can partly be answered. The points in dispute between "scholiasts" may be small, but the issues at stake are great—the issue between knowledge and ignorance, the issue between accuracy and inaccuracy. On these issues a man will feel strongly in proportion as he has a bent for science or for scholarship, although he need not express his feelings, as some scholars have done and do, with the intemperance of a malignant demoniac.

But the scholar has always been something more than the scholiast, as Johnson himself, who loved the name of scholar, would have been the first to protest. He certainly would have thought it odd on the part of posterity hardly to regard himself in the light of a scholar at all. Yet something like this is what has happened. The verdict of, I suppose, many qualified judges to-day would be something like this. "In virtue of the Dictionary we must allow Johnson to have been a scholar, but a great scholar we cannot, in virtue of his technical deficiencies, honestly call him." Perhaps he despised the scholiast too much. On the other hand, something rises in protest within us when the scholiast thus puts him in his place. The true judgment surely is that Johnson was a great scholar in spite of his technical deficiencies; great because of the *quality* of his work in verbal criticism.

It would be possible to take an even bolder line.

What, it might be asked, are we to say of a man like Gray? Gray was a better classical scholar, at any rate a better Greek scholar, than Johnson ever made himself. But people think they have said enough when they have called him a scholarly poet. Then there is Milton. He is allowed even by classical scholars to be one of themselves, and his name appears in histories of scholarship. But is that all they have to say about Gray and Milton? Are the *Elegy* and *Paradise Lost* just "scholarly poems"? Surely what we have in them is something more than is implied in a phrase like that. What we have *is* scholarship—scholarship distilled into poetry.

The retort is obvious: the business of the scholar is with scholarship, not with any distillation of it. Well, it would no doubt be ridiculous to deny that Milton was something more than a scholar. But it would not be so ridiculous as to maintain that he was a scholar when he was writing Latin, and not a scholar when he was writing English, verses. This, perhaps, no one would say; but something very like it is almost constantly implied or tacitly assumed. The root of the fallacy is only too evident—people have come to think of scholarship as something which exists independently of literature. That is the modern heresy, and it is a very dangerous one. For, of course, scholarship subsists, and can only subsist, upon literature. This is not to call it a parasite. If it draws its life from literature, there is some service it can give in requital—a service which, in the case of an ancient and difficult language, may be important or even essential. On the other hand, if you divorce scholarship from literature, if you make it purely a science, what you are doing is this. You are applying to literature tests to which

as an art it does not and cannot conform. You are dooming your own method to sterility.

For scholarship is not learning; it is the application of learning to literature. True learning in some important subject is one of the rather few things in life that one can admire without reservation. But the mistaken application of knowledge is far worse than useless. What has been imaginatively conceived can be only imaginatively understood. It is the privilege and the highest function of the scholar to make a new revelation to the world of old wisdom and old beauty; beauty, of which it has been said that its loveliness increaseth, and wisdom, which is something more than the truth of the changing hour.

A restatement of this kind must exact from him who would make it not merely the exact knowledge of the specialist, but besides that, and in a manner over that, the skill of the literary artist. In other words, scholarship is an art rather than a science. To draw out the meaning, still more to draw the veil of difficult or allusive speech from the beauty of an ancient play or poem is a very different thing from pointing to a sunset or even to a statue. If this were not so, scholarship would be worse than unnecessary. Perhaps some self-illuminated spirits think it is. At least, one often finds it said or written that the great masterpieces of literature speak for themselves. They speak for themselves, but only to those who have ears to hear; to the rest they are dumb. This is, of course, in a special sense true of the ancient classics. Clearly it will not do for the man who reads Aeschylus in translation to say that the *Agamemnon* speaks for itself. To him at any rate it speaks through a scholar. The truth is that all literature, even the simplest, requires in the

mind of the reader a certain preparation or predisposition which is itself the result of a process of education, not necessarily bookish. What we have got to do is to give the masterpiece the chance to speak for itself. And this is just the business of the scholar.

How, then, shall he best perform it? It is a question that every scholar must answer for himself. He will find by experiment what method suits him best; and then he had better steadfastly follow that. He may use translation or criticism or exposition or a combination of any or all of these. It matters nothing so long as he does not merely tell us what his author says, but lets us see and feel what he means. It may be that to expect this is to expect too much. Doubtless many people, scholars themselves, would say that if a scholar does something to establish the text of his author it is all you have a right to demand from him. But in practice it will be found that even this is not possible unless the textual critic profoundly understands not only the characteristics of his manuscripts but the style and thought of his author. Besides, scholarship has always been held to involve the exegesis as well as the confirmation of its texts. A false modesty, in scholarship as in other pursuits, will produce nothing in the end but a disastrous compromise. Where learning is without imagination, or deliberately excludes it as an element of danger, the result at best is a respectable pedantry. It is not by their historical interest (although that is extreme), it is by their power upon the human imagination that the ancient classics survive and will survive. In that power the scholar finds his main pleasure and justification; and his main concern is with that.

It is probable enough that the type of scholarship

here outlined as suggested is characteristically English. There has, at any rate, been always a tradition among us that the scholar should also to the best of his ability be a writer; and English scholars have, in fact, very often possessed literary gifts. That is a tradition worth clinging to. No doubt it exacts a price. It does, to use a phrase of the economists, tend to reduce output, when a scholar will not publish results, which might be important, because he is not satisfied with the form in which they are cast. It tends to limit the scholar himself. For if, in your admirable resolve not to fling the unripened fruits of your study in the face of the public, you work a little material over and over again, it leaves you no time to explore a wider field of knowledge in which alone that material is seen in its full significance. No doubt it is better to speak of what one knows than to make a vain pretence of being "exhaustive." Yet in many matters exhaustiveness is necessary, especially perhaps in scholarship. Again, the maxim that every author is his own best commentator loses all its soundness and most of its value if you regard your author as his only commentator. The obvious truth is that the student can never know too much, for he never knows what unexpected fact may illuminate his subject. Thus, while his innate distrust of discursiveness is one of the best points about the English scholar, it becomes a weakness when it leads him to refuse fair consideration to any proposed extension of his studies. Of course, there is a risk involved. It need not be denied that the sudden opening of new windows in the student's "pensive citadel" by very remarkable discoveries and by new investigations that a few years ago hardly seemed possible may to some extent have dazzled the most eager gazers. But it is

better, after all, to be dazzled than to pull down the blinds. Gradually things will be seen in their true colours and proportions; and then the new knowledge will enrich the old.

What, then, emerges from this discussion? One thing, or one thing principally: that scholarship has a dual nature. It is both an art and a science; an art based upon science. To divorce one from the other is fatal. The danger of such a divorce is serious, and it is increasing. As the study of ancient language, ancient thought, ancient ruins gets more exact and minute, the harder it becomes to keep up with it all. It may be that in the future there will be no room in scholarship except for the specialist, for the man who knows everything about some author or portion of an author, and very little about anything else. It is a disquieting prospect. Should it be realized, it will mean (so far as one can see) the submergence of ancient literature as a living influence upon modern. No doubt there are people who would welcome such a result. But no scholar could be expected to welcome it, and it is of scholars I am writing. It is their business, if they are to hold their citadel, to reinterpret the classics to their own generation in the light of living thought and with the skill of the literary artist.

It is because Murray has done this that his work has been so valuable.

THE GREEK DOOR TO THE STUDY OF HISTORY

ESSAY A. J. TOYNBEE

THERE ARE several possible approaches to the study of history because there are several alternative stimuli, any one of which may awaken the historical sense that is probably latent in every human mind.

One stimulus which may turn us into historians is the direct personal experience of some public event—a religious or political or economic revolution—which strikes us at once as being almost certainly destined to have a profound effect upon the future, and which at the same time can also be seen to have roots in the past that are correspondingly deep. This is the stimulus which was the making of some of the greatest of the Greek historians. Thucydides was inspired to write by the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, and was given the opportunity when the fortune of war provided him with the enforced leisure of exile. Polybius was inspired by the spectacle of the conquest of the world by Rome within the span of half a century; and he, too, was forcibly provided with the leisure to write, thanks to the epilogue to that dreadful story—an epilogue which included Polybius' own deportation to Italy as a political hostage and his eventual exclusion, once for all, from an active political career through the annihilation of his native Achaean commonwealth. Procopius, again, was inspired by the wars of Justinian: a misguided attempt to repay the barbarians in their own coin, for which the Hellenic World, *in articulo mortis*, scraped together and squandered its last resources of social energy. These three great Greek historians all

thus entered into the study of history through the same door; but there is another door, to which the key is not given by any direct experience of contemporary public events.

—This alternative approach lies through an initiation into the language and literature and history of some culture which is not our own, yet which is related to our own in a close enough degree for us to be able to make ourselves at home in it. In looking for examples of famous historians who have responded to this alternative stimulus, we shall find ourselves drawing blank if we call the roll of the Greek historians again. It is true that one of the greatest of them, Herodotus, was inspired in part by the exciting experience of becoming personally acquainted with several cultures that were non-Hellenic; yet, although the spectacle of the civilizations of Egypt and Babylonia and Syria and Iran was vastly stimulating to Herodotus' intellectual curiosity, the interest was always external, because, for him, these cultures remained exotic; and this was inevitable in view of the relation into which Herodotus saw these alien cultures entering with his own native Hellenism. This relation was one, not of give and take, but of collision and conflict. The theme of Herodotus' work is the impact of a united East upon Hellas and the feat of the Hellenes in standing up triumphantly to this tremendous ordeal. But there is, of course, a very different relation in which two civilizations may stand to each other. A foreign culture may play a part in our life, not because it has attacked our own society and threatened it with extinction, but because it stands at the back of our own civilization and has bequeathed to us some of the most precious things in our social heritage.

This is, as we know, the relation in which the Hellenic culture stands to our present civilization in the Western World; and we can at once call up the names of several great modern Western historians—a Gibbon and a Grote and a Mommsen—whose stimulus has been given to them by this relation between our own Western Civilization and Hellenism. Is there nothing in the background of Hellenic history which might have done for Herodotus what Hellenism has done for, let us say, Eduard Meyer? The Minoan-Mycenaean culture seems to answer to this prescription more or less. For the Greeks, however, the Minoan-Mycenaean past was evidently very much dimmer than the Graeco-Roman past is for us. Only the tail-end of this ancient history seems to have been remembered by the Greeks at all, and even this only in the folk tales about a labyrinth which was perhaps the counterpart of the Colosseum and a King Minos who was perhaps the Caesar-Augustus and an Agamemnon who was perhaps the Theodoric of this antecedent society. Moreover, even these memories—as enshrined in the legends of Minos and Daedalus—are as misty as our own medieval legends about Alexander the Great or Virgil. Our latter-day Western archaeologists have recovered a far more exact and detailed knowledge of that pre-Hellenic world than was inherited from it by Thucydides or by Plato. In fact, the link of tradition between the Minoans and the Hellenes seems to have been singularly weak. The reason for this weakness will be considered at a later point in this essay. For the moment, we may simply take note of the fact that we ourselves have an advantage over the Greeks in commanding—as an alternative to that approach to history which lies through contemporary

events—another approach which is opened up by a familiarity with an antecedent culture which is distinct from our own without being entirely alien from it.

This advantage—in our fortunate possession of which we differ from the Greeks—is something that we enjoy in common with certain of our non-Western contemporaries; for we Westerners are not the only people in the world to-day who have an heirloom of “classics.” The Greek and Latin classics which we possess here in the West have their counterparts in the Chinese classics of the Far East and in the Sanskrit classics of India and in the Arabic and Persian classics of the Islamic World. These are true parallels, for in all these other societies the inherited classics have enriched a latter-day civilization with a wealth of language and literature, of thought and feeling, of beauty and knowledge which manifestly corresponds to the wealth which the Greek and Latin classics have conferred upon us. A classical heritage thus proves to be a common possession of the great living civilizations of the present age, by contrast with the relative cultural poverty of those antecedent civilizations, of an earlier age, which had to start life without this inherited endowment.

It is the more curious to observe that, at the present moment, the living civilizations seem all to be of one mind in their eagerness to throw this wealth away—to close, with a contemptuous bang, the magic door which offers us an entry, if only we will leave it open, into the kingdom of the history of mankind. Before we finally turn the key and slide the bolts, should we not be wise to stay our hand and set the door ajar again and take one more peep into the garden from which we are perhaps rather wantonly shutting ourselves out?

Surely this is no more than bare common sense; and if this act of prudence has to be made fashionable by somebody setting an example, there can be no doubt that it is we, in the West, who are called upon to take the initiative; for we lack one plausible excuse for "scrapping" the classics which most of our non-Western contemporaries can put forward.

A young Cantonese or Gujarati or Smyrniot is bound to ask himself very searchingly to-day whether the continued cultivation of his own traditional classical culture—the Chinese or the Sanskrit or the Arabic and Persian, as the case may be—may not be a spiritual luxury in which he can no longer afford to indulge. When his own modern vernacular culture is failing him by apparently proving inadequate for the solution of the urgent problems presented by a new social environment, what sense can there be (he may ask himself) in attempting to preserve the still more antiquated culture upon which his own is founded? For the sake of self-preservation, ought he not rather to concentrate all his spiritual energies upon the formidable task of adapting himself to the requirements of the modern Western Civilization which has now broken into his world and is so ruthlessly turning it upside down? This present Western complication in the life of all the living non-Western societies makes it difficult for any of their members to see the question of the classics in true perspective or to find the right answer to it. But we in the West are uniquely fortunate in being free from this disturbing factor; for our civilization, alone among the surviving civilizations, is still more or less of "a going concern." It is still living and growing—not, alas, tranquilly or harmoniously, but at any rate without being shattered by the impact

of any alien civilization of greater aggressive power. The aggressive civilization which is turning the rest of the world upside down to-day is ours; and, inasmuch as the Greek classics are part of our Western cultural heritage, these Greek classics are contributing, at least indirectly, to the impetus behind this dynamic spiritual movement which, for good or evil, is sweeping through the whole of mankind in our time. In such circumstances can we Westerners really afford to deprive ourselves lightheartedly of a spiritual heirloom which is manifestly one of the sources of our own civilization's present potency? Ought we blindly to yield to the prevailing impulse to "scrap" the past and make "a clean cut" with it and proclaim the beginning of a new era?

In this connection we may observe that our own generation is by no means the first to have been attracted by this particular vein of iconoclasm. Our post-War Fascists in Italy, who prefer to take the year of Signor Mussolini's march on Rome, instead of the year of the Nativity of Christ, for their parochial Year One, are consciously imitating their Jacobin predecessors in France. And the Americans who date the beginning of history from the invention of the cotton-gin or the steam-engine, or from the Declaration of Independence, or from the crossing of the Atlantic by Christopher Columbus, are unconsciously following in the footsteps of those Greek historians who equated the beginning of history with the crossing of the Hellespont by Alexander the Great, or those Greek cities which dated their official documents by the Seleucid era.

Now these Greek precedents suggest that the impulse to make a new start in history may be a sign of

something being amiss with the body social. When an historian or a community proclaims that the past is not worth remembering, and that a dazzling present deserves to occupy the whole of our attention and enthusiasm, this iconoclast may not in reality be living in that "glorious hour of crowded life" to which he is implicitly laying claim. It is at least equally probable that he has recently got himself into a scrape and is now earnestly hoping that he can induce everybody to forget about it. This was certainly the case in the Greek instance which we are considering; for the Greek world which proclaimed that nothing worth remembering had happened before Alexander's crossing of the Hellespont was a world which had, in fact, been tragically destroying itself, through its own folly and wickedness, during the immediately preceding century, which had opened with the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. And the verdict of history has not in the end upheld the opinion of those latter-day Greeks who asserted that Alexander's crossing of the Hellespont was the first event in history that was worth recording. What the Greeks achieved in the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. seems to-day to be of considerably greater importance and value for us than what they achieved in the third century or in the second; we consider Herodotus and Thucydides to have been greater historians than Callisthenes or Nicolaus of Damascus, and Athens and Sparta to have been greater cities than Laodicea on the Lycus or Gadara beyond Jordan. In the perspective which is given by the passage of time, the post-Alexandrine Greek "moderns" can be seen to have "given themselves away."

✓ This Greek parallel has a plain moral for us "moderns" of the West, who to-day are as busy as

beavers at the work of diminishing our own heritage and contracting our own horizon. In our world in our day there is a strong impulse to depreciate and ignore everything that is not "modern" and not "national"; and there is a tendency to interpret each of these terms in a narrower and narrower sense, until "modern" has come to mean the mood of a single generation, and "national" to be bounded by the squirting-range of the parish pump. Both in the time-dimension and in the space-dimension we seem to have been doing our utmost to make the walls of our prison house close in upon us, until we have very nearly succeeded in immuring ourselves alive. How long can we manage to breathe in this self-imposed mental Black Hole? And what motive is inducing a hedonistically minded society, such as ours is, to subject itself to the cramping torments of an Indian fakir? The underlying motive undoubtedly is an egotism that has gone mad. We have become so infatuated with the sacred task of "self-expression" that we are inclined to repudiate all spiritual wealth that is not of our own immediate personal creation. We prefer to condemn ourselves to spiritual penury rather than to enjoy spiritual treasures for which we are beholden to others, whether these others be our forebears or our contemporaries. Now this crack-brained egotism is the very antithesis of that reverence for the fruit of other men's souls which is implied in a cultivation of the classics. In the light of our own present state of mind, we can understand why it is that the classics are now out of fashion; but if we judge this state of mind to be contemptible and disastrous—as we can hardly help judging it to be when once we have looked at it honestly and squarely—then we are almost bound to accept the corollary

that the cultivation of the classics is a tradition to which we ought now to cling more closely than ever before, in the conviction that the spiritual value of the classics has never before been so great for us as it is to-day.

We may ask ourselves next why it is that this *furor* of egotism has come over us at this particular moment in our Western history; and we may tentatively seek an excuse for our present unlovely state of mind by pleading that our passionate self-absorption is due to a consciousness of having arrived at the critical stage of a momentous historical journey. Since our Western Civilization first began, some twelve or thirteen centuries ago, to emerge out of the dark age that had followed the fall of its Hellenic predecessor, we have been gradually feeling our way across unexplored country towards an unknown destination; and during all this time we have managed to make progress without running into disaster. We have eluded the skulking dragons and have broken out of the primeval forest into the noontide sunlight, and now this light is revealing to us the disconcerting fact that we have come to a supremely perilous parting of the ways—a place in our path where we must either scale a precipitous height or else hurl ourselves down into the abyss over a yawning precipice. When we have arrived at this pass, what eyes can we be expected to have for anything but this formidable “climber’s pitch” that lies immediately ahead of us? Are we to make our fall certain by letting our attention wander off to the distant trail of such strangers as “the ancient Greeks”? This is our excuse, and on first thoughts it may seem plausible; but on second thoughts it becomes evident that the plea will not bear examination.

What, after all, will a prudent climber do when he

comes to a "pitch" which looks as though it might be beyond his powers? Surely, before he risks his life by trying his luck haphazard, he will cast about him to find a guide? Is there not perhaps some more experienced climber, within hailing distance, who has mastered the art of negotiating difficulties of the kind, even if it has never actually come his way to grapple with this particular crag? Would it not be well to take his counsel on the sleight of hand and foot that will carry the climber to the summit, and also on the mistakes that may send him whirling headlong to destruction? And what about those bones that lie bleaching at the foot of the precipice, and the tattered parchment in the clutch of the skeleton fingers? Perhaps the faded letters may prove to spell out the pathetic last will and testament of one climber who suffered a fatal fall, but who found time and spirit, while he was dying his lingering death on the spot where his body came to rest, for jotting down a warning for the benefit of some other adventurous explorer whom Chance might lead to the same perilous pass in times to come. Just such a testament has, in fact, been preserved, for our benefit, in the record of its own life and death that has been bequeathed to us by Hellenism; and the more selfishly we are absorbed in the problems of our own danger and our own destiny to-day, the more eagerly we ought to pore over a *dossier* which may indeed be fragmentary and obscure, but which is still the nearest thing to a chart of our own future life-course that Providence has vouchsafed to us.

But how can the future be revealed in the history of a civilization which reached and passed its *floruit* more than two thousand years ago, before the beginning of the Christian era? How such a thing can be

possible was made clear to the writer of this essay at the outbreak of the modern Western Great War of 1914-18.

During the years immediately before this catastrophe overtook our generation, I had been making a fairly close study of the Greek historian Thucydides; and I had imagined that I had mastered this Greek classic more or less, so far as it might be possible for a modern Western scholar, born nearly two thousand three hundred years after Thucydides' death, to enter into this "ancient" author's thoughts and feelings. But in 1914, when our own thoughts were convulsed and our feelings stirred to the depths by the direct experience of a supreme calamity in which our own generation was now caught, I suddenly perceived a number of unsuspected shades of meaning in Thucydidean phrases—*παρασκευή*, meaning "preparedness," and the like—and became sensitive to surprising tones of feeling in famous passages which I had previously thought of as being carved in cold marble and not as being incarnate in palpitating flesh. And then I realized that Thucydides had trodden already the path which was opening at this very moment before our own feet. The war which may prove to be a fatal turning-point in history—Thucydides had lived through that; and he had realized that he was living through it; and he had expressed, in a *κτῆμα εἰς αἰεί*, the experiences and thoughts and feelings which, for our generation in 1914, were present and future. Thucydides had lived to look back upon the end of the Great War—an end which, for our generation, was still shrouded in darkness in 1914. And now, if Thucydides was thus revealed to be "future," and not "past," for a Westerner born in A.D. 1889, how much further

forward into our modern Western future must extend the long Greek series of Thucydides' successors—from Plato, the giant with the vulture gnawing at his breast in the first of the post-war generations, to Julian, the leader of the latest of the forlorn hopes. The death of Julian is separated from the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War by a time-span of nearly eight hundred years. In the *êthos* of "the Apostate" and his generation, might it be possible to catch, by distant analogy, some glimmer of a glimpse of the future of our own Western Civilization in about the year A.D. 2700?

Without letting ourselves be drawn into an idle pursuit of fantasies, we may perhaps take this cue so far as to accustom ourselves to thinking of the Greeks as being philosophically our contemporaries and only being our predecessors in a trite chronological sense which has no philosophical significance. The ten or twenty or thirty societies that have represented, up to date, the very recently created new species of society that we call "Civilization" are, in fact, to be thought of, in relation to one another, as being like so many brothers and sisters in the same family. In one of those large families that were reared in nineteenth-century England, and that are being brought up still in twentieth-century Quebec, it is perfectly possible to conceive of older children growing up and dying before some of their younger brothers and sisters have been born; but we would not classify the children of the same parents as belonging to different generations just because their lives did not overlap chronologically. They are still brothers and sisters who have grown up in the same family circle; and, in view of this common origin and common environment, the life-history of the elder brother has a most pertinent bearing upon

the future of the younger brother who has been born after his elder brother's death and who himself is still in the land of the living.

What, then, are the chief points of interest which the history of our own Greek elder brothers has to offer to us? As we study their history with this question in our minds, we shall admire the Greeks for compassing their vast spiritual achievements without the aid—or encumbrance—of the material means which we ourselves command *ad nauseam*. We shall sympathize with them for having been starved, in the springtime of their growth, of certain spiritual consolations and hopes which, in the course of their decline and fall, they eventually acquired from strangers and have so been able to bequeath to us; and we shall put our finger upon a fatal aberration to which the downfall of the Greeks can be traced, and which may—if we have fallen into them likewise—be preparing our own downfall for us in our Western World in this very generation.

The admirable feature of the Greek Civilization which we in the modern West ought most deeply to take to heart, is its thorough independence of that elaborate apparatus—refrigerators and luxury-liners and shoe-shiners' throne-like chairs—which the Greek language dismisses contemptuously as “stage-properties” or *χορηγία*. In our twentieth-century world the only civilized people who can venture to challenge comparison with the Greeks in this important matter of material simplicity, are the Hindus; and even the Hindu Society to-day is being infected with the Western virus of “consumption-mindedness.” In his retreat at Sabarmati the Mahatma Gandhi may still be striving to philosophize as starkly as Diogenes in his tub; but a few miles off, round Ahmadabad, the

new cotton-mills, equipped with the latest machinery from Lancashire, are feverishly spinning and weaving profits which a rising Gujarati bourgeoisie will be sorely tempted to spend in our vulgar Western bourgeois manner. In a world that is so rapidly being Westernized in every longitude and latitude, even India would be wise to put her pride in her pocket and to fortify her own threatened tradition of material simplicity by fixing her eye upon the shining example of the Greeks.

The spiritual treasure which we have inherited from the Greeks is, of course, Christianity; a Syrian gospel which has come to us through a Greek medium. Paradoxically, this Hellenized Christian tradition is the most vital of the links between the Greeks and us, though in Greek eyes Christianity was not a native Hellenic growth, but a late exotic graft upon a withering Greek stem. Nevertheless, it is thanks to this exotic religious link that the Greek culture to-day means so much more to us than the Minoan culture ever meant to the Greeks. A higher religion, inherited from a Minoan past, is the thing that is most conspicuously lacking in the Greeks' start in life, by contrast with our own. This failure of the Minoan Civilization to bequeath anything like the Christian heritage to its Hellenic successor seems to be established beyond question. One of the most convincing pieces of evidence is the apparently deliberate invention of a brand-new higher religion, to fill the spiritual vacuum in Hellenic life, in the sixth century B.C. By that time, when the Greeks were spiritually fast growing up, the vacuum was becoming intolerable; and Orphism seems to have been called into existence in order to meet this urgent need. Yet, perhaps just because of its

artificial origin, Orphism never succeeded in completely playing the rôle for which it had been cast. From first to last there was an awkward, unattractive element of "fanciness" or "crankiness" about it. And so, in spite of the Orphics' heroic effort to solve a perhaps insoluble problem, Hellenism, in its spring-time, never found itself in serene possession of a religion that was worthy of it.

This original religious poverty of Hellas produced certain momentous historical consequences which have a direct bearing upon our own problems in the Western World of these latter days. The first consequence was a precocious intellectual development; for the barbaric polytheism of the Achaeans, which became the official religion of the Greeks in default of any effective religious heritage of a higher order from the Minoans, was a spiritual anachronism which invited an intellectual revolt. The rationalistic *Aufklärung* in Hellas which began in the sixth century B.C. bears a remarkably close likeness to the corresponding movement in Iceland which began in the tenth century of the Christian era; and this latter movement was set against a similar barbaric religious background. In Iceland this intellectual precocity was overtaken by the triumph of Christianity; but in Hellas events took a different course because Orphism, which might conceivably have played the equivalent part, was unable—perhaps for the reason suggested above—to draw upon the necessary well-spring of spiritual vitality. Hence, in Hellas, a precocious rationalism continued unchecked upon its course and set itself the task of satisfying men's needs in every sphere of life. This Greek intellectual enterprise, however, was overweeningly ambitious; for there are some faculties in the soul which

cannot be fed on intellectual nourishment alone, or even on a combined diet of intellectual ambrosia and artistic nectar. The Greeks' hunger after a worthy object of worship remained unsatisfied in the age when the Greeks' intellectual and artistic powers were at their zenith; and a generation which had become too highly sophisticated to be able any longer to take at all seriously the disreputable Homeric pantheon now fell back in despair upon grimmer objects for an idolatrous worship. From Zeus the *roué* and Hephaestus the *cuckold* and Ares the *miles gloriosus*, the fifth-century Spartan transferred his hungry devotion to the city-state of Sparta, and the fifth-century Athenian his to the city-state of Athens. Therewith Athens became a Juggernaut and Sparta a Moloch. The idolized Greek city-states devoured their devotees. This state-worship was the spiritual disease that Hellenism died of.

The moral of this for us is too obvious to need pointing. The Greek door to the study of history manifestly brings us, when we open it, face to face with the most searching and urgent questions of our own destiny.

Professor Gilbert Murray's Works

Published by George Allen & Unwin Ltd

THE ORDEAL OF THIS GENERATION: the War, the League
and the Future

Halley Stewart Lecture, 1928. Third Impression.

Cloth 3s., Paper 2s.

A SURVEY OF RECENT WORLD AFFAIRS in "*Problems of Peace*,"
Eighth Series. 8s. 6d.

THE PROBLEM OF FOREIGN POLICY. 4s. 6d.

THE WAY FORWARD: Three Articles on Liberal Policy. 1s.

EAST AND WEST, with Rabindranath Tagore. 2s. 6d.

RELIGIO GRAMMATICI: The Religion of a "Man of Letters."
2s.

SATANISM AND THE WORLD ORDER. 2s.

THE STOIC PHILOSOPHY. *Conway Memorial Lecture.*
Out of print

ARISTOPHANES AND THE WAR PARTY: A Study in the Con-
temporary Criticism of the Peloponnesian War. 2s.

ANDROMACHE: A Play. *Third Edition. Cloth 3s., Paper 2s.*

ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES. *Ten Essays and Addresses, including*
"Religio Grammatici," "Satanism and the World
Order," "The Stoic Philosophy," "Aristophanes and the
War Party." 10s. 6d.

Translations

ARISTOPHANES: The Frogs. 24th Thousand

EURIPIDES: The Alcestis. 20th Thousand
Bacchae. 29th Thousand

Translations—(continued)

- EURIPIDES: Electra. 46*th* Thousand
 Hippolytus. 38*th* Thousand
 Iphigenia. 28*th* Thousand
 Medea. 33*rd* Thousand
 Rhesus. 9*th* Thousand
 Trojan Women. 39*th* Thousand
- SOPHOCLES: Oedipus, King of Thebes. 24*th* Thousand
- AESCHYLUS: Agamemnon. 12*th* Thousand
 Choëphoroe. 5*th* Thousand
 Eumenides. 4*th* Thousand
 Suppliant Women. 4*th* Thousand
 Prometheus Bound. 4*th* Thousand
 Seven against Thebes. 4*th* Thousand

Each play: Cloth 3s., Paper 2s.

In one volume

- THE ORESTEIA: Containing THE AGAMEMNON, THE
 CHOËPHOROE and THE EUMENIDES. 7*s.* 6*d.*
- THE ATHENIAN DRAMA: Volume 3, EURIPIDES, includ-
 ing THE FROGS, HIPPOLYTUS, and THE BACCHAE. 8*s.* 6*d.*